

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

A study of the relations between the Communist States and the Western Democracies from the end of World War II to the death of Stalin (1945-53)

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HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

by
Kenneth Ingram



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K. I.

I

INTRODUCTION

WHATEVER the manner in which posterity interprets the years immediately following the second world war, there can be no doubt that this period will be recognised as a time of acute tension and of critical historical significance. The tension arose from, and was expressed in, the hostile relationship between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union, together with its Communist allies. Accordingly, this record will be concerned exclusively with that relationship, tracing its development and endeavouring to explain its causes. My aim in attempting this task is to present an objective account and to avoid any personal bias in favour of one side or the other. The procedure which I shall adopt, in order to achieve my purpose as nearly as possible, will be to confine myself in the main to a factual survey, and chiefly in the closing pages to offer any conclusions and comments of my own. Where I quote official explanations given by the West in justification of its actions, I shall quote also the Communist view of those actions, and vice versa. My intention is to enable the reader to consider the arguments of both sides, so that, after my own summing-up, he can assess the measure of guilt attaching to both parties.

There is, however, one fundamental misconception which we should remove from our minds at the outset, since otherwise we are likely to approach our subject from a mistaken angle. It is commonly assumed in the West that although the Soviet Union had been viewed with suspicion from the 1917 Revolution onwards, a different attitude was adopted by the West once Russia had been forced into the second world war. Western statesmen, it is supposed, were willing to let bygones be bygones and to hold out the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union in the spirit of confidence and with the desire to

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co-operate whole-heartedly in the work of building up a peaceful world; it was the Moscow Government which spurned the olive branch and on which, therefore, the blame must wholly be laid for the subsequent deterioration of relations. This impression is well illustrated by the remarks made by Sir Winston Churchill in a speech delivered at Glasgow* immediately after President Eisenhower's peace pronouncement in the spring of 1953. "I could not understand," he said, "why Soviet Russia did not join with the Western Allies at the end of the war in seeking a just and lasting treaty of peace. Instead, this immense branch of the human family was led into the morasses of measureless ambition."

Such an interpretation of Soviet postwar policy is so largely an over-simplification that to rely upon it to any extent would greatly falsify our conclusions. It is true that at popular level Western opinion was animated by an enthusiastic admiration for the heroism of the Red Army and the Soviet civilian population. Had the Moscow Government accepted the British invitation to send representatives of their services to the Victory Parade, the Soviet contingent would probably have received a greater ovation from the London crowds than that accorded to any other military unit.† It is true also that at official level Western diplomacy, partly through the influence of President Roosevelt, made several important concessions to Soviet demands, as, for example, the agreement reached at Yalta that the Kurile Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and a lease of Port Arthur as a naval base should be ceded to the Soviet Union—in spite of the fact that the Atlantic Charter, which the Soviet Union had signed, declared that the signatories sought "no aggrandisement, territorial or other," and desired "to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Moreover, it must not be forgotten that in the closing stages of the war American forces were withdrawn from

* April 18th, 1953.

† The Soviet refusal to take part in these celebrations was announced by the British Government on May 27th, 1946.

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large areas of Germany which they had occupied, and also from parts of Czechoslovakia, so as to allow the Red Army to take possession.

We shall presently be examining in greater detail these and other instances showing the attempt of Western statesmen to preserve alliance with the Soviet Union, even at the cost of assenting to Soviet claims to a fuller extent than they would otherwise have wished. What, however, needs at once to be emphasised is that suspicion of Soviet intentions was a consistent underlying factor in the minds of Western statesmen, and that this suspicion was never removed either during or since the war. The Soviet leaders were well aware of this attitude, and reacted by remaining correspondingly suspicious of the West. We are not here discussing whether Western suspicions and Soviet counter-suspicions were justified or not. All that needs to be stated is that this mutual distrust was dominant throughout. It is not enough, indeed, to attribute Soviet obstruction to a spirit of 'measureless ambition.' The 'measureless ambition' was due, in part at least, to a belief that the West was so intensely critical and hostile towards the Communist system as to induce the Soviet Union to safeguard its frontiers by extending its territorial influence, by maintaining its war strength, by isolating itself from any schemes which might compromise its independence, and in general by treating the West as a potential enemy rather than an ally. Distrust breeds distrust, and though we may deplore the Soviet attitude and regard it as unreasonable, we cannot afford to leave out of account the influences which helped to produce it.

That the Western distrust of Russian integrity and condemnation of the Soviet system never abated during the war years can be confirmed by many incidents. As early as September 1941 Mr. Churchill was writing to President Roosevelt expressing his fear that the Russians might be harbouring the idea of making a separate peace, although he admitted that "nothing in [the Soviet ambassador's] . . . language warranted the assumption."*

* *The Grand Alliance.* (Cassell.)

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broadcast on the day of the German invasion of Russia Mr. Churchill, while welcoming as allies and promising unstinted support to Russia and the Russian people in their struggle against a common foe, was frank enough to interject the remark that "the Nazi régime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism." Those who urged that the Second Front should be opened in mid-Europe rather than in France admitted that the purpose of such a campaign would be to prevent the spread of Soviet power westwards. Again, in 1945 Mr. Churchill was urging General Eisenhower to stack the arms taken from the Germans so that they could be issued again to German soldiers to use against the Russians in case the Soviet advanced too far to the west. But the outstanding example of Western distrust—outstanding in the sense that it subsequently left a deeper impression on the Soviet mind than any other event—was the Western determination to confine the secret of the atom bomb to American and British laboratories. Whereas Great Britain could feel sufficient confidence in the United States to welcome the fact that it possessed this epoch-making weapon, both of them were determined not to assist the Soviet Union similarly to arm itself.

On the other hand it should be remembered that the Western Allies passed on to the Russians full information regarding radar and the invention of penicillin. Russian gratitude for penicillin was not very noticeably expressed. Indeed, the Russians subsequently claimed that penicillin was their own discovery!

Western fears of Soviet intentions were greatly intensified by the Moscow attitude regarding the Polish settlement. Sir Winston Churchill, writing about British-Soviet relations as early as 1941, stated that "the attitude of Russia to Poland lay at the root of our [British] relations with the Soviets."* It became evident after Yalta and before the Potsdam Conference that Moscow was determined that what became known as the 'Lublin Government' should be constituted as the Government of Poland with as little alteration in its constitution as possible. The Western Powers regarded this body as an entirely

* *The Grand Alliance.*

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unrepresentative puppet instrument which Stalin intended to impose on the Polish people, in defiance of all democratic principles. In addition, they were dismayed by the fact that the Soviet Union had transferred German territory east of the Oder and Neisse to Polish administration, even before the Potsdam Conference had met. In the Western view these activities showed that Russia was prepared to act with unscrupulous disregard of agreements already reached, whenever her own interests were concerned. We shall be referring to these developments in a later chapter, and at the moment it is only necessary to note that Western suspicions of Soviet designs before the end of the war were deepened more seriously over the Polish issue than on any other count.

The Soviet reaction to these suspicions and their consequences was that the West must be regarded as an enemy, once military hostilities had ceased. This conclusion was based not merely on incidents during the war but on memories of prewar Western policy—such as the Western support of anti-Soviet offensives by Czarist and Polish armies in the twenties, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Munich Conference, the refusals of Britain to agree to conferences of the anti-Fascist States in face of the Hitler menace, the readiness of Britain to declare war on the Soviet Union by sending an expeditionary force in 1940 to assist Finland. Moreover, the repeated Western expressions of detestation of the Communist system were accepted as proof that in its postwar relations with the West the Soviet Union would be dealing with Powers which would make use of any opportunity to weaken or destroy the Soviet régime. The Russians are extraordinarily sensitive to Western criticism, to the traditional Western view that the Russian Empire was, and the Soviet Union is, barbaric and semi-Asiatic. There has always been the element of an inferiority complex in the Russian attitude to European Powers. When Sir Stafford Cripps was Ambassador in Moscow he was continually writing home to urge that the utmost care should be taken by the B.B.C. not to offend Soviet susceptibilities by any disparaging remarks in reference to the Soviet conduct of the war. The very tone of voice of British announcers in recording

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events in the Russian theatre of operations was commented upon in Moscow circles and frequently resented.

The delay in opening the Second Front intensified Soviet suspicions of the West and led to bitter criticisms of Western strategy.* From the Western standpoint it was essential not to incur the disaster of another Dunkirk, and essential therefore not to launch the attack before preparations attending this gigantic undertaking were complete. The invasion had accordingly to be postponed until the summer of 1944, although at first Western assurances had allowed the Russians to suppose that it would take place at a much earlier date. From the Soviet standpoint the reasons advanced for this delay were only another way of saying that in the Western view it mattered comparatively little that Russia should continue to endure the full weight of the German divisions and that the colossal losses of the Red Army should be unrelieved, provided that American and British casualties were kept down to a minimum. This clash of interests would no doubt have occurred under any circumstances, but the bitterness of the Russians was fed by the belief that Western strategy desired to see the brunt of the fighting fall on the Soviet Union so that its strength in the postwar period might be diminished. Though we may consider this to be an unfair and ill-founded interpretation of Western motives, we must not forget that it was a point of view openly expressed in some quarters, and that Soviet statesmen were well aware of such utterances. Thus, two days after the German invasion of Russia, there appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* the following statement: "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is

* The chief of the United States Military Mission to U.S.S.R., General John R. Deane, remarks in his book, *The Strange Alliance*: "In August 1942, after the decision was made to invade Africa, Prime Minister Churchill made a special trip to Moscow to break the news to Stalin. The interview was stormy, to say the least!" See also Mr. Churchill's own account of the interview in *The Hinge of Fate*.

Stalin, however, paid generous tribute to the Normandy invasion-operation, once it had commenced. In an interview on June 13th, 1944, he said that history "knows of no other similar undertaking in the breadth of its conception, in its giant dimensions and the mastery of its performance."

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winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible." The author of this article was at the time a comparatively inconspicuous senator, but its significance is that he subsequently became the American President—Harry S. Truman.

So strained had Soviet-Western relations become in the closing stages of the war that in March 1945 Stalin announced to Roosevelt by cable his belief that the Nazi commander, Marshal Kesselring, had "agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the east," and that Britain and U.S.A. had promised in return "to ease for the Germans the peace terms." Churchill's reactions to this accusation were immediate. He "stressed the political importance of the capture of Berlin by Allied forces in order to counterbalance the prestige the Red Army was about to gain by capturing Vienna and overwhelming Austria. . . . Quite apart from the political advantage which the Russians would gain by capturing Berlin, Churchill feared that if priority were given to Bradley's drive for Dresden, Montgomery would not have the resources to reach the Baltic quickly and thus prevent the Russians 'liberating' Denmark, seizing the north German ports, and gaining an outlet to the Atlantic."*

We must rid ourselves altogether, therefore, of the impression that official relations between the West and the Soviet Union had become during the war wholly cordial, and that the subsequent Soviet attitude represented a sudden unexpected and unwarrantable change of policy. The misgivings of each of the parties towards the other had never subsided. So long as both the Soviet Union and the West were engaged in the task of overcoming a peril which mutually threatened them, this discord was expressed less openly than in former days. Once the war was at an end, the deep underlying estrangement was bound to be revealed more blatantly.

* *The Struggle for Europe*, by Chester Wilmot. (Collins.)

II

THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD

Disputes with the Soviet Union regarding Poland and Germany

THE Potsdam Conference, which opened on July 17th, 1945, may conveniently serve as the starting-point of this postwar survey. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were accompanied by Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin, as possible Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary—the results of the British General Election not then being known—and America was represented by its President, Mr. Truman. It was the first and only occasion on which Truman and Stalin were to meet.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies had markedly deteriorated since the previous conference at Yalta. In the Introduction mention has been made of the accusation levied by Stalin as to the alleged intentions of Britain and America to compromise with Germany, through Marshal Kesselring, over the terms of surrender. A further dispute had been raised over the American support of Argentina as a candidate for United Nations membership. America had assented to the Soviet claim that Byelorussia and the Ukraine should each be included, and had overcome the opposition of the South American republics to this proposal—but only on the condition that the United States should support the candidature of Argentina. When the United States did so Molotov at once objected that Argentina was a Fascist State and as such was disqualified. As the United States stood by the undertaking it had given to the South American republics, the Soviet Union then reacted by pressing for the immediate admission of Poland. The effect of this move was to bring to the surface fundamental divergences between the Soviet and the Western

interpretations of the Yalta decisions regarding Poland. Stalin admitted that a reconstruction of the Polish Government had been agreed, but argued that such reconstruction must accept the existing Government as its basis. Harry Hopkins was sent by President Truman to attempt to clear up these and other issues with Stalin, prior to the Potsdam Conference. Mr. Hopkins met with much apparent success in his negotiations, Stalin agreeing to the American definition of the principle of 'free elections' and 'civil rights' which were to be observed in Polish and other general elections. Stalin also assented to the inclusion of Mr. Mikolajczyk, who belonged to the 'London' group of Poles, and also (provisionally) of Professor Lange, of Chicago University, as part of the process of broadening the existing (Lublin) Polish Government. A more serious issue in connexion with Poland, however, had arisen from the fact that the Soviet Union had transferred on unilateral authority all German territory east of the rivers Oder and Neisse to Polish administration, although Section vi of the Yalta protocol provided that the Polish western frontiers were not to be fixed until the Peace Conference. Stalin justified these arrangements to Mr. Hopkins on the ground that they had been necessary to protect the Red Army lines of communication.

The impression produced in the minds of Western statesmen, accordingly, was that the Soviet Union was prepared to extend its influence by furthering the territorial objectives of its East European allies, on its own responsibility and without consulting or even attempting to obtain the consent of the Western Powers. This was an extremely grave conclusion to reach, since it was saying nothing less than that the Soviet Union could not be depended upon to act in co-operation with the other Powers, but would disregard the obligations of alliance and behave unscrupulously whenever it was believed that an advantage was to be gained by doing so. This impression was confirmed by an incident which had taken place, on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, in connexion with the Venezia Giulia. This peninsula, together with the port of Trieste, had been handed over to Italy under the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo. Under an agreement signed by Marshal

Tito and Field-Marshal Alexander in July 1944, the entire Venezia Giulia was to be placed under the control of the Allied Military Government. In a last attack on the retreating German Army, however, Yugoslav troops entered and proceeded to occupy this area (May 1st, 1945). The Western view was that this action had been taken with Soviet connivance, although there does not appear to be any positive evidence in favour of this supposition. The British sent an ultimatum to Marshal Tito, demanding an instant withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces. The Soviet Government took no steps to encourage the Yugoslavs to defy the ultimatum, and its silence was interpreted by the West as proof that a strong and uncompromising threat, backed by force, was the only way of dealing with Soviet tactics. A series of incidents between the United States and Soviet Military Commands led General Clay to draw the same moral. Russian opposition and aggression must be overcome by 'getting tough.'

It may be worth while to glance more closely at General Clay's account of the experiences which led him to form this view, since his conclusion was to form the pattern of the American attitude towards Russia on almost all subsequent occasions. General Clay is describing* the first meeting of the American and Soviet High Commands in Berlin, to draw up an agreement as to the administration of Germany under Allied occupation. He mentions that, although General Eisenhower was in a hurry to return to his post, there was a long delay caused by the Russians, which eventually was explained by the fact that one of the clauses in the draft would have necessitated the arrest of all Japanese citizens resident in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not yet at war with Japan. General Clay notes the legalistic care with which the Russians studied each sentence in the draft and its implications.

During these negotiations General Zhukov, on behalf of the Soviet Union, insisted that coal for Berlin should be made available from the Ruhr, and that food for West Berlin should be supplied from the Western zones. He pleaded that Russia and Eastern Germany were short of food. The Americans

* *Decision in Germany.* (Heinemann.)

eventually accepted responsibility for feeding the American sector of Berlin, despite the fact, General Clay observes, that no corresponding concession was offered by the Russians to the Western Allies.

When the advance guard of the American Army approached Berlin they were held up by the Soviet authorities, and a demand was presented that the force should be reduced to thirty-seven officers and 175 enlisted men. Although he knew of no justification for these numbers, Colonel Howley, in command of this force, to prevent further delays, assented.

The Soviet representatives, General Clay continues, had agreed to withdraw from the Berlin sector allotted to the Americans. But a series of conferences to arrange for this 'brought no results.' On July 4th General Parks instructed Colonel Howley to take over in the American sector at once, adding "but don't get into too much trouble" (with the Russians). This operation was carried out successfully. "The Soviet representatives, who rise late in the day, rushed to protest, but it was too late. We had learnt our first lesson in how to obtain Russian consent." The picture becomes clear. The Russian love of hard bargaining, of resort to what seemed to the American mind mere legalistic obstruction, and of resorting to tiresome red-tape interference, was maddening to the Anglo-American desire for swift action. It led to the Western interpretation that Soviet tactics were deliberately anti-co-operative and hostile. That interpretation was to colour all Western strategy towards the Russians in the future—certainly in the military field. But, however justified the interpretation might be, the root cause of these conflicts was a profound difference of temperament, and perhaps a fundamental failure of the West to understand the Russian temperament.

The Potsdam Conference

Six weeks before the Potsdam Conference (June 5th, 1945), the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union had signed a declaration regarding the occupation of Germany. Germany was to be divided into separate zones administered by each of these Powers, with Berlin as a fifth zone similarly partitioned.

An Allied Control Council, consisting of the military commanders of these Powers, was to have jurisdiction over all matters concerning Germany as a whole.

When the Conference assembled the American delegation at once urged that an attempt should be made to determine the procedure for negotiating the various peace treaties, and also to decide what political and economic principles should be observed in administering Germany. The Americans pressed further for a discussion on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, in the light of the agreements reached at Yalta regarding liberated territory. Yet another American proposal was that the problem of reparations should be re-explored, inasmuch as the Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow had failed to reach agreement on this issue.

As regards peace treaty procedure it was agreed to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers, representing the Five Powers, and that this Council should draft treaties for Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and ultimately Austria and Germany. Stalin was anxious that the Council should be confined to the Powers which had signed the terms of surrender of the particular ex-enemy State, subject to the provision that other members of the United Nations should be given opportunity to discuss and propose amendments to the drafts.

The American delegation suggested that the Council should be instructed to deal first with Italy, as this treaty was less likely to raise controversial issues. Stalin agreed, on condition that Britain and the United States should make certain concessions in respect of the Soviet claims for reparation. The work of drawing up treaties for the Balkan ex-enemy States, and for Finland and Hungary, was also to proceed without delay.

Some progress was made in drawing up plans for the administration of Germany, but the serious difficulty at once encountered was concerned with the question of partition and dismemberment. In the previous September President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had supported what came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan, under which Germany was to be de-industrialised and reduced to the status of a purely agricultural country. The extreme provisions of this plan were,

however, strongly opposed both in America and Britain, and an American 'policy directive' was eventually produced which rejected any partitioning scheme. Stalin had been under the impression that at Yalta both Britain and America had pronounced against dismemberment. On being informed by Mr. Hopkins that this was not so, he replied that he would keep an open mind on the subject, and that the Three Powers must discuss it frankly among themselves.

Far less successful were the deliberations of the Conference on reparations and the nature of the new Governments which were being set up in Eastern Europe. Indeed, almost immediately after the Conference, the disunity between the Powers and the different interpretations which they placed upon the agreements reached were nakedly exposed. An unexpected difficulty was created by France. France announced that since she had not been present at Potsdam she was not bound by its decisions. This warning was hardly a favourable augury for the responsibilities of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Allied Control Council for Germany, on both of which bodies France was represented.

Mr. Bevin's first speech as Foreign Secretary

It had been the boast of several speakers in the General Election campaign that a British Labour Government would be in a position to develop more amicable relations with the Soviet Union than would be possible if the Conservatives took office. The immediate Soviet reaction to the Labour victory was favourable. In a Moscow broadcast, reported in the *Daily Mail* on July 27th, 1945, the following comment was made: "A new chapter has opened in the life of Britain. The Labour Party has won a vast majority and is to assume power. . . . In foreign politics the Labour Party will see to it that the last remnants of Fascism are exterminated. Britain will maintain her friendship with the Soviet Union and will oppose the propaganda which has been carried on by certain Conservative circles."

What would be the Labour international attitude? The first debate in the House of Commons on foreign affairs since

the General Election was necessarily an event of peculiar interest. In particular, the speech of the new Foreign Secretary Mr. Ernest Bevin, was listened to with eager attention.

This speech was delivered on August 20th, 1945. It was studiously moderate in tone and expressed optimistic hopes as to the outcome of the Potsdam deliberations and the possibility of co-operation between the Powers in the resettlement of the world. Only on one aspect was a critical note sounded in connexion with Soviet policy. "The Governments which have been set up [in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary]," Mr. Bevin stated, "do not, in our view, represent the majority of the people, and the impression we get from the recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. . . . Elections, we understand, are very shortly to take place in Bulgaria. The electoral law, in accordance with which the elections will take place, is not, in our view, consistent with the principles of liberty. We shall not therefore be able to regard as representative any Government resulting from such elections."

Mr. Bevin went on, by way of contrast, to describe the measures which were proposed to ensure a democratic election in Greece, the one Balkan State which had been included in the Western 'sphere of influence.' "The United States, France and His Majesty's Government," Mr. Bevin continued, "have undertaken to assist in the supervision of the election, and I propose to invite as part of our contingent of observers representatives of the Dominion Governments." The Soviet Union had been invited to send observers, but had declined.

This utterance let loose a flood of violent denunciation in the Soviet Press. *Red Star* (August 24th, 1945) protested that the régimes in Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary were fully democratic, "and will develop in their way, no matter what those people say who cannot imagine democracy without the leading rôle of reactionary and pro-Fascist elements." *Izvestia* declared that "control, or as it is sometimes called 'observation,' by a foreign State over an election in an alien country is indisputably one form of direct interference in the internal affairs of that State. This interference does not help to strengthen democracy, but undermines its strength."

Pravda (August 26th, 1945) commented that "the election speeches of the Labour leaders and their pronouncements after the election led to certain illusions in England and abroad. . . . But Mr. Bevin's speech shattered all those illusions."

The resentment expressed in the Soviet newspapers towards Mr. Bevin's remarks regarding Bulgaria revealed the profound difference between the Western and Russian conceptions of democracy. Mr. Bevin and probably the majority of Englishmen took it for granted that the liberal traditions of Britain would be naturally accepted as the standard by which the bona fides of a régime must be judged; they did not sufficiently allow for the fact that these traditions were largely foreign to Eastern Europe. This divergence was aptly illustrated by a Soviet criticism which was levied a few weeks later (December 10th, 1945), following the formation of a 'Federal Socialist Party' in Britain, against which no official action was taken, although the body was professedly Fascist in character. Peter Orlov on the Moscow radio made the following observation: "Now another Fascist organisation has been formed in Britain. We know that these bodies cannot be described as popular, and their influence must not be overrated. Some people seem to imagine that Fascists have a right to exist so long as they do not break any rules. But the very existence of Fascism is a violation of the rules of human conduct and of international security. It follows that the existence of Fascists cannot be tolerated."

The London Conference of Foreign Ministers

Meanwhile, on September 11th, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers held its first formal meeting in London. The session lasted till October 2nd, and the agenda was the drafting of the Italian, Balkan and Finnish peace treaties. The war in the Far East had come to an unexpectedly early end. The Soviet Union had scrupulously fulfilled its undertaking to declare war on Japan, and it must be remembered in this connexion that the territorial concessions which have been mentioned on an

earlier page* were agreed to by America and Britain as inducements to Russia to lend her aid in hostilities which, at the time of Yalta, it was anticipated would be prolonged. The Western Allies were unaware of the imminence of the Japanese collapse.

The London Conference proved to be largely, though not entirely, abortive. The differences between the Soviet Union and the West were brought more markedly into the open than on any previous occasion. The Council was composed of the British, American, French, Chinese and Soviet Ministers. The Western Ministers were dismayed at the outset by the Soviet claim, advanced by Mr. Molotov, that Tripolitania, or one of the other Mediterranean Italian colonies, should be placed under Russian trusteeship. Mr. Molotov argued that the Soviet Union was entitled to a base for its merchant fleet in a warm-water sea, and contended that this claim was all the more justifiable as it had been admitted that Russia had the right to use Dairen and Port Arthur in the Pacific. "We do not propose to introduce the Soviet system into this territory [Tripolitania]," he stated, "apart from the democratic order that is desired by the people." In a significant aside he added: "This [Soviet control of Tripolitania] will *not* be done on the lines that have been used in Greece."

The Conference shelved the issue for the moment by agreeing that all the former Italian colonies should be administered under the trusteeship provisions set out in the United Nations Charter, and passed on to consider what should be the exact frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia. On this contentious question Mr. Molotov raised many difficulties, but accepted an American proposal that Trieste should be established as a free port under international control, and that an expert commission should be sent to the adjacent region in order to recommend how the boundary could most justly be drawn, with due regard to racial and economic considerations.

Over the problem of reparations to be exacted from Italy a bitter controversy raged. The Soviet demand was for a payment of 600 million dollars, of which one-sixth should go to

* Introduction, page 10.

Moscow, in view of the immense devastation which the Soviet Union had suffered, and for which Italy as well as Germany was responsible. The rest of the Council vehemently rejected this demand, on the ground that Italy was not in a condition to play so large a sum. No compromise could be reached, and the Council had to content itself with a definition of human rights, guarantees of disarmament of Italian forces and arrangements for the eventual withdrawal of Allied troops. These principles had some value in providing a pattern to be observed in the drafting of other peace treaties.

Perhaps the bitterest controversy was provoked when the Council attempted to deal with other treaties. The Soviet case was that—particularly in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—it was essential that the Governments which were set up should be friendly to Russia (and should therefore be prepared to accept the direction of Moscow). The Western Allies protested that they could not recognise the existing provisional Governments in those countries, as they had not been elected by methods which were in the least consistent with Western democratic standards. The London Conference broke up without any agreement being reached on this point. The Soviet contention was in effect that the West had no right to impose their own ideas of democratic methods on Eastern European States. The West clung to the belief that, even in States like Greece, the will of the majority could be sufficiently ascertained at elections, so long as there was adequate supervision over such elections by 'democratic' observers.

But what emerged subsequently—mainly at an interview between Stalin and the American Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Harriman—was the Russian suspicion that the Soviet Union was not being fully consulted in the arrangements being made for the control of Japan; that the West was insisting on the right to interfere with the political settlement of Eastern Europe, while the Soviet Union was being kept at arm's length over settlement in the Far East. Moreover, Mr. Molotov particularly resented the fact that the representatives of France and China were allowed to intervene in the discussions on Balkan affairs and invariably supported the Western view.

Accordingly, he suddenly proposed that the procedure of the Council should be amended: only those Ministers should be present at the discussions whose Governments had signed armistice terms with the country under consideration. Britain and America protested that no such arrangement had been agreed upon at Yalta. The effect of Mr. Molotov's proposal was that the conference spent the rest of its time debating procedure. America attempted to find an acceptable compromise, based on the Soviet proposal, but adding the condition that the treaty drafts should finally be submitted to all European members of the United Nations and to all non-European members who had contributed 'substantial' military assistance against the enemy. The American compromise was thus forced to meet Soviet objections by expressly excluding Argentina.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had no authority to accept this offer, and went on to suggest that the Soviet Union would find it easier to agree to an Italian treaty if it was decided to appoint an Allied Control Council for Japan. The Japanese question, indeed, was once more seen to be the main cause of Soviet non-co-operation.

After the comparative failure of the London meeting the public comments of the British Foreign Secretary became more openly critical. Speaking in the House of Commons on November 7th, 1945, Mr. Bevin declared that "at Moscow, Yalta and all the rest of the Conferences we met almost every territorial demand [of the Soviet Union]. . . . You cannot help being a little suspicious if a Great Power wants to go right across the throat of the British Commonwealth" (this was a reference apparently to the trusteeship of Tripolitania).

Mr. Bevin had been exasperated at the London meeting by Mr. Molotov's manoeuvres. At one stage of the discussions he accused him of resorting to 'Hitlerian methods.' Commenting on this incident the future Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. R. A. Butler, remarked that at the General Election "the Socialists claimed that if the Tories were returned they would upset Russia. But Mr. Bevin has been far more rude to Russia than any Tory."*

* In a speech at Wimbledon, November 19th, 1945.

The Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers

In order to explore the possibility of resolving the disputes which had emerged at the London Conference, the American, British and Soviet Foreign Ministers met in Moscow during the closing weeks of 1945. America had endeavoured to satisfy the Soviet objections by proposing that an Allied Council for Japan should be created and should operate from Tokyo. A Far Eastern Commission, sitting at Washington, was also to be established, its membership consisting of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, India, China, France, Holland and the Philippine Republic. The Commission was charged with the duty of deciding the occupation policy for Japan, and at first it seemed that these arrangements had resulted in producing a more friendly relationship between Russia and the West. The programme for the Peace Conference, to be opened on May 1st in Paris, in its initial stages met with no Soviet criticism.

But very soon the differences reappeared. America still insisted that, before the European peace treaties were signed, full discussion must be allowed in which all European members of the Conference would have the right to take part. The Soviet Union eventually yielded on this point, but raised difficulties as to the status of India, arguing that India was not a sovereign State, and that, if she was admitted to the Peace Conference, some of the Soviet Republics—such as Estonia and Latvia—should similarly be included. America replied that in that event an equivalent number of constituent members of the United States should be invited to attend. Stalin, however, instructed Molotov to accept the original American proposal, on the understanding that only those countries which had been actual combatants against the respective ex-enemy States should be signatories to that particular peace treaty.

During the Moscow meeting America presented a report which Mr. Mark Ethridge had drawn up as to the political conditions obtaining in Bulgaria and Rumania. The Soviet Union vehemently protested against the unfavourable conclusions at which the report arrived, but, here again, there were

apparent signs of willingness to adopt a conciliatory attitude. A commission made up of the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow, together with Mr. Vyshinsky, representing the Soviet Union, was appointed to advise Rumania on the broadening of the composition of her Government. The Soviet Union was entrusted with the responsibility of bringing similar influence to bear on Bulgaria, where elections had already been held. In neither case, however, did these steps result in more than liberalising gestures. In both countries, once the Allies had given their formal recognition of the validity of the respective Governments, the political constitution of these States resumed its previous complexion.

Although these formal agreements had been reached and some progress seemed to have been made, a new controversial issue arose to disturb the Moscow meeting before the Ministers dispersed. American, British and Soviet troops during the war had occupied Persian territory immediately south of the Soviet frontier, in order to guarantee the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union and in view of the suspiciously hostile attitude of the Persian Government. It had been arranged that simultaneously, on a given date, all these forces should be withdrawn. But the Soviet troops prolonged their occupation and were accused of instigating a rebellion in Northern Iran which resulted in the establishment of a regional Government in that district, friendly to the Soviet Union. The Russian case was that by this means it had been possible to bring pressure to bear on the legal Persian Government to grant oil exploitation rights to the Soviet Union, rights which the Soviet Union badly needed in view of the damage inflicted on the oilfields by the German invaders. The Western case was that the Soviet Union had been guilty of sharp practice and had violated its agreement to withdraw.

The Persian Government forwarded a complaint that the Soviet forces which were occupying its northern territory were using their influence to interfere with Persian affairs. Russia denied the validity of this complaint when the American Minister raised it, and moreover refused to give any guarantee

that Soviet troops would evacuate this region by the date agreed, arguing that until the defences of the Baku oilfields across the Soviet frontier were secure the Soviet troops must remain. Anglo-American fears of Soviet territorial designs were at once quickened, and were accentuated by the Soviet refusal to discuss this issue further, on the ground that it was not included on the Moscow agenda. Although at the time it looked as though this trouble might develop into a major clash, it did not materialise; the Soviet troops were ultimately withdrawn.

Commenting on this dispute, an American observer, Mr. Howard K. Smith, the author of *Last Train from Berlin*, remarks*: "The Western Powers rightly condemned Russia's behaviour in the Security Council, and the pressure of opinion eventually forced the Russians to withdraw from Persia. Then, the Persian central Government sent troops north and broke up the autonomous Azerbaijan Government, restoring central control, and the Persian Parliament denounced the oil agreement with Russia. What is not widely known about the sequel is that as Russia moved out—America moved in. Not with troops and noisy revolution, but silently with dollars in support of the *status quo*. The Persian Government received American funds and a set of American—including military—advisers. Persia is in effect today an American satellite. If America does not already have military bases in Persia, she can have them any time she wishes. . . . America had accomplished exactly the nefarious end Russia sought, and there was no way to make a case of it before the Security Council as there had been when Russia had sought to dominate Persia. Russia was patently at an extreme disadvantage. Moreover, this 'defence' base that America had for the taking was six thousand miles from her shores, but on Russia's most sensitive border. Russia could legitimately press the West to answer the question which the West had put to her: 'Where does security end short of domination of the whole earth?' . . ."

At the Moscow meeting plans for the control of atomic energy were also discussed, the Soviet Union agreeing to the

* *The State of Europe*. (Cresset Press.)

American proposal that a United Nations commission should be appointed for that purpose. It will be more convenient, however, to trace the history of these negotiations in a separate chapter.

The Moscow meeting, in spite of the frictions which had been aroused, was considered to have attained satisfactory results. The news that the Peace Conference would be held in May was officially announced on Christmas Day. It was not more than ten weeks after this announcement that Mr. Churchill delivered his famous Fulton speech (March 5th, 1946).

Mr. Churchill's Fulton Speech

Although Mr. Churchill now held no official position, save that of leadership of the Conservative Opposition, his personal status remained such that any utterance of his on international affairs was bound to carry exceptional weight. Moreover, at Fulton he spoke from an American and not a domestic platform. He was accompanied by Mr. Truman, and though Mr. Truman was not necessarily committed to what was said, the presidential presence lent additional emphasis to the occasion. Mr. Churchill was in effect broadcasting to the world, and his words were not likely to be taken by the world as a merely individual opinion, but as the voice to a large degree of British and Western sentiments.

Mr. Churchill gave the usual assurances that he desired peace, that efforts should be made to reach fuller agreement with the Soviet Union, and that war was not inevitable. But a significant feature of his speech was to be found in the following sentences: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation.

"If the Western democracies stand together," Mr. Churchill continued, "in strict adherence to the principles of the United

Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense, and no one is likely to molest them. . . . If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, and in science and industry . . . there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.

"Neither the sure prevention of war nor the continuous rise of the World Organisation will be gained without what I have called the 'fraternal association' of the English-speaking peoples. . . . Fraternal association requires not only growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers. . . . It should carry with it a continuance of the present facilities of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world."

The Soviet reaction to this pronouncement was immediate. *Pravda* described it as 'poisonous' and coloured with 'hate-filled words.' The *New Times* came out with a detailed denunciation of British motives. "There is not a single country nameable where Britain is trying to rely on advanced democratic circles or to support the young growing forces to whom the future belongs. The [British] Socialist Government has disillusioned the world. . . . Britain is using her armed forces and her international weight to hinder the liberation of the Indonesian people from Dutch imperialism." Greece was "a nest of Fascist reaction under British occupation," and the Labour Party was pursuing the same policy as that of the Coalition Government. "The support of General Anders' Polish Army in Italy is an inglorious continuation of that hostile line which London leads in its relations [with Poland]. . . . India is no nearer her long-awaited independence." While British "support of the decaying Fascist régime of Franco in Spain serves as a final touch to the general picture."

Stalin expressed his view in no uncertain terms. On March 13th, 1946, a two-thousand word interview with him was published in *Pravda*. "Mr. Churchill's speech," he declared,

" was a dangerous act, calculated to sow seeds of dissent and hinder collaboration among the Allied nations. It has harmed the cause of peace and security. Mr. Churchill has now adopted the position of a warmonger.

" Mr. Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler started the work of warmongering by proclaiming a racial theory.... Mr. Churchill also started his campaign of warmongering with a racial theory, asserting that English-speaking nations are the only nations of full value, and must rule over the remaining nations of the world."

For anyone who is attempting sincerely to understand the Soviet impressions of the Western attitude, these repercussions to the Fulton speech afford an interesting study. Soviet statesmen were quick to seize upon the implication of the speech, namely that the best way to ensure peace was to confront Russia and her allies with a consolidated Anglo-American bloc, consolidated not only in its political strategy but in its assembly of military force. This interpretation only served to confirm Soviet suspicions that the West was hostile in its intentions. And, though Mr. Churchill had emphasised that the 'fraternal association' of English-speaking peoples was advocated for entirely peaceful and defensive purposes, the moral of the Fulton utterance was that reliance should be placed on a balance of power, of an Anglo-American against a Communist bloc, and therefore on a sharpening of the division between the two worlds. However inevitable this division might be considered to be, however ardently Mr. Churchill might invoke the principles of the United Nations Charter, the effect of what he was arguing was the formation of one group of Powers against another—the very development which the Charter had been designed to prevent. The 'fraternal association' was also an invitation to Britain to become increasingly dependent on the United States, in view of its economic condition.

The (British) Labour Government's solitary daily newspaper, the *Daily Herald*, remarked that "British comment was promptly and overwhelmingly opposed to Mr. Churchill's

proposals" (March 12th, 1946), a statement which, if hardly accurate, reflected as a whole the Labour Party's reactions.

Preparations for the Peace Conference

It had been arranged that the deputies of the Foreign Ministers should meet in London (January 18th, 1946) to prepare drafts for the treaties to be considered subsequently by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The deputies found themselves bogged down with difficulties. There was dispute as to the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, the disposition of the Italian colonies and Trieste. The American and British Governments considered that the Soviet draft for the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian treaties was unsatisfactory, mainly on account of the omission of any economic clauses, though minor amendments submitted by those Governments were adopted. In addition, the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was simultaneously meeting in London, produced an atmosphere of acrimony amid mutual charges of unwarranted military occupation. The Persian delegation had complained of the non-withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, while the Soviet delegates retorted with a counter-complaint regarding the presence of British forces in Greece and Indonesia.

The deputies at their preparatory conference were able to make so little progress that the Council of Foreign Ministers decided not to wait for preliminary arrangements to be reached, but to hold their second session on April 25th, Paris being chosen as the rendezvous on an American suggestion. On the opening day of the session Mr. Molotov conceded the right of the French Minister to join in the discussion of the five treaties, but on condition that France should vote only on the Italian treaty.

It was evident, however, from the first that the Soviet attitude had hardened, and that Mr. Molotov was less disposed than before to be conciliatory. In view of the Soviet Press and radio accusations that disarmament in the Western German zones was being delayed with the deliberate intention of building up German strength as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, Mr. Byrnes, on behalf of America, proposed a twenty-five-year

treaty between the Four Powers for the control and disarmament of Germany. Stalin had previously expressed his approval of this plan, and his support had been communicated to the Council at the Moscow session. Mr. Molotov, however, now rejected the American proposal on the ground of its inadequacy, explaining that Stalin had approved only in general terms and had not had the actual draft before him. Mr. Molotov refused to consent to placing the Austrian treaty on the agenda.

In a private conversation with Mr. Byrnes Mr. Molotov revealed, according to Mr. Byrnes' account,* that the Soviet attitude was due to the resentment felt by Moscow at the position which America had taken up on the Security Council over the presence of Soviet troops in Iran. Mr. Molotov suggested that there was evidence of an anti-Soviet campaign on the part of the United States. Mr. Byrnes reminded Mr. Molotov that he had warned Stalin that the American attitude would inevitably be critical if Soviet troops were not withdrawn and the issue brought before the Security Council.

Some progress, however, was made before the Ministers' Council adjourned. It was agreed to accept certain amendments to the terms of the Italian armistice, to abolish the Allied Commission and virtually to restore Italian sovereignty. Far more important was the Soviet abandonment of claims to trusteeship of any of the Italian colonies.

Although it was not until three years later that the future of these colonies was considered by the U.N. General Assembly (May and November 1949), it will be convenient at this point to record the main results of the discussion. On the former occasion the Assembly was presented with the proposal that most of Eritrea should be handed over to Ethiopia, and that Somaliland and Libya should be placed under the trustee administration. Libya was to be split into three parts, Britain to be the trustee for Cyrenaica, France for Fezzan and Italy for Tripolitania, as well as the whole of Somaliland. The proposal that Italy should once more be allowed to control North African territory not unnaturally aroused strong opposition—

* *Speaking Frankly.* (Heinemann.)

chiefly from the Arab States. Addressing the American delegation, which was supporting the proposal, Mr Rafik Asha declared: "For the first time in your history you are supporting the principle of imperialism. You are supporting the return to Africa of a country [Italy] whose record in colonial administration has been condemned by your own statesmen and thinkers." Turning to the South Americans, who were following the United States' lead, he went on: "Can you honestly say that a decision to return Africa to Italy, in the teeth of the opposition of the Africans, shows a determination to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small?"

The Soviet proposal that Libya and Eritrea should be placed under an administrator appointed by the Trusteeship Council, assisted by advisory councils to which various Governments (including U.S.S.R.) should elect one member each, for five years only, that Somaliland should be similarly administered for ten years, and that Ethiopia should be given an outlet to the sea, was defeated. But so were the other proposals—registering a significant defeat for American-British policy. At the November session America, Britain and France urged that Libya should not attain independence until the various administering Governments should decide that she was ready for that responsibility. In the end, however, the Assembly ruled that Libya should be granted independence in 1952. Somaliland was to be placed under Italian trusteeship, assisted by an advisory council representing Egypt, Colombia and the Philippines. A commission was appointed to ascertain the wishes of the Eritrean people. An advisory council was also set up to assist the trustee Powers responsible for Libya. The Soviet bloc was excluded from this council, the Soviet delegates therefore abstaining from the final vote. It is worth mention that the next day, November 10th, 1949, the *New York Herald-Tribune* interpreted this result in a headline "Libya Freedom is voted at U.N. despite Soviets."

*Disputes regarding the Danube and former
Italian colonies*

The dateline of May 1st, 1946, for the Peace Conference was now obviously out of the question. Mr. Molotov refused to agree to fix a postponed date, on the ground that the council must reach agreement on fundamental issues before the Conference could be held. He also rejected the American amendments concerning economic guarantees to be inserted in the Balkan treaties, as well as the proposal that the Great Powers should ensure that free navigation on the Danube should be open to all nations.

Mr. Molotov's general view of the international situation at this stage can be gauged by a speech which he delivered and which was broadcast and reported in *Pravda* on May 27th, 1946. "Certain circles in the United States, with their friends in Great Britain, are seeking to establish naval and military bases in all parts of the globe." They are using "methods of pressure, threats and intimidation . . . Danubian countries should not be allowed to dictate their will to other Danubian countries. . . . Soviet reparation requirements from Italy are only a very small compensation for the damage which we suffered [at the hands of Italy] during the war. . . . Soviet concessions on the Italian colonies problem did not meet with deserved recognition and appreciation [from the Western Allies]."

Mr. Bevin's reactions were expressed in the House of Commons on June 4th, 1946. "We cannot acquiesce," he said, "in an indefinite stalemate. We must regulate our relations with ex-enemy countries, and it cannot go on much longer. We can and we must bridge the gap between East and West, since otherwise peace will be no more durable than that of after 1919. . . . I should have thought that a [twenty-five years] Four Power Pact [to prevent the recrudescence of the German menace], carried out with vigour and honesty between us, would create a situation [for Russia] far more secure than harnessing a few satellite States as a buttress against aggression." Mr. Bevin described this speech as containing a 'last warning.' "I say to the Soviet Union," he continued, "if

you value peace above all else, do not miss [this opportunity]. It may never come again."

Pravda replied to this criticism on June 9th, 1946, by expanding Mr. Molotov's complaints in the following terms: "This speech of Bevin's shows the extent of the character of the psychological preparations for a complete retreat from the principle of collaboration among the Allied Powers. . . . It was an obvious attempt to prepare the break-up of co-ordinated co-operation among the Allies, and to substitute methods of pressure and threat against the Soviet Union. It is unnecessary to show the unreality and futility of such wicked methods.

"It is natural that non-Danubian States cannot and should not dictate their private views on the organisation of shipping on the Danube. It appears, however, that Britain desires to interfere and to prescribe the organisation of the Danubian shipping régime, in view of the famine in Europe.

"The British Foreign Minister argued about the former Italian colonies in the same spirit. . . . Britain is demanding the cession of Cyrenaica—under the style of British protection—without considering the vital interests of this area alongside Egypt. Britain proposes to round off British Somaliland by adding a part of Italian Somaliland to it. . . .

"The old wish to expand British possessions, interests and privileges in North and North-East Africa explains the Anglo-American proposal for putting the matter before the twenty-one United Nations in the case of a failure of the Paris Conference." This latter comment obviously referred to the fact that the General Assembly of UNO was so composed as to give the Western Powers an almost certain assurance that they would obtain a majority vote in their favour.

The British Press at this period still showed a disposition to consider the Soviet case sympathetically and to make allowance for Soviet susceptibilities, in the interests of peace and good will. Thus, in a leading article entitled "Bluntness has a drawback," the *Evening Standard* suggested that the situation would have been happier "if Mr. Bevin had made some express reference to Russia's own point of view, other than by way of total condemnation."

At the Labour Party Conference held at Bournemouth in June 1946, Professor Laski remarked that "no small part of the responsibility for Russian suspicions must be borne by those who decided upon secrecy in relation to the atom bomb." Mr. Bevin in his speech to the Conference, however, vehemently repudiated the criticism that he might have done more to relieve the tension between Britain and the Soviet Government. In reply to a question as to what he would do if the adjourned meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council again failed to reach agreement, he said: "Would I sign a separate peace treaty? I do not know what steps we will take to get the peace treaties. But no one nation is going to keep me in a state of war forever with other countries."

The Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers

Meanwhile, the Council of Foreign Ministers had arranged to continue its Paris session on June 15th, 1946. At first it seemed as though no further progress would be possible. The Russian demand for a reparation payment by Germany of twelve billion dollars was pressed firmly—on the ground that America had agreed at Yalta to this sum; and it was also made clear that there would be no Soviet consent to the summoning of the Peace Conference unless reparations were paid by Italy. After long discussions the Americans assented to the proposal that 100 million dollars should be paid to Russia by Italy, and that a portion of this amount should be drawn from current production, on condition that Russia provided Italy with raw materials.

Mr. Molotov, on his side, was now willing to make several important concessions. He agreed to insert some economic clauses in the Rumanian treaty, and, on being pressed by Mr. Bevin to agree to the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, he stated that the Soviet Union would have no objection. A lengthy dispute ensued over the procedure to be adopted at the forthcoming Conference, the Soviet Union arguing that there should be a two-thirds majority before any recommendation could be forwarded by the Conference to the Ministers' Council. The Americans refused to yield on this

THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD

point, and the Soviet Union eventually withdrew that claim. Mr. Molotov, in addition, formally agreed that the Peace Conference should now be summoned, and the date was fixed for July 29th, 1946.

The first phase of postwar resettlement had been slowly and painfully negotiated.

III

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND AFTER

Soviet-Western relations in 1946

BEFORE we turn our attention to the proceedings of the Peace Conference, it will be well to take a general survey of the relationship between East and West as seen by individuals and as reflected in Press and official utterances. It is a mistake to suppose that the picture is one of solid gloom and uniform enmity. On the contrary, there were several gestures of courtesy and friendliness manifested on both sides, incidents which perpetually gave rise to the hope that a more congenial era was about to emerge.

In the high summer of 1946 Great Britain sent the aircraft carrier *Triumph* to take part in the Red Navy victory celebrations. Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, describing his experience, declared that "as far as the Royal Navy is concerned, I think we have broken the ice with the Russians. We hope the good relations will be continued. But there was one disappointment. Ashore our men were not allowed to go around except in organised parties. . . . I personally had the greatest freedom. When I went to Moscow I took my orderly and my valet with me, and both were surprised that they were allowed to travel without visas. None of the Russians are unfriendly."*

During this summer a delegation of the Labour Party, headed by Professor Laski, visited the Soviet Union. The delegation had an interview with Stalin. Mr. Morgan Phillips, secretary of the Labour Party, on his return to Britain gave his impressions of this interview in the *Daily Herald*.† Stalin had enlarged on a theme which he frequently adopted in talking

* Report in the *Manchester Guardian* (August 10th, 1946).

† August 22nd, 1946.

with foreigners. "There are two roads to Socialism," he said, "the Russian way and the British way. It is clear that we both intend to reach the socialist goal in our own fashion. The Russian road is shorter but more difficult, and has involved bloodshed." "Stalin wanted us to remember," Mr. Phillips continued, "that Marxist-Leninists did not think theirs was the only way to Socialism."

Critical allusions, however, continued to be displayed in the Press of both countries. An article, signed by Boris Izakov and entitled "Behind the Velvet Curtain," appeared in *Pravda* (July 1946). "The only [Balkan] country [Greece] which is on the other side of the velvet curtain," Mr. Izakov wrote, "has become a Fascist preserve, where yesterday's Hitlerite hirelings, protected by British bayonets, persecute and torment a freedom-loving people." The article also accused Great Britain of using the Hindu-Mohammedan conflict as a "stumbling-block for a solution of the Indian problem."

A violently anti-Soviet article had appeared during August in the columns of the *Garrison Guardian* of the British Army of the Rhine, and was the subject of a protest by Mr. Rust, the editor of the *Daily Worker*. The War Office took immediate action. The paper ceased publication and the editor was 'released' from Army service.

This incident may be paralleled to some extent by the action taken by *Pravda* in its issue of December 19th, 1946. An article attacking the conduct of a British convoy to Archangel in July 1942 had been recently published in *Krasni Flot* (the Red Fleet journal). *Pravda* condemned the article in the following terms: "The Soviet Government and the Soviet public fully appreciate both the skilful operations of the Allied Navies and the gallantry of British and American seamen. This appreciation has found tangible expression in the decoration of British and American seamen with Soviet orders and medals. . . . Proceeding from a wrong starting-point Andreyev [the author of the article] arrived at a wrong conclusion which does not correspond with the attitude towards convoy operations, both of experts and the Soviet public."

A complaint was made by the Soviet Press that six Russian

women had been prevented from flying to Australia, in order to take part in a conference to which they had been invited, on pretexts by the British Government which were characterised as 'a mockery.' The Foreign Office issued a statement on September 3rd, 1946, refuting this accusation. "The conference began on August 4th and ended on August 14th. The Russian women did not arrive in London until August 5th, and the Soviet Embassy in London had made no arrangements for the onward flight of the delegates. Every effort was made to obtain priority passage, but it was already too late for the delegates to reach Australia before the conference ended. Therefore the Australian authorities ruled that priority must be given to persons travelling on business. These facts have been explained to the Soviet Embassy."

Fear that the Soviet Union was increasing rather than diminishing the strength of its military forces was expressed by Mr. Churchill in October 1946. He asked whether it was not true that there were now 200 Soviet divisions in Europe. A few days later Stalin replied to a questionnaire addressed to him by Mr. Hugh Baillie, the president of the United Press of America. Stalin stated (October 28th) that there were now only sixty divisions in Europe, and that in two months' time, this number would be reduced to forty. In another questionnaire drawn up by Mr. Alexander Werth, representing the *Sunday Times*, Stalin asserted his "absolute belief in the possibility of friendly and lasting co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies." He added that in his opinion the withdrawal of American troops from China "would advance the cause of peace." Asked whether he considered that the West was attempting to encircle the Soviet Union, he replied that it would be impossible for such an attempt to be successful.

The Soviet Government was also criticised at this time in regard to the alleged deportation of German workers and their families to Russia, to assist in the work of Soviet reconstruction. The Soviet Press protested that these allegations were false, and that the German workers had gone to Russia voluntarily. *The Times* commented on this reply (October 20th, 1946) by stating that "recent reports from our correspondent in Berlin

leave no doubt at all that the workers in Berlin and Jena did not go willingly."

In January 1947 Field-Marshal Montgomery visited Moscow and was cordially received. During this visit he invited the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vassilievsky, to come to England in the spring, and the invitation was accepted. The visit, however, did not materialise.

One other incident should be mentioned at this point, since at the time it threatened to assume seriously controversial dimensions, and is a fair illustration of Soviet susceptibilities. Mr. Bevin had given a broadcast address on December 22nd, 1946, partly devoted to his favourite theme that Britain was independent and uncompromised by her association with capitalist America or with any other Power. *Pravda* commented on this speech as follows (January 15th, 1947): "When Mr. Bevin states that Britain is not tying herself up with anybody, the question arises—has Mr. Bevin forgotten that Britain is linked with the Soviet Union by a treaty . . . valid for twenty years? Bevin proposed to extend the validity of that treaty for fifty years, but today he ignores the existence of such a treaty."

This accusation was considered sufficiently serious to warrant an official British protest by the Foreign Office, asserting that the meaning of Mr. Bevin's words had been entirely misinterpreted. The protest was handed to Stalin by the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson. On January 23rd, 1947, the Soviet Ambassador in London presented Stalin's reply to Mr. Bevin. "I must admit," he said, "that your statement that Great Britain is not tied to anybody, except in regard to her obligations arising from the Charter, caused me some perplexity. . . . However, your message and the statement of the British Government explain the affair and do not leave any room for misunderstandings." Referring to the offer to prolong the treaty, Stalin added: "Before extending it, it is necessary to change it, freeing it from reservations which weaken it." Subsequent inquiries as to what changes Stalin had in mind did not produce any concrete suggestions, and the question was allowed to lapse.

The Peace Conference

The Peace Conference met at the Luxembourg Palace in Paris, and was composed of the representatives of twenty-one States. The fact that at long last it had been summoned raised widespread hopes that positive progress would now be achieved in the task of constructing a general world settlement. Ten commissions were appointed—a General, a Military, and a Drafting (Legal) Commission, together with five political and two economic bodies. For the first twelve days the Conference was absorbed in questions of procedure. The Soviet representatives again urged that all decisions should require a two-thirds majority, claiming that this had been agreed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes, on behalf of the United States, rejected this proposal and held that the Conference must be left entirely free to draw up its own rules. A British motion that Conference resolutions obtaining both a two-thirds and a simple majority should be passed on as recommendations to the Council was carried by fifteen to six.

The voting on this occasion at once revealed the reason for the Soviet insistence on a two-thirds majority. The Conference was clearly divided into two groups. The Western alignment was made up of the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, India, China, Ethiopia, Greece, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Brazil. The Soviet Union could count on the support only of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. France abstained from voting, and indeed throughout this Conference tended to assume the rôle of intermediary. Over fifty resolutions were passed by a two-thirds majority, and some forty by simple majority. On the major issues some agreement was reached as to the general principles to be observed regarding the control of the Danube and the creation of an internationally administered Trieste region. But no progress was made in regard to the reparations problem.

The Conference rose on October 15th, 1946, and the recommendations which had been carried were passed back to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council met in New

York on November 4th, 1946, the main item on a formidable agenda being the final preparation of the treaties with the ex-enemy States, excluding Austria and Germany. From the outset it was obvious that there was to be prolonged dispute over most of the items. Mr. Byrnes, who was acting as chairman for this session, complained that the Soviet Minister and his associates "entirely disregarded the recommendations of the [Peace] Conference and argued as they had been arguing for the past thirteen months." When the Yugoslav representatives appeared before the Council they reopened the same issues involved in the Trieste problem as had been discussed a year before. After four weeks of attempted bargaining Mr. Molotov accepted the main proposals which the Conference had adopted.

The chief difficulty in attempting to determine the frontier to be drawn between Italy and Yugoslavia arose from the fact that there is no natural racial line of demarcation to be traced in the Venezia Giulia region. The Yugoslavs are in a majority towards the northern and eastern portions of this territory, while large numbers of Italians are to be found along the western coast and in Monfalcone and Gorizia. Trieste itself was estimated as eighty per cent. Italian. As a compromise between the American, Soviet and British proposals, a French plan had been eventually accepted by the Council in July 1946, a plan which included the creation of an international 'free' territory around Trieste to the west of the French line, divided into an Anglo-American and a Yugoslav zone. The Security Council of UNO was made responsible for the independence of the Free Territory, the executive power was to be placed in the hands of a governor appointed by the Security Council, and an 'assembly,' elected by the inhabitants on a proportional representation method, was to be vested with legislative authority. Although the Council reached agreement on paper as to these provisions, the difficulty of choosing a governor was subsequently to prove insoluble.

As regards the payment of Italian reparations it was decided that the Ambassadors representing the Four Powers in Rome should have authority to settle any differences which might

arise. The Soviet proposal had been consistently in favour of direct bilateral negotiation over such disputes, but Mr. Molotov yielded on this point.

It was further agreed that Yugoslavia should receive a reparation payment of 125 million dollars, Greece 105 million dollars and Albania five million. When the Soviet and the Ethiopian payments were included, this brought the Italian liability to the total sum of 360 million dollars.

The only decision reached in the Danubian controversy was an assent to the general principle that there should be freedom of navigation on that river, and that a conference of the Four Powers and the Danubian States should be summoned within the next six months to draw up a plan of control. The Soviet Union persisted in its objection to any incorporation of this plan in the peace treaties.

The Council of Foreign Ministers was able to report progress so far as the treaties with Italy, Hungary, Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria were concerned. These treaties were now agreed and would be ready for signature by February 1947. The Council decided to hold a further session in Moscow on March 10th, 1947, in order to tackle the German problem. Deputies were appointed to work on drafts for both the German and Austrian treaties, those formidable problems on which at present no kind of settlement was in sight.

Plans for Germany

Even if there had been complete amity and unity between the Powers, the German problem would have presented grave difficulties. The fundamental question to be faced was whether Germany should be permanently weakened and suppressed, or whether in the comparatively near future her energy and resources should be utilised to contribute to the restoration of European economy. Was she in fact to be regarded as an inevitable and permanent menace to world peace, or was she to be admitted as soon as possible into the comity of nations, in order to serve as a bulwark against greater dangers? France, who had suffered three times from the blast of a German onslaught, was consistently suspicious of any policy which

would risk a revival of German dominance, and only with reluctance was induced to fall in with the plans of her Western Allies. France had indeed, prior to the Yalta Conference, negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union for mutual assistance in the event of further German aggression. The existence of this treaty, incidentally, did not dispose Russia to support the admission of France to equal status with the other three Powers. Moscow only assented to the creation of a French zone in Germany on condition that it was carved out of the American and British zones.

In the immediate postwar phase both America and Britain, in common with France, were chiefly concerned to render Germany impotent ever again to threaten the peace of the world, and were therefore generally in accord with the Soviet standpoint. This purpose was to be fulfilled by dismantling all German industrial plant which might be used for the manufacture of armaments, by deterrent punishment of leading Nazis and the dissolution of Nazi or near-Nazi organisations, by educating the German public in democratic principles, by reparations for the immense damage and destruction which German military aggression had caused, and by the elimination of armed forces and armaments. More extreme measures had been advocated in some American quarters. The Morgenthau Plan,* which was originally favoured by President Roosevelt and eventually endorsed by Mr. Churchill, would have dismembered Germany into three separate States, transformed her into an agricultural and non-industrial country, closed down the Ruhr mines, allowed 'forced' German labour for the reconstruction of foreign devastated areas, as a form of reparation, and handed over the long-term policing of Germany to Continental control, excluding Britain and America but including France and the Soviet Union.

The Morgenthau Plan, as has already been pointed out, was strongly opposed in many American quarters and almost everywhere in Britain. Indeed, by the time that the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow Anglo-American opinion had

* A brief reference has already been made to this plan (see page 20).

begun to turn very definitely in favour of re-establishing German economic strength. Thus the Western policy was based on inherently conflicting aims. The need for dismantling the machinery for war potentials was still recognised, and yet the industrial plant must be preserved. The old difficulty, which had so often faced the League of Nations, reappeared—what is and what is not war potential? While the Americans were pressing for unification of economic control over Germany—without which there could be little hope of industrial recovery—the Soviet Union, which had suffered infinitely more devastation at the hands of Germany than any other of the Western Allies, regarded restitution through reparations as the primary necessity and demanded reparation payments from the current German production. America and Britain maintained that until there was agreement regarding the level of German production to be allowed, the reparations problem could not be solved, nor any decision reached as to how far the process of dismantling plant was to proceed. France showed herself opposed to any serious revival of German industry, and insisted on the continuation of deliveries of German coal. The Soviet Union proposed that the Ruhr coal-mines should be placed under Four Power control, but this was rejected both by the United States and Britain.

Meanwhile, the American insistence on the need for economic unity had resulted in two significant developments. In May 1946 the United States representative on the Allied Control Council announced that, as a consequence of the French and Soviet reluctance to assist in establishing unity of economic administration, reparation deliveries from the American zone would henceforth cease. The other development was the American offer to merge its own with other zones, an offer which Britain agreed to consider, but which France and the Soviet Union declined. This development was especially significant, as it marked the first step in the severance of Western from Soviet control of Germany. The merger of the British and American zones which eventually took place also meant the final abandonment by the British Labour Government of the policy of socialising and rationalising

German heavy industry. In spite of the fact that Mr. Bevin had officially announced that in the British zone mines, as well as chemical and engineering industries, would not be returned to capitalist ownership but would be socialised, the British Government ignored the unanimous vote of the German Social Democrats of the three Western zones at their Cologne Convention in 1946, demanding a fulfilment of this British promise. In 1948 the Ruhr Government passed a socialisation law, and Britain at once vetoed it.

Denazification and the punishment of war criminals had been agreed upon in principle by all the Four Powers. Denazification, however, proved far from easy to apply in practice. The less scrupulous members of the Nazi Party were usually anxious to protest that they had only acted under compulsion and that at heart they had always been pure democrats, while it is probably true to say that the mass of Germans were conscious only of the catastrophe which the defeat of Hitler had entailed and felt little or no sense of guilt for the atrocities which the Nazi régime had perpetrated. The elaborate methods which had been devised for uncovering the political record of suspects could hardly be expected to be a hundred per cent. effective. Soviet accusations that the Western authorities were carrying out the task of eliminating Nazi influences in a half-hearted manner were freely levied, while Western critics complained that the Russians were inciting the conversion of pro-Nazis to Communism by bribery through favours and privileges. Even as regards the punishment of war criminals there was some degree of discord between the Powers. The Western procedure of justice was often at variance with the severer and more ruthless methods of Soviet disciplinarianism, and was frequently interpreted by the Russians as a symptom of over-leniency.

The Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers plainly revealed the increasing suspicions of East and West towards each other. On almost every item on the agenda there was deadlock. The only agreements reached were that land reform in Germany should be completed by the end of 1947, that the armies of occupation should be reduced and the

process of repatriating displaced persons should be speeded up. The problem of the Polish-German frontier remained a highly controversial issue. America and Britain insisted that at Potsdam no more than provisional arrangements had been made, and urged that a commission should be set up to draft a final plan. The Western Allies also claimed that the resources of Upper Silesia should be available for general European use, even though this territory was to be allotted to Poland. The Soviet Union opposed both these propositions, and also the French claim that the Saar region should be detached from Germany. The Soviet contention was that, if this were done, the Ruhr should be simultaneously placed under Four Power control.

With respect to the setting up of a German provisional Government America declined to assent to the need for elections. Here Britain and the Soviet Union were at one against the American attitude, although differing as to the electoral methods to be applied. France was in favour of greater decentralisation, whereas the Russian policy favoured a concentration of power at the centre. No progress was made on the question of what political parties were to be sanctioned, or as to the status of German trade unions.

*Results of the failure of the Moscow meeting of
Ministers*

One of the contributory causes of the Russian fears that the Western States were tending to align themselves in order to form anti-Soviet groups, the fears which had become so manifest at the Moscow session, was the signing of the Franco-British treaty of mutual assistance against possible aggression, as well as the discussions which were already taking place in various quarters as to the desirability of some form of federation for Western Europe. The proposed merger of the American and British zones in Germany was considered in Moscow to be a step in the same direction.

Mr. Bevin, on his way to Moscow, in a speech delivered at Dunkirk (March 5th, 1947) was at pains to emphasise that the Anglo-French treaty was not directed against the Soviet Union.

"I think Soviet Russia realises," he said, "that . . . this treaty . . . is not [intended to be a move in forming] a Western bloc, but is an attempt to make one contribution, woven in the rest of the fabric of Europe and the world, into a perfect pattern of a universal peace." Soviet observers were not slow, however, to note that only a short time previously President Truman had announced that American aid was being given to Turkey and Greece, and that this was being done to establish these two countries, in his own words, "as bastions against Communism."

Mr. Bevin reported on the failure of the Moscow session to the House of Commons on May 15th, 1947. After stating that "Stalin agreed with me that we should get on with revision of the Anglo-Soviet alliance of 1942," and that the matter "was still under consideration," he continued: "If the task of making peace treaties with Germany and Austria is unduly delayed, and if relations between East and West are not put on a more satisfactory basis, no one can prophesy the course that the world will take." Commenting on this report, in the same debate, Mr. Eden said: "It is no use deluding ourselves that the position is better than it really is. While I endorse Mr. Bevin's determination to persevere, I cannot feel it alters the gravity of the setback that has occurred."

Cards on the Table, an official Labour Party publication which appeared about this time, declared that Mr. Bevin "wants as close an association with the Soviet Union as we now have with the United States." It attributed the "unceasing Russian attacks on British policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to the determination of the Russians to expand their security system in these areas" in preparation for the "clash between Communist Russia and Capitalist America which the men in power in the Soviet Union have taught themselves to regard as inevitable."

Izvestia replied at some length (May 22nd, 1947) to Mr. Bevin's speech, and likened it to "a reflection of the Moscow session in a curved mirror. . . . Mr. Bevin has confused the issue of reparation. In the face of numerous facts one cannot deny that the [Western] Allies have failed to fulfil their

obligations following from the Crimean and Potsdam decisions.” (This complaint referred to Mr. Bevin’s assertion that “you have to get a balanced economy [in Germany] before you can reasonably take reparations out of current production.”) Speaking of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, *Izvestia* declared that “Russians see little advantage to themselves in a new treaty which would leave the British Government free to participate with Truman in an anti-Communist alignment all over the world. Russians desire a guarantee against such a prospect.”

No report of Mr. Bevin’s speech appeared in the Soviet Press except a summary confined to a brief sentence in a report by the Tass Agency. There was no comment on Mr. Bevin’s announcement that the fusion of the American and British zones in Germany was imminent.

The Times (May 23rd, 1947) referred to the reparations issue in the following terms: “Not even Mr. Gallacher [the Communist M.P.] has urged that we should increase our income tax so that the Germans can give goods away to Russia. Yet this is what the Russian plan for reparations from current production means, and no amount of sentiment about Russia’s damaged towns can disguise it.”

Mr. Bevin’s utterance did not, however, win universal approval in the House of Commons. Mr. W. N. Warbey (Labour member for Luton) complained that it contained “no criticisms of America’s policy of acquiring bases thousands of miles away from her own frontiers, of seeking to convert Japan into an American protectorate, of supplying arms and sending naval and military missions to countries on the very doorstep of the Soviet Union . . . and of scrapping UNRRA in favour of unilateral relief to politically favoured clients.” This speech was one indication of the growing dissatisfaction in some Labour quarters with the general trend of the policy of the British Government.

The Soviet wives

Incidents which are charged with strong emotional sentiments often leave a deeper impression on the political mind than issues of more importance. Few events at this period aroused

greater resentment in ordinary British circles against the Russians than the affair of the Soviet wives. Some fifteen British soldiers, serving in Russia during the war, had married Soviet women and had expected, once the war had terminated, to be allowed to bring their wives back with them to England. According to Soviet law, however, these women, in spite of their marriage, remained Soviet subjects and as such were not entitled to leave their country except by special permission. The official Soviet view was that all able-bodied men and women were needed to assist in the work of postwar reconstruction, and that against this obligation personal considerations were of no avail. Repeated appeals and protests at official level met with no success. When Mr. Bevin was in Moscow for the Foreign Ministers' Council he made a strong request to Stalin himself that the wives should be permitted to rejoin their husbands. Stalin replied that this was a matter for the Supreme Soviet, and that he could do no more than pass on the request to that body. The permission was not granted.

Later on the matter was again raised at a Press conference with Mr. Vyshinsky, the Deputy Foreign Minister. Mr. Vyshinsky's answer was hardly conciliatory. "I am not interested in this question," he remarked. "I am far more interested in the one hundred and fifty thousand Soviet citizens in the British zone of Germany who have not yet been released." The official British rejoinder to this charge was that these persons did not wish to return to the Soviet Union, and that under an Allied agreement there was no obligation to repatriate against their will persons who had not been Soviet subjects before September 1939. As these peoples belonged to Baltic States, they did not belong to the Soviet Union at that date. Mr. Vyshinsky's attitude on the issue of the Soviet wives is a fair illustration of the Russian tendency to justify one course of action by complaining of action taken by the other party in a different field; it also illustrated the Soviet disinclination to override the rules of political discipline.

A letter to *The Times* (August 1st, 1947), signed by five of the husbands, suggested that insult was being added to injury in this affair, inasmuch as these Soviet women were being

subjected to a tax levied on all childless men and women over the age of twenty-one. The amount of the tax was said to be equivalent to £50 a year.

This same issue was raised by Chile in the United Nations and came before the General Assembly on April 25th, 1949. Mrs. Roosevelt, on behalf of the United States, stated that 350 Russian wives of American citizens were forbidden to join their husbands, and the Assembly eventually passed a resolution condemning such forced separation by any State as an infringement of human rights, and calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw such measures. The Soviet defence was that this was an internal matter which lay outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and that America and Australia offered examples of similar treatment: the former in regard to the rights of negroes, and the latter in respect of its immigration regulations respecting non-Europeans.

Meanwhile, efforts were being made to reopen trade relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. In September 1945 a Soviet order for £48 million worth of British goods had been delivered, but the Soviet Government had refused to meet the invoices for the first consignment of £11,500,000, on the ground that the prices were too high. A further effort to reach agreement was made by Mr. Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, who went to Moscow as the head of a British trade delegation. On his return in May 1947 Mr. Wilson stated that the Soviet Government had expressed the view "that a healthy development of Anglo-Soviet trade would not be possible unless some further adjustments of the terms of the credits advanced under the Civil Supplies Agreement of 1941 were made." Mr. Wilson added that he had not had authority to deal with this issue, which must be settled through the usual diplomatic channels. Shortly afterwards Mr. Wilson was able to offer a readjustment of these terms, but by then the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Marshall Aid negotiations and the consequent Soviet decision to organise alternative economic aid to the Communist States in Europe suggested, so Mr. Wilson affirmed, that Russia might not have supplies available for Britain. Nevertheless, the trade talks

were reopened on November 24th, 1947, and Mr. Wilson again journeyed to Moscow. On December 11th he was able to announce that a delivery of 500,000 tons of barley, maize and oats was promised by the Soviet Government under a short-term trade agreement. On January 8th, 1948, it was further announced that 750,000 tons of coarse grains would be supplied by Russia over the next nine months. The British export of capital goods, in payment for this delivery, would be spread over the next three or four years. The first delivery of Soviet grain arrived in London on February 11th, 1948.

On March 2nd, 1948, in the House of Commons, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton criticised this trade agreement, declaring that "materials of which we have urgent need are being sent to the Soviet Union," and that "we are paying for Russian grain in the hardest of hard currencies, namely in machinery and equipment." Mr. Harold Wilson denied that Britain was lending money to Russia which would not be repaid for over fifteen years. "In fact," he said, "it is Russia who is lending us money by the value of the grain which we are getting"—a loan which would not be repaid until Britain had delivered the capital goods.

We must now turn to the important developments in Western relations with the Soviet Union which arose as a result of the offer of Marshall Aid.

IV

THE EFFECT OF MARSHALL AID

The end of UNRRA

No feature of this present epoch has been more conspicuous than the immense productive capacity and consequent wealth of the United States. By the middle of the present century America had become the millionaire of the world—not a millionaire who had to reckon with formidable rivals but a monopolist beyond the reach of any conceivable competition. In the dark days of 1940 the availability of American resources alone stood between Britain and total defeat. American assistance in the war which had been given at first on strict business conditions blossomed out into the more generous terms of 'Lend-Lease' under the beneficent influence of President Roosevelt. It was applied not only to Britain but to Russia, once she had become involved as an ally in the struggle against the Nazi foe.

Lend-Lease had been terminated in 1945 with such peremptory abruptness that in Britain there were whispered suggestions that this was a sign of American displeasure at the return of a Labour Government to power. Although the Soviet Union had obtained a slight extension of Lend-Lease, Stalin had referred to the cessation of this aid as "unfortunate and even brutal." Once the war was over, American assistance, however, proved to be as essential as during the active hostilities, in view of the devastation which Europe, unlike America, had suffered, and the financial straits to which Britain, her European allies and the countries which had endured the yoke of enemy occupation were reduced. America gave valuable aid in food and other goods to populations, which might otherwise have starved, through UNRRA—the U.N.

Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—without political discrimination. UNRRA had been set up in 1943, and though it was anticipated that its main task would be completed by 1947, it was evident that further measures of relief would have to be continued if economic stability was to be restored. The Director-General of UNRRA, Mr. La Guardia, previously Mayor of New York, told the General Assembly in November 1946 that unless relief of this kind continued there would be widespread starvation. He proposed the setting up of a Food Fund to carry on the work of UNRRA, and this was warmly supported by the other representatives, except the American and British delegations. To the dismay of the Assembly America and Britain opposed the plan, and recommended instead that Governments and international organisations should give individual assistance to those countries which they saw fit to help. America and Britain turned down every amended proposal which was suggested, and announced that they would refuse to accept any majority vote on the subject which did not meet their point of view. In other words, any further relief was to be given under conditions of strict political discrimination.

Mr. La Guardia, although an American, was horrified by this decision. "Does the Government of the United States," he exclaimed, "intend to adopt a policy which will make innocent men and women suffer because of the political situation which makes their Government unacceptable to the United States? . . . Each rich nation will choose the recipient and make its own conditions. That's plain, ordinary, old-time power politics that has produced war after war."

UNRRA was finally dissolved in February 1947. Some of its work was, however, carried on by other agencies. The Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) performed much valuable service, without political bias, and free from 'cold war' controversy at least for several years, with East and West co-operating amicably. Nor should it be forgotten that America made a generous gift of fifteen million dollars to this body within five months of its inception.

It must be remembered that a collapse of European economy

would have been highly detrimental to American interests, and that even a delay of European recovery would have been a grave misfortune from the American commercial standpoint. A continued inability on the part of Europe, including Britain, to purchase American goods must eventually have had a serious effect on American economy. Moreover, the consideration which was uppermost in the American mind was the fear that poverty and distress might well provide the very conditions in which revolutionary upheaval and the spread of Communism would be stimulated. This was a disaster which America was at all costs determined to prevent.

That this was the context in which the Marshall Aid proposals were launched is shown by President Truman's speech, delivered a few weeks earlier (March 12th, 1947), when he proclaimed the so-called 'Truman Doctrine' and announced that military aid would be given to Turkey and Greece for the express purpose of 'containing' Communism and Soviet influence. Mr. Dean Acheson at Cleveland on May 8th, 1947, disclosed this object even more deliberately. "These measures of relief and reconstruction," he told his American audience, "have been only in part suggested by humanitarianism. Your Congress has authorised, and your Government is carrying out, a policy of relief and reconstruction today chiefly as a matter of national self-interest. For it is generally agreed that until the various countries get on their feet and become self-supporting there can be no political or economic stability in the world, and no lasting peace or prosperity for any of us. . . . Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we are going to have to concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations. This is merely common sense and sound practice. It is in keeping with the policy announced by President Truman in his special message to Congress on March 12th on aid to Greece and Turkey. *Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and*

human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American aid."

This was a frank utterance, revealing unmistakably that such American assistance as Marshall Aid was to be offered with very definite political qualifications, namely or primarily to those countries supporting the type of political and economic régime of which America approved.*

The Marshall offer

The first indication of the Marshall offer was contained in a speech made by Mr. Marshall at Harvard University. The offer was couched in very general terms: it was described as a 'suggestion' rather than a 'plan.' The European States were invited to draw up a detailed statement as to their needs and to consider what machinery they could provide for the distribution of such assistance as America might decide to supply. No invitation was addressed by America to the Soviet Union or to any specific Government. The invitation to Russia to attend a

* How misleading an impression may be conveyed, when only one side of the case is presented, is shown by the following quotation from a pamphlet issued by the King-Hall Services Ltd. (*Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-52*, No. 6, page 27): "Even more astonishing was the [Soviet] reaction to the Marshall Plan. The U.S.S.R. had accepted a postwar extension of Lend-Lease by the United States and had received a large amount of UNRRA goods; the Soviet Press had even spoken of the United States' moral obligation to provide aid to Europe. But in 1947, when the Marshall Plan's machinery was already almost complete, the Soviet leaders suddenly denounced it, and ordered the Communist members of the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, who had accepted it, to withdraw at once.

"It is clear that at this time some high policy decision was taken in the Politburo, which excluded any friendly ties, economic or otherwise, with the United States. It soon became apparent, with the foundation of the Cominform in September 1947, and the events which followed, what this decision must have been: to go forward with plans for an attempt to extend Soviet power against the democratic nations and to launch the assaults in Europe and Asia which we are still experiencing."

This interpretation is of no more value than that provided by most other controversial propaganda. But it is an apt illustration of how easily a distorted picture can be presented by the type of publication which makes no attempt to understand the reasons for the attitude adopted by those against whom the propaganda is directed.

meeting in Paris to discuss the proposals was sent by Mr. Bevin, who had at once eagerly accepted the implied offer. The Soviet reaction was from the first extremely cautious. The Moscow Government emphasised that it had "no data regarding the character and conditions of the possible economic assistance to European countries from the United States." In an interview in Moscow with Sir Maurice Peterson Mr. Molotov said that "his Government did not feel sufficiently well informed as to the Marshall Plan to offer any opinion but would be interested to receive further information as and when disclosed." Accordingly, the Soviet Union decided to accept Mr. Bevin's invitation and to send a delegation, headed by Mr. Molotov, to Paris on June 27th, 1947.

It is easy enough to appreciate why Mr. Bevin was willing that Britain should avail herself of whatever American economic aid might be forthcoming. Britain was in dire need of such assistance if she were to escape a prolonged phase of increasing privation. Moreover, although America might have preferred to see a Conservative rather than a Labour Government in power, she had no reason to disapprove radically of Labour policy, and was unlikely to impose any ideological conditions as the price of her assistance. Mr. Bevin was at pains to emphasise the unity of outlook between the two peoples in a speech which he delivered at the Independence Day dinner of the American Society in London (July 4th, 1947). After declaring that he loved the Russian people, he added: "America and Britain will continue to think alike. I beg the great American continent to go on with its great mission. . . . As long as I am Foreign Secretary I will work with you. My country will do all it can to harmonise with you."

From the Soviet standpoint, however, the position was very different, and it is interesting to conjecture whether, in inviting Mr. Molotov to Paris, Mr. Bevin failed to realise this, or, if he was aware of the true situation, what his motive was in issuing his invitation. The most probable explanation arises from his desire to go down in history as the Foreign Secretary who had brought peace and settlement to his own country and to the world, and his consequent tendency to persuade himself

and others that the prospects were brighter than he knew them to be. In this instance his optimism took the form of a determination to believe that Russia could be induced to come within the Marshall scheme, and that America could be induced to offer aid to Russia.

It is indeed doubtful whether America ever seriously contemplated applying the Marshall proposals to the Soviet Union, save in the highly unlikely event of Russia abandoning her Communist principles. The Marshall speech was taken in the West specifically to include an offer to Moscow mainly on the strength of a reply of Mr. Marshall at a Press conference, where in answer to a question he expressed the view that he saw no reason why his proposals did not apply to Russia. It is hardly conceivable, however, that American financiers would have consented to the allocation of United States funds to support a Communist régime, in view of the fact that the professed aim of the general policy embodied in Marshall Aid was, according to Mr. Acheson, to "preserve democratic institutions and human freedoms from totalitarian pressures." So far there had been complete silence in Congress. The only public comment had come from Senator Taft. He remarked a few days prior to the Marshall speech, and in reference to the Truman policy, that this contemplated "lending programme would have the effect of raising prices" in the United States.

It was obvious that American reluctance could only be overcome, and the Marshall Plan authorised, by linking it closely with the Truman Doctrine, by emphasising, that is to say, that financial assistance for Europe was the essential means of combating or 'containing' Communism. It did not take Mr. Molotov long to discover this fact. His suspicions were accentuated when he learnt that Marshall Aid was not to be administered through any machinery set up by the United Nations but through an independent medium, in which—so he assumed—American influence would be unchallenged. The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) was ready to hand for precisely the purpose which the Marshall Plan envisaged. But on ECE all the European States were represented, with the exception of Albania, and from the Soviet standpoint it was

ominous that this organisation was bypassed in order, apparently, that the plan should be more completely under American control.

A further ground for Soviet suspicions arose from the fact that before the Paris meeting Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault had drawn up a plan based on the principle of integrating national economies. But, as Mr. Howard K. Smith points out,* "integration in a single plan means that each nation must produce what it produces best. To Mr. Molotov this looked like asking the Eastern countries to jettison their various national 'plans' to industrialise, and to become instead the agricultural granary of the West; that would be the ideal integration. Tied to an industrial nation, an agricultural nation always becomes the weak dependent sister." Within a few days, therefore, Mr. Molotov had packed up his papers, gathered together his retinue of secretaries, and shaken the dust of the Paris Conference from his feet. The Soviet Government proceeded to bring pressure on Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia to withdraw. In a private interview with Jan Masaryk Stalin insisted that Czechoslovak economic and political interests lay with Russia rather than with the West.

The effect of Marshall Aid was thus of extreme importance. It consolidated the two blocs, it drove a deeper wedge than had hitherto existed between the Communist world and the West. Henceforward Soviet policy was directed to a welding together of the East European States so that a scheme, rivalling the Marshall Plan, could be developed and the Communist orbit rendered as economically independent as possible of the West. The rift was now complete. The Soviet Union was finally convinced that it was faced with an organised Western group, sustained by the vast resources of America, and intent on crushing out Communism by attaining world domination. Conversely, the West was assured that the accelerated and intensive preparations by which the satellite States had bound themselves, politically and economically, to Moscow could only mean that a Soviet offensive against the West, probably of a military character, was contemplated.

* *The State of Europe.*

The results of this completed rift we must now trace, observing as far as possible the chronological order of events.

Economic consolidation of Eastern Europe

Soviet fears had from the first been focused on the influence of the American dollar, with all its political implications. When the Bretton Woods Agreement was concluded, the Soviet Union had assumed that the currency of all the signatory States would be linked to the dollar, particularly in view of the provisions of the International Monetary Fund regarding international control over the value of national currencies. Accordingly, though the Moscow Government had signed this agreement, it refrained from ratifying it and from announcing a par value for the rouble.

The same considerations were uppermost in the Russian mind as to the effect of Marshall Aid. It would enable the United States to interfere with both the economic and political development of any country which had become dependent on American assistance, by the mere threat that dollars and goods would be withheld, should the Government of that country propose to take action of which America disapproved, or refuse to take action that America insisted was necessary. Italy, indeed, was faced with this actual threat in March 1948, when Mr. Marshall, Secretary of State, bluntly declared to Italy and all other nations participating in the European Recovery Programme that "benefits under ERP will come to an abrupt end in any country that votes Communism into power."

Once this conclusion had been reached, there was only one course which the Soviet Union could follow. It would be fatal to Soviet interests if the satellite States passed to any extent under American control. Pressure must be used to induce them to reject Marshall Aid, and simultaneously their economic recovery must be brought about by a rival plan, economically independent of Western commitments. Further it was essential, from the Soviet standpoint, that Eastern Europe should not rely to any appreciable degree on supplies from the West which could be suddenly cut off in the event of war.

Accordingly, on July 10th, 1947—less than a month after

Mr. Molotov's abrupt departure from Paris—a trade agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, with Czechoslovakia on July 11th, with Hungary on July 24th, with Yugoslavia on July 25th, with Poland on August 4th and with Rumania on August 26th. In September 1947 the Cominform was set up in order to co-ordinate the work of the Communist Parties in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and in France and Italy. The manifesto announcing the formation of the Cominform declared that this consolidation was necessary in view of "the conditions of sharpened struggle which characterise international relations in the postwar period."

The Bulgarian agreement mainly provided for a supply of Soviet machinery and such materials as raw cotton, in exchange for Bulgarian tobacco, up to a collateral amount of the equivalent of eighty-seven million dollars. Bulgaria, prior to this agreement had not arrived at a stage of economic development which would enable her to absorb more. Bulgaria was probably less attracted by the Marshall offer than any of the other East European States.

The Czechoslovakian agreement was by far the most ambitious. The value of goods to be exchanged over a period of five years was to be equivalent to 500 million dollars on both sides. The Soviet Union was to supply raw materials, such as cotton and grain, in return for textiles, footwear, various manufactured goods and machinery. Payments were to be made only in goods.

The Hungarian agreement covered only one year and involved an exchange of goods, the total of which did not exceed thirty-five million dollars. In order to assist the Yugoslav Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union assented to a postponement of Yugoslav deliveries for three years. Yugoslavia was to supply agricultural produce, as well as copper, tobacco and hemp, in return for Soviet capital goods and the offer of Soviet technical assistance for certain Yugoslav industries.

The first agreement with Poland covered only one year, but a fuller agreement was subsequently concluded for a period of four years, the ceiling of exchange being reckoned at 1,000 million dollars. The later agreement included a nine-year

credit, equivalent to 450 million dollars, for industrialisation. The Soviet Union was to supply raw materials and to receive in return certain non-ferrous metals and manufactured goods. Poland undoubtedly benefited greatly from the Soviet loan; both the Polish and Czechoslovakian requests for a loan from the International Bank had previously been refused. The Rumanian agreement followed much the same pattern, the results being that in respect of her foreign trade over forty-eight per cent. of Rumanian imports came from, and more than fifty per cent. of her exports went to, the Soviet Union.

Trade agreements were also concluded between Hungary and Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The latter treaty was so far reaching as almost to suggest the possibility of a political and economic merging of the two countries.

Some attempt has been made in Western circles to liken these arrangements to the Nazi economic policy towards the States which came under German domination before and during the second world war. But this comparison ignores two fundamental differences between the Nazi and the Soviet attitudes. Germany had attained a high standard of living and required the small States within her orbit only to supply her with the kind of goods which she was unable to obtain elsewhere. She was concerned to keep the standard of living of those States at their existing level in order to obtain the largest amount possible of the goods which she demanded of them, and therefore to restrict their own consumption. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is still in a stage of economic development much below that at which she aims. The Soviet interest, accordingly, is to increase the industrial productivity of the States associated with her in order that her own industrial development may be promoted.

Secondly, the Nazi policy was based on the assumption that the German race was the natural aristocracy of the world, and therefore, as Mr. T. E. M. McKitterick has pointed out,* "to treat Central and Eastern Europe as a colonial area fit only for exploitation in the interests of Germany." The Soviet Union

* *Russian Economic Policy in Eastern Europe.* (Fabian International Bureau.)

is, on the contrary, concerned, as Mr. McKitterick emphasises in the same pamphlet, "to encourage the stability of the régimes [of her associated States] and to keep them favourable to her." She is bound, therefore, to assist them to improve their economic conditions, apart from any consideration of Communist principles as to racial equality.

Proposals for a Western Union

The Marshall Aid proposals had thus accentuated the rhythm of reaction and counter-reaction which was to constitute all too familiar a feature of the postwar period. Every move taken by the one side was regarded by its opponent as a potential offensive which must be met by retaliatory measures. These retaliatory measures in their turn were interpreted as a threat which necessitated further defensive preparations, and so the monotonous, pendulum-like motion continued, the result being a deepening rift, and a thickening of the iron curtain of suspicion and estrangement.

In such a situation the objective observer finds it impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive action. Each party will be sincerely convinced that his motives are defensive, while to his opponent they will inevitably appear to be aggressive. A vicious circle is produced from which it becomes increasingly difficult to escape. The Soviet calculation was that under the Marshall scheme the West would now be reorganised and economically assisted by American finance, that American political influence over the West would be immensely strengthened, and that this constituted a dire threat to Soviet security. Thus, as we have seen, Soviet plans were immediately put into operation for the purpose of the economic consolidation of the Communist bloc, and also of ensuring political, diplomatic and military unity by setting up the Cominform. The West interpreted this move as further preparation for a Communist offensive against the West, and therefore accelerated its schemes for closer political and military alliance between the various Western States. These schemes further confirmed the Soviet apprehensions.

From the Western standpoint the Soviet attempt to launch an offensive campaign for the spread of Communist rule had already been revealed in Greece. The war had resulted in the emergence of two violently opposed forces, a Left-Wing force which claimed to have formed the backbone of Greek resistance to the German invaders, and a force composed of very definite Right-Wing elements. British-American policy had been directed from the first to preserve Greece as a non-Communist oasis in the Balkans, and therefore to support any Government which was determined not to come within the Soviet sphere of influence. Guerrilla fighting had broken out towards the end of 1946, the Left-Wing anti-Government forces receiving support from Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia. The Greek Communist Party was declared illegal by the Government in the latter half of 1947, and vigorous measures were taken to suppress the rebels. Resistance to the Government, however, intensified, and in December 1947 a rival Government was set up in the area under Left-Wing occupation. In the summer of 1948 the rebels were driven back into Albania and Yugoslavia, which countries they used as bases for further raiding operations. The Greek rebel forces were provided with hospitals and training camps in Yugoslav territory and Yugoslav military experts gave the training. What, however, finally brought this military conflict to an end was the breakaway of Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc, a development which we shall be considering at a later stage. The effect of this schism was that Yugoslavia was no longer willing to aid the Greek resistance army, and that, cut off from this assistance, that army was unable to continue the struggle.

The United Nations had attempted to exercise some control over these disturbances by sending a commission to inspect the area of fighting, as well as to visit Sofia and Belgrade, so as to ascertain how far the other Balkan States were helping the rebels and thereby attempting to overthrow the Greek Government. A sub-commission was subsequently appointed to report on military activities at the frontiers. The fact that the Soviet Union opposed the appointment of these bodies confirmed the Western group in its suspicions that Russia was

endeavouring through its Balkan satellites to bring Greece under Communist domination.

If this was true, it was equally true that from the Soviet standpoint America and Britain were to be regarded as similarly interfering in Greek affairs in order to ensure that Greece did not go Communist, and therefore, to ensure that she remained subject to Western domination. In the elections to appoint a Government for Greece the Western Powers might take all available precautions to see that the Greek people were able to vote freely, but there could be little guarantee that pressure behind the scenes was not being exercised to make certain the appointment of an anti-Communist Government. The anti-Communist attitude of both America and Britain was no secret, and since Greece relied on financial support from these sources, the average middle-class Greek voter would naturally be disposed to vote in a manner which he knew these powerful allies would approve. Moreover, as usually happens where a country is in a highly unsettled condition, where what is virtually a civil war is raging, and where the intention of the Government is to suppress Communist resistance, political liberties were at a discount. Stories soon began to emerge of the savage cruelties perpetrated on political victims in Greek prisons, such as Makronisos, of sentences of death passed on individuals solely on account of their political convictions, on men, indeed, whose affinities were Liberal and Social Democratic, and who could not be accused of Communist sympathies. It is no part of our immediate task to examine these accusations in detail. It is sufficient to emphasise that these reports have been so widespread and consistent that the brutality of Greek police methods can hardly be doubted. The Soviet criticism that Anglo-American interests were helping to maintain a reactionary and violently repressive Government was therefore not without foundation. Two wrongs do not make a right, but the Western charge against the ruthlessness of Communist régimes was morally weakened, in so far as it could be shown that similar abuses were being perpetrated in the one Balkan State where American-British influence was paramount.

The Western conclusion, however, was that the Soviet Union clearly intended to impose Communist rule, and therefore its own aggressive supremacy, whenever the opportunity to do so arose. Thus, in a broadcast on January 3rd, 1948, Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister, insisted that "Soviet Communism pursues a policy which threatens with a new form of imperialism—ideological, economic and strategic—the welfare and way of life of the other nations of Europe. At the other end of the scale," he continued, "the United States stands for individual liberty in the political sphere and for the maintenance of human rights; but its economy is based on capitalism, with all the problems which that presents." *Pravda's* comment on this utterance (January 11th, 1948) was that "the false conception of so-called democratic socialism with which Attlee screens Labour's submission to American capitalism is a conception devoid of democracy and socialism."

The proposal that West European States must consolidate their forces on a pattern corresponding to some extent to the Cominform grouping, though avoiding anything akin to Soviet authoritarianism, began to gain ground. The term 'Western Union' was increasingly heard. "I believe the time is ripe for the consolidation of Western Europe," Mr. Bevin declared in the House of Commons on January 22nd, 1948. "... We shall not be deterred by threats . . . from our aims of uniting by trade, social culture and other contacts, those nations of Europe that are ready to co-operate." He went on to argue that 'Western Union' would fit in with the Charter of the United Nations. The Moscow radio a few days later described this speech as "a smoke-screen for the creation of a Western bloc."

If a Western Union, then Germany must obviously be a constituent and highly important member. But this could mean only Western Germany and not the Soviet zone, so that inclusion of Germany in Western Union would perpetuate and deepen the division of Germany. In February 1948 talks between the British, American and French Ministers were opened in London to consider this question. The Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia protested against these

consultations, but the official Western reply was that no violation of the Yalta or Potsdam agreements was contemplated.

Relations between the West and the Soviet Union were obviously deteriorating at a more rapid rate than in any previous period. On March 1st, 1948, the *Daily Herald* remarked in a leading article that "if Britain and America have made mistakes in their dealings with Russia, those mistakes are trivial in comparison with the stupidity, boorishness and arrogance of Russia's spokesmen at almost every major international conference. . . . The Soviet policy is sinister, and the Western peoples would be reckless if they ignored its implications."

An incident which occurred in the following month, and which was to be the precursor of several similar events, is a fair illustration of the strained situation which by now had developed. A British Viking clashed with a Soviet fighter plane, and was brought down in flames over the western outskirts of Berlin. Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet commander in Germany, refused the request for a quadripartite commission of inquiry, and laid the blame for the accident on the British authorities. The Russians also refused to allow American eye-witnesses of the disaster to give evidence, although some Americans had been killed in the plane. As their refusal was not supported, the Russians withdrew from the investigations. The court of inquiry, so depleted, found the Soviet pilot to be entirely to blame. The presence of the Soviet fighter had not been notified to the British authorities, nor apparently did the Soviet officials at the Berlin Air Safety Centre know it was in the air. In the West the worst motives were attributed to the Soviet attitude. But a far more serious offensive on the part of the Soviet Government was now about to materialise.

V

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

The emergence of a West German State

THE fact that Berlin is situated in the eastern half of Germany, and therefore well within the Soviet zone, meant that the line of communication between the capital and the zones for which the three Western Powers were responsible was narrow and precarious. As early as April 1948 it was apparent that the Soviet authorities were determined to make access from Western Germany increasingly difficult. Transport was held up, at first on the score of technical reasons, such as repairs on the roads or railways. These obstructions were intensified until the city was completely cut off from the West. An entire blockade was eventually established, the result being that the western sectors of Berlin were placed in a state of siege. This was the most openly warlike gesture on which either side had as yet ventured.

What had induced the Soviet Government to have recourse to so desperate a challenge? The main reason was clearly a determination to threaten and, if possible, to prevent, the Western intention to bring Western Germany into the Western European group, thus immensely increasing the military and industrial potentialities of that group. The Western Allies had by now set up a West German Government and had constituted Frankfurt the capital of what was virtually a separate German State. The Soviet case was that the allocation of sectors of Berlin, although within the Soviet zone, to American, British and French occupation forces had been agreed only on the principle that Berlin was the capital of a united Germany. Once Germany was dismembered, this right disappeared. So far as the Western Allies were concerned, Bonn, not Berlin,

became the capital. The Western action was aggravated, in the Russian view, by the fact that the Western Powers had introduced a reformed currency in those zones of Germany under their control, thus obliging the Soviet Union to reform the currency in its own zone. The Western Allies had then introduced their new currency into their sectors of Berlin, causing thereby serious economic confusion not only in Soviet Berlin but in the whole Soviet zone of Germany. In Soviet eyes this move was a clear indication that the Allies were planning to set up a united and independent Western Germany, and the Soviet authorities had demanded an explanation at the Allied Control Council, but were given no answer. The Soviet representative walked out of the Council as a gesture of his disapproval.

The Soviet complaint is conveniently set out in the official reply from Moscow to an American note protesting against the blockade. "The situation which has arisen in Berlin," it contended, "is a result of the violation by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, of the agreed decision adopted by the Four Powers in relation to Germany and Berlin, expressed in the carrying out of a separate currency reform, the introduction of special currency notes for the Western sectors of Berlin, and the policy of dismembering Germany. . . . In accordance with this agreement the Governments of the Four Powers accepted responsibility for administering Germany, and undertook to determine jointly the status of Germany. . . . Measures for the demilitarisation of Germany have not been completed [by the Western Powers], and such an important centre of German war industry as the Ruhr has been removed from the control of the Four Powers.

"The quadrilateral administration of Berlin is an inseparable component part of the agreement on the quadrilateral administration of Germany as a whole. When the Western Governments began to create in Frankfurt-on-Main a capital for the Government of West Germany, they thereby undermined also the legal basis on which rested their right to participate in the administration of Berlin. . . . Berlin is in the centre of the Soviet zone and is part of that zone. The interests of the Berlin

population do not admit of a situation where there has been introduced into Berlin, or even into the Western sectors of Berlin, a special currency which is not in circulation in the Soviet zone. Moreover, the introduction of separate currency reform in the Western zones of Germany has placed Germany, and with it the entire Soviet zone of occupation, in a position where these . . . currency notes . . . threatened to pour into Berlin and into the Soviet zone. The Soviet Command was therefore compelled to adopt urgent measures to safeguard the interests of the German population as well as those of the economy of the Soviet zone and the area of Greater Berlin."

This statement was accompanied by an offer to send supplies into Berlin from Eastern Germany, an offer which the Western Allies at once declined. The Soviet statement also included the warning that the start of any negotiations to bring about a settlement as to Berlin could not be "linked with the fulfilment of any preliminary conditions."

The Times, commenting on this statement (July 16th, 1948), remarked that Russia demanded "a share in the control of the Ruhr without offering to allow any form of Four Power control in the Eastern zone. . . . It was only when the Western Powers, despairing of agreement and determined to end the distress in Western Germany, began seriously to organise their zones and bring them into the European Recovery Plan, that the Russians showed signs of desiring German unity."

The Blockade and the Air Lift

Co-operation between the Soviet and Western administration of Berlin was finally dissolved. On July 1st, 1948, Colonel Kalinin, chairman for the month of July of the Kommandatura (the joint body of control), announced that Soviet representatives would no longer participate in the quadripartite meetings. The reasons given for this withdrawal included the complaint regarding the introduction of the reformed currency into Berlin, and also a complaint concerning the behaviour of the American representative at a previous meeting. Colonel Hawley, the representative in question, subsequently explained that after a thirteen hours unbroken session he was too tired to

carry on, and had left the meeting, arranging for his deputy to act as substitute.

The Western Powers were faced with the grave problem of how to overcome the siege and to save the West Berliners from starvation. It is alleged that the American military authorities at one moment proposed to rush the Soviet blockade with armoured cars and tanks, and that this desperate measure was only prevented by urgent appeals at the eleventh hour from the British and French Governments. Such action might well have precipitated a third world war. The wiser and much more imaginative course which the three Allies adopted was to organise a continuous air service carrying supplies into the city from the West. This ambitious operation was carried out successfully, without interruption, for more than twelve months. As each heavily laden plane landed at the Berlin airport and discharged its cargo, another plane would be approaching on a similar mission. This achievement inevitably involved for America and Britain an immense financial burden as well as a test of technical efficiency. It seems probable that the Soviet authorities did not expect that the Western Allies would have the will or the ability to maintain the air lift for so long. Presumably, had the deadlock persisted, there must have been a time limit beyond which America and Britain could not have kept up the service, certainly at the same rate. It might have been necessary to evacuate a large proportion of the city population. But, viewed as a gesture of determination not to be driven from the city, the ' Battle of Berlin ' must be reckoned as very definitely a Western victory in the cold war.

Meanwhile, the three Western Powers were endeavouring to settle the dispute through diplomatic channels. On August 2nd, 1948—after forty-six days of the blockade—envoys of the three Powers had an interview with Stalin and Molotov lasting two hours. Other meetings took place with Mr. Molotov alone. On August 20th another interview with Stalin and Molotov lasted nearly five hours and only ended at two in the morning. No agreement, however, was reached, and the envoys were recalled on September 20th to Paris, to report to the three Foreign Ministers. On September 22nd Mr. Bevin in the

House of Commons described the blockade as 'dastardly' and announced the breakdown of the negotiations in Moscow. "We must see it through," he declared. "We can go on during the winter." On September 27th the three Powers stated that they were bringing the issue before the United Nations Assembly.

Western proposals for a Berlin settlement

The Anglo-American Note to the United Nations was delivered at the end of September 1948. In a detailed summary describing the Note and its context the *Manchester Guardian* (September 30th, 1948) traced the commencement of the troubles to the previous year when Cominform forces "were mobilised through Eastern Europe against the European Recovery Plan and the setting up of West Germany on its own feet." The Russians "had already tried to capture the Berlin City Government and had almost brought to a standstill Four Power co-operation through the Allied Control Council. Restrictions on access to Berlin from the West were steadily tightened through April and May, and after June 16th, when Western currency reform took effect, became total except for the air. The Russians refused to discuss currency reform in Berlin and carried through their own [arrangements]. The Western Allies responded by introducing the Western currency into their sectors of Berlin. . . . The three Western Governors protested to Russia on July 6th, taking their stand on the Russian breach of the postwar agreements. The Russian reply of July 14th cast aside the technical excuses [originally given as the reason for restrictions on transport], and declared in effect that the blockade was a retaliation for what the Allies were doing in their zones of Germany. It claimed that their rights in Berlin had lapsed and that Berlin was a part of the Soviet zone." This summary went on to report the personal contacts between the Western envoys and Stalin and Molotov. "The Western Allies made it clear that they agree that the Russian currency should rule in Berlin under proper safeguards. The first conversation with Stalin was not unhopeful, though he asked, but did not press, for a reversal of the steps towards

[setting up] a West German Government." Conversations with Molotov had followed, dealing with the application of the principles agreed to by Stalin. At first Molotov had insisted that the Western Allies had forfeited their rights in Berlin, but when the envoys refused to admit that this was so, he seemed to abandon the contention. The next phase was a detailed discussion of the conditions of lifting the blockade and settling the currency question. This exploratory phase seemed fairly favourable. Mr. Molotov suggested that the currency details might be left to the Military Commanders in Berlin, but the Western (representatives) pointed out that this would merely transfer unsettled problems from Moscow to Berlin. On August 23rd Stalin was again appealed to, and he made apparent concessions, agreeing to the sending of a directive to the Military Commander. The Commanders met on August 31st, and "it soon became apparent that Marshal Sokolovsky was not ready to honour the undertakings reached in Moscow."

The basic Western conditions for a settlement were: first, a recognition of their coequal rights to remain in Berlin and an abandonment of the contention that the whole city was part of the Soviet zone; secondly, that there would be no withdrawal of the plans already carried out by the Three Powers in Western Germany; and, thirdly, proper quadripartite control of the Soviet currency, which the Western Allies were ready to agree should circulate in Berlin. But Marshal Sokolovsky now demanded that air transport into the city should be subject to restrictions, and that the Western Powers should have no control over the circulation of the Soviet mark in the city. The Western Powers then made further representations to Stalin, on the ground that the Marshal was acting contrary to Stalin's previous agreements. Stalin was away on holiday, but a Soviet reply was received on September 18th, upholding the Military Commander's attitude. After a further exchange of Notes the three Western Governments announced that they would bring their complaint against the Soviet Union before the Security Council, while repeating that at any time they would be willing to reopen discussions with

Moscow on all outstanding issues regarding Germany, provided they were not asked to negotiate under duress, by entering into discussions on condition that they should first accept Soviet demands.

Commenting on this impasse the *Manchester Guardian* observed (September 30th, 1948): "Taking everything together we must conclude that the Russians did not want a settlement on any terms tolerable to the Western Powers. . . . They were ready only for a settlement on terms of surrender."

The Danubian dispute

Berlin was not the only theatre at this time where the West complained of Soviet hostility and obstruction. The question of how international traffic on the River Danube should be controlled had been left over from the Peace Conference and the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Pending any final agreement on this issue, the administration of control had passed into the hands of the Communist riparian States of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union was evidently reluctant that this arrangement should be disturbed. France considered that no satisfactory agreement could be reached, and that a conference would prove futile. America, however, was determined to bind the Soviet to its previous assent to a French compromise-proposal, namely that a conference on this question should be held and that the general principle of free navigation should be upheld, without naming any specific guarantees. Owing to American persistence, a conference was held in Belgrade at the end of July 1948.

The Western Powers took their stand on a Convention of 1921 which had confirmed the establishment of a European Danube Commission, originally set up in 1856, and including Britain, France, Rumania and Italy. Both France and Britain contended that the legal rights which they had acquired under that Convention could not be annulled without their consent. Certain powers of this Commission had been limited by an agreement reached in 1938, and the Soviet argument was that this later provision replaced the 1921 Convention. But the

fundamental difference between the two standpoints was that the West regarded the river as an international waterway, the control of which should be vested in an international body; whereas the Soviet Union held that such control should be confined to the riparian States, and that the Anglo-American attempts to share in this control was another instance of Western interference with East European affairs. President Truman, shortly after Potsdam, had reaffirmed the American claim that there should be "free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future peace and security of the world." Both Britain and America also maintained that as occupying Powers of Austria they had an additional right to be represented on any governing body. Mr. Molotov urged that the Western claim was dictated by motives of 'economic imperialism' and by an American desire to gain control in the Balkans by an infiltration of American capital.* Further, America alleged that since the war her own and other Western-owned vessels had been deliberately prevented from using the waterway by Soviet obstruction, and that as a result international trade along that route had seriously declined. The Soviet attitude was to dismiss the appeals to previous rights over the Danube as the legacy of an obsolete imperialist era. In the Soviet view the river belonged only to those States past whose territory it flowed.

* Before discussing whether Mr. Molotov's objection was due to irrational ideological prejudice, it may be well to note a comment on this issue which appears in *The Search for Peace Settlements*, an admirably connoted survey of postwar relations, compiled by Redvers Opie and others on behalf of the Brookings Institution at Washington, and therefore presenting the American standpoint. "The United States has had a direct interest in lowering the costs of occupation through increasing the trade of these two countries [Germany and Austria] with the Danubian basin. Free navigation in the Danube would contribute to this end and to the general aims of American foreign economic policy. The latter aspect is of great importance, for to accept on principle a permanently State-controlled trading system in the Danubian basin, of which restrictive practices on the river itself are but a part, would be to accept a considerable defeat for American economic policy. This was at the back of the President's statement recommending international control of the Danube."

How Mr. Molotov would interpret the aims of "American economic policy" can be readily imagined.

The Belgrade Conference opened inauspiciously. "The door was open for you [the Western delegates] to come," Mr. Vyshinsky, the chairman, remarked. "The same door is open for you to leave, if that is what you wish." Austria, although a Danubian State, was not allowed, as an ex-enemy, to vote. Russian and French were adopted as the official languages to be employed at the Conference. The East European countries were in a majority and rejected all the American, British and French amendments. The majority agreed that the 'Iron Gates' should be administered by Rumania and Yugoslavia, while the delta and mouth of the river were to be controlled by Rumania and the Soviet Union. The rest of the waterway was to be administered by a Commission consisting of the riparian States other than Austria. The Commission was formally appointed in November 1949, but by then Yugoslavia was no longer within the Cominform group.

Needless to say, America, France and Britain vigorously protested against these decisions.

Soviet currency in West Berlin

Meanwhile, the Berlin blockade and the Western air lift continued. The Western Powers brought the matter before the Security Council in October 1948, contending that as a threat to peace it came within the jurisdiction of that body, under the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union denied that there was any threat to peace, that it should not be considered by the Security Council, but that a further meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers should be summoned. The Soviet Government reiterated its claim that the Western Powers were alone responsible for what was happening in Berlin, since they had dismembered Germany by setting up a separate German Government.

Faced with the refusal of the Soviet Union to take part in Security Council discussions, or to give information about the restrictions which had been imposed and other relevant information, and faced also with the refusal of the Western Powers to call a further meeting of the Foreign Ministers

Council until the blockade had been removed, the neutral States on the Security Council explored other possibilities of a settlement. On October 25th it was announced that they were examining a Soviet suggestion that the blockade should be raised by stages, but this proposal was rejected by the Western Powers. Britain and the United States, however, announced that they would vote for a prior resolution drafted by the neutral States (on October 22nd), calling for the immediate removal of restrictions on transport entering Berlin, for a meeting of the four Military Commanders to arrange for a uniform currency, and for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss urgent German problems. The Soviet Union would not accept this resolution, and exercised its right of veto.

Meanwhile, a committee of economic experts was set up by the Security Council to work out plans for a settlement of the currency difficulty. The Soviet representative, according to Mr. Evatt of Australia—at that time President of the General Assembly—agreed to co-operate but raised certain objections to detailed proposals, in particular to a technical proposal advanced by America and supported by France and Britain. The committee then abandoned its task as hopeless, and in March 1949 the three Western Powers announced that Soviet currency would cease to be legal tender in their sectors of Berlin.

Soviet Peace Campaign

During the early stages of the Berlin blockade, in the summer of 1948, a 'peace campaign' was launched under Cominform patronage, consisting of a number of international conferences, the avowed object of which was to promote world unity and avert the danger of war. The first of these conferences was held at Wroclaw, in Poland, and was confined mainly to 'intellectuals.' Some prominent American and British writers, artists, professors and scientists accepted the invitation to attend, as did representatives from other Western countries. A succession of conferences followed, at New York, Paris, Vienna and elsewhere, a World Peace Council being formed for the purpose. In March 1950 a Stockholm Peace Conference

was convened from which emanated the 'Stockholm Peace Appeal.' The appeal faithfully embodied the policy proposals of the Soviet Government. Communist organisers in every country were urged to collect signatures for the appeal, and several million were obtained.

At all these conferences the policy programme advocated and adopted was identical with the general Communist line on international affairs, and the World Peace Council came to be regarded by the Western public generally as an organ designed to promote Cominform propaganda. Sponsors of the World Peace Council were always able to reply to this criticism by insisting that the conferences, as well as the Council itself, were open to all those who were genuinely working for peace, whether their standpoint was Communist or not; if non-Communist views were not expressed at these gatherings, such critics had only themselves to thank for boycotting the proceedings. The fact remained, however, that the W.P.C. was generally supported only by those elements in Western States which were openly Communist or at least genuinely sympathetic to the Soviet and Communist policy.

As regards the Berlin dispute the Soviet propagandists had at least one strong card to play. The Western Powers, whatever the alleged justification, had been the first to set up a separate sectional German State, with its own Government. It was not until May 15th, 1949, that elections to a 'People's Congress' were held in the Soviet zone. A sponsored list of candidates was presented, on the Soviet pattern of elections, but nearly a third of the twelve million electors voted against the ticket. Eventually—in October 1949—an East German Government was set up. The Socialist Unity Party—a fusion of Communists and Socialists—held the majority of seats in the Cabinet. The Western High Commissioners declared that this Government was "devoid of any legal basis" on the ground that it had not been formed as the result of what the West considered to be a 'free' election with rival candidates.

Meanwhile, during the spring of 1949, conversations had been proceeding between the American and Soviet representatives at the United Nations. In April it was suddenly announced

that the Soviet Union had agreed to lift the Berlin blockade by May 12th. There were still many disputes over trade restrictions and transport. Indeed, as late as January 1950 there was a sufficiently revived interference by the Soviet authorities with traffic between West Germany and Berlin to constitute what was termed a 'Little Blockade.' In June the Soviet authorities refused to supply the Western sectors of Berlin with electric power and water, but by August this dispute was settled.

The air lift ceased at the end of September 1949. The number of flights by Western planes into Berlin had exceeded 277,000.

VI

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN COUP D'ÉTAT

Political consolidation of Eastern Europe

WE must now turn our attention to a dramatic development which hardened the heart of the West, and deepened its fears of Soviet motives, more than any other event in this postwar period. Many of those, particularly on the Leftward side of politics, who had hitherto clung to the belief that Russia was not so black as she had been painted by Western propaganda, were now convinced that the Soviet Government was a remorseless and perilous foe, bent on expanding its power wherever the opportunity to do so presented itself. As this development is probably the chief grievance of the Western charges against the Soviet Union, we shall need to examine it with particular care and objectivity.

We must take into account in our approach to this history that the Soviet policy was centred on the belief that it had become increasingly necessary to consolidate the smaller adjacent States, through the Cominform, as a group which would follow the direction of Moscow and pool military and economic resources in complete unity. In the Soviet estimate it was now clear that the West intended to set up some form of federal organisation in Western Europe, supported by America under the Marshall Plan, dominated by America, and armed to its fullest capacity. The Anglo-American attempt to gain a place in the administrative control of Danubian traffic, the repeated criticisms and endeavours to interfere in the domestic affairs of Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and, above all, the establishment of a West German State and the evident intention of creating a West German Army, confirmed the Soviet view

that it was essential to push forward with similar measures on the Communist side of the 'iron curtain.'

It is a familiar feature of all such controversies that each side should argue that the other commenced the process, that the other party bears the original blame. Both the West and the Soviet Union argue that it is the action of their opponent which has compelled them, in retaliation, to resort to a mobilisation of their forces and the creation of barriers between the two camps. It is usually profitless, however, to become involved in an attempt to discover who was first responsible for the cleavage. It is equally profitless to examine how sincere are the protests of both parties that the military preparations to which they have committed themselves are not offensive in aim. As we shall see presently, the Western States have consistently maintained that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is wholly defensive and non-aggressive. However genuine this contention, in its practical effect it is worthless. The other side will invariably regard such preparations as offensive. The Soviet assurance that the consolidation of the Cominform bloc is innocent of any aggressive motive, and is solely precautionary, is never likely to be accepted by the West. The fact is that any military mobilisation by a strong Power, however peaceful the desires of its promoters, becomes a threat to the State against which the promoters of mobilisation seek to protect themselves. Indeed, experience shows that it is all too easy for a Government, having built up military strength, to persuade itself that, still in self-defence, it is necessary to commence hostilities. The plea in such cases is that, as the enemy is sure to attack, it is wise strategy to take him by surprise and get in the first blow.

The policy of the Soviet Union, accordingly, was to ensure that all its associated States should concur with Moscow in their foreign policy, and that therefore their Governments should be of such a nature as to be willing to accept Moscow direction. This meant that all such Governments should be Communist or pro-Communist in complexion. In the Soviet 'satellite' States the process of strengthening Communist influence was always discernible. In Rumania, although at first Moscow had allowed the monarchy to survive, ultimate pressure

brought about the abdication of King Michael, at the end of 1947. A permanent monarchical régime in that country must, sooner or later, have proved incompatible with Soviet designs.

In this preliminary survey no suggestion is implied that the Western and the Soviet methods of achieving political consolidation have been identical. The Soviet method has always been uncompromisingly authoritarian. In the Western group no direct compulsion was used to bring about a change of Government in any of the constituent States; America did not demand the substitution of a pro-capitalist for a Labour Ministry in Britain. The West professed to be acting on the democratic principle of the right of self-determination for each country. Yet it is to be questioned whether America or Britain would have tolerated the emergence of a Communist Government in any Western State—say, in France or Italy—even if that Government had been returned by a free vote of the electorate. In that eventuality America would certainly have withdrawn all financial assistance, and, quite probably, would have considered it necessary actually to intervene.

Soviet distrust of Czechoslovak tendencies

But, of all the States nominally within the Soviet orbit, it was Czechoslovakia, whose integrity was chiefly doubted by the Moscow leaders.

Czechoslovakia is largely Slav, and the Czech tradition has for many centuries been pro-Russian. In the first world war Czech forces had deserted from the Austrian command and fought on the Russian side. On the other hand, Czechoslovakian cultural and political affinities were pro-Western. In the interwar period the Czechoslovakian State had preserved a type of political régime which, in Western eyes, was much nearer the liberal democratic pattern than that of any other country on the Soviet side of the iron curtain. The Communist Party was supported by the largest number of voters in the Czech section, but the Government was a coalition, consisting of Social Democrat and 'Liberal' elements as well as Communists. A considerable amount of socialisation in industry had been carried out, and had caused little unsettlement,

since most of the wealthy owners of businesses and land estates had been pro-German and had had their property confiscated as a result of the war. But the process of socialisation was far from complete. In Slovakia especially, resistance on the part of the peasants to collectivisation was acute and opposition to Communist influence was strong.

Any visitor to Czechoslovakia, after the war and prior to 1948, would find himself confronted by assurances on all sides that the country was in the happy position of having actually formed the bridge between West and East. He would be told how cordial was the co-operation between the Communist and non-Communist parties within the Government. He would be reminded that Czechoslovakia enjoyed the most amicable relations both with Moscow and the West, that Czechoslovakia had a foot in both camps and showed that the iron curtain was an illusion.* But beneath the surface there was evidence of grave internal dissension. The revolution was half-baked. Many of the non-Communist leaders were satisfied with the *status quo* and resented any proposal that the socialisation of the system should be carried further. The Communists, on the other hand, believed that the country required a drastic and immediate revolution, and were determined to overcome resistance to that end.

It was in July 1947 that the Czechoslovakian Government unanimously decided to avail itself of the Marshall offer, the Communist as well as the non-Communist Ministers assenting. At the same time there was a further gesture towards the West

* When I visited Czechoslovakia in the late summer of 1947, I was inclined to accept these assurances as valid. Looking back, however, at various personal experiences I see they had a significance which I did not then perceive. I heard Jan Masaryk describe, 'off the record,' his interview with Stalin after Czechoslovakia had decided to accept Marshall Aid. I listened to his account of how, in an entirely friendly conversation, he had become convinced that Marshall Aid would not be in Czech interests. My visit left me with the impression that there was fundamental conflict in political outlook among several of the leading statesmen. I realise now that both Mr. Masaryk and his associates were insisting overmuch on the unity and happy conditions of their country, and that this was psychologically a defence mechanism which they were erecting to disguise their growing anxieties.

which was disclosed in a personal letter sent by President Beneš to Stalin, announcing that his country desired to renew its political and military alliance with France. Nothing could have been more inopportune from the Russian standpoint. The Soviet Union had decided that the Marshall Plan denoted an attempt to bring Europe under American financial and therefore political domination, and that the Communist group must accordingly safeguard its financial and political independence. For one of the Soviet's most developed and valuable allies to conclude a treaty with a Western State would run entirely counter to Soviet policy. Accordingly, the Prime Minister, Mr. Gottwald, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Prokop Drtina, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jan Masaryk, were summoned to Moscow to discuss both the question of Soviet-Czech economic relations and the proposed Franco-Czech treaty. Stalin and Molotov insisted that the Czech Government must think more of the dangers of American imperialism than the advantages of American credit. The Czech Ministers were faced with a virtual ultimatum. They were told that their Government must renounce its claims for Marshall Aid that very day. Late that evening Prague submitted to this direction.

There were other indications, trivial in themselves but significant when regarded as features of one picture, which caused the Soviet leaders to view with some distrust the general tendencies of the Czechoslovakian outlook. A caricature of Tito appeared in a Czech Catholic newspaper, and, in spite of a protest from the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague, no official steps were taken to remonstrate with or exact an apology from the editorial staff. The Christian Democrat journal *Obzory* inserted an article commenting in very unfavourable terms on the Soviet-Nazi Pact of 1939. Critical references also appeared in the Press to Anna Pauker and La Pasionaria—both Communist heroines at that time. One of the Czech newspapers compared the parts played by the American and Soviet forces in liberating Czechoslovakia, with the inference that the country owed more to the American than to the Red Army. Again, it was at this time that a book by President Beneš was

published, containing some uncomplimentary remarks about the Soviet decision to come to terms with Hitler at the outbreak of the war. It is said that Edouard Beneš altered in page proof the remark, "I believe in the sincerity of the Soviet Union" to "At that time I still believed in the sincerity of the Soviet Union."

The Soviet leaders also regarded with displeasure the visit of Mr. Duchacek and the deputy chairman of the Christian Democrat Party to Paris and London in order to explain—and in effect to apologise—to M. Bidault and Sir Stafford Cripps for the withdrawal of their country from acceptance of Marshall Aid.

Czechoslovakia suffered from a severe drought in the summer of 1947. The Soviet Union came to the rescue by delivering quantities of wheat, but complaints were openly expressed concerning the high price which the Soviet Union charged for these supplies. The Soviet denounced these complaints as symptoms of gross ingratitude.

The Communist coup d'état

The trend of public opinion in Czechoslovakia seemed to the Soviet leaders and other Cominform countries—the Cominform had been established by the end of September 1947—to be exhibiting highly undesirable features. At the elections of students' associations, at the Universities of Prague and Brno, the Marxist poll (Communist and Social Democrat) was reduced to twenty-five per cent. of the total vote, while the Christian Democratic and National Socialist vote rose to seventy-five per cent. At the Congress of the Social Democratic Party, held at Brno, the leader, Zdenek Fierlinger, who was strongly pro-Communist in sympathies, failed to secure re-election and lost his seat on the executive, in company with most of the extreme Left supporters. This was regarded as a sign that the party was very definitely determined to shed its near-Communist affinities.

Early in 1947 Klement Gottwald, who besides being Prime Minister was leader of the Communist Party, had declared that at the 1948 General Election it was essential that the

Communists should receive at least fifty-one per cent. of the total vote. But when Mr. Kopecky, the Minister of Information, through his staff carried out a 'Gallup Poll' test, he found that the Communist representation in Parliament would probably fall to thirty-eight or possibly thirty per cent. of the membership. One day during that summer an attempt was made on the lives of three of the non-Communist Ministers, including Jan Masaryk. A wooden box containing a time-bomb was sent to each of them. There is no evidence that the Communist Party was in any way involved in this act of terrorism, but a Communist deputy, Jura Sosnar, was arrested and convicted of the charge that he had himself placed the explosives in the boxes. The importance of this event was that for the first time the immunity from arrest which members of Parliament had hitherto enjoyed was abrogated. Several other 'unofficial' members of the Communist Party were also charged.

By now there were widespread rumours that the Communists were reacting to this situation by planning a *putsch*. The leaders of the non-Communist parties, however, refused to credit these reports. Their calculation was based on the assumption that the Communists would not resort to force without obtaining the consent of, or indeed receiving an order from, Moscow to do so. They further calculated that Moscow would not take the risk of giving this order in view of the repercussions which it might provoke on the part of Western Governments. They were woefully at fault in their estimate of the probabilities. Active preparations were already on foot to promote a revolution. These preparations were carefully and skilfully laid. The only difficulty was that, as Mr. Nosek, the Minister of the Interior, quickly realised, it would be necessary to carry out a purge of the police, in order to ensure that they would loyally co-operate when the moment for revolutionary action arrived. Nosek therefore decided to replace eight of the commandants of the Prague region by Communist sympathisers. The non-Communist Ministers were now alarmed. They carried a resolution in the Cabinet rescinding Nosek's order, but Mr. Nosek refused to accept the resolution as binding upon him. On February 10th, 1948, therefore, the twelve non-Communist

Ministers interviewed the Prime Minister, and endeavoured to obtain from him an assurance that their resolution would be carried into effect in spite of Nosek's refusal. Mr. Gottwald would give no such assurance, and the twelve Ministers then handed in their resignations.

It can hardly be denied that in doing so these Ministers were guilty of a strangely mistaken strategy. The explanations which they subsequently offered was that by their resignations they hoped to restore respect for the principle of majority control in a Coalition Government, and to precipitate a General Election at the earliest possible moment in defence of that principle. But it is easy enough now to see that, by resigning, they had played right into the hand of their opponents. Mr. Gottwald accepted their resignations and promptly reformed his Government. The new Government was composed of Communists and pro-Communist members of the Social Democratic Party, together with two members, one from the Christian Democrats and the other from the National Socialists, who were ready to accept the Communist programme. On February 25th President Beneš agreed to sanction the Government so composed.

The *coup d'état* was accomplished without violence. On February 21st Nosek had ordered several companies of police to march into Prague and take an oath of allegiance, not, as hitherto, to the Republic and the President, but to Gottwald and himself. On the next two days some arrests were carried out. The homes of the retired Ministers were 'protected' by a police guard. The broadcasting station in Prague was occupied by police, and armed bands of workers' militia paraded in the street, but there were no executions.

Much comment was caused, both in Czechoslovakia and abroad, by the arrival at Prague of the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zorin, by plane, on February 19th. He came ostensibly to superintend deliveries of Russian wheat, though this was a task with which his department would not normally be expected to be concerned. He stayed in the city six days, by which time the *coup* had been successfully accomplished.

The tragedy of Jan Masaryk

All these events had been followed with close and critical attention in the West. But a tragedy was now to occur which filled the mind of the Western public with an intensified sense of horror, and seemed to confirm the worst fears which they had entertained as to the nature of the *coup d'état*.

Jan Masaryk was one of the most popular figures in Europe. He was beloved not only by most of his fellow-countrymen but throughout America, Britain and Western Europe. He had many intimate friends in the West. Speaking English fluently, fully in harmony with Western democratic ideals, genial, entirely approachable and possessing a keen sense of humour, it was felt that, so long as he remained Foreign Minister, nothing could be very wrong with the Czechoslovak régime. The fact that he was the son of that eminent statesman who had played the foremost part in creating the modern Czechoslovak State inspired confidence in, and additionally endeared him to, the Western mind.

As has already been remarked, Jan Masaryk strove to convey the impression in the West that his country had solved the Western-Soviet problem, that it was the bridge between the two rival civilisations, that the Czechoslovak Coalition Government was itself proof that Communists and non-Communist progressives could co-operate happily and with success. But those who knew him personally realised that beneath the surface he was the victim of a fierce tension. His cheerful demeanour was an emotional mask. On the night of March 9th, 1948, he was working as usual in his room in the Czernin Palace, dealing with correspondence as Foreign Minister in the new Government. Early the next morning he jumped from the window of his room into the street below. His body was found at 6 a.m.

Nosek declared that his suicide was induced by the letters which he had received from friends in America, reproaching him for consenting to remain in the new 'Communist' Government. This explanation, however, carried little weight, so far as Western opinion was concerned. It was indeed

obvious that with his outlook and traditions Masaryk could not fail to be prey of deep depression, caused by the developments which had taken place. The bridge between East and West was breaking down, and he was on the bridge. A 'special correspondent' of the *Manchester Guardian*, who had recently been in Prague, in some degree confirmed Mr. Nosek's explanation. Masaryk had told him he proposed to clarify his position in reply to the many critical messages which he had received from America and England, which messages, he admitted, "had hurt him deeply." Then he added: "The end of Czechoslovakia is coming, but it will take some time."

It was only natural that Western opinion should be profoundly shocked by this grim tragedy. In a few quarters, indeed, whispers were heard that Jan Masaryk had not met death by his own hand, and that the Communist Government was responsible. But this was a wild and highly improbable suggestion. Even those who take the most antagonistic view of Communist motives and methods must admit that nothing could have been more inimical to Communist interests than the violent death of so prominent a personage, whose popularity was so great in Czechoslovakia as well as in the West. If the new Government had decided that Masaryk must be removed from office—as may well have been the case, considering his Western affiliations—all they had to do was to put out a statement that he was resigning on account of his health. If they believed that his presence at large would be dangerous and that he might become the focal point of counter-revolutionary revolt, they could have confined him and placed him under guard in some remote residence, on the plea that he had suffered a nervous breakdown and was under treatment. His sensational death, whether genuine suicide or murder disguised as suicide, was the worst possible advertisement for Czech Communism, and the last thing therefore that the Government could have wished to happen. Mr. Eric G. M. Fletcher, M.P., in a letter to *The Times* (March 12th, 1948) indeed stated that "several days before the event he [Masaryk] had intimated his decision to commit suicide. Masaryk felt that this was the only step available to him as a demonstration that the new régime

was a denial of all the ideas of Czech freedom and independence for which he had always stood."

Jan Masaryk was accorded a State funeral which was attended by the Ministers of the Government, and official tributes were paid to his memory. The procession wended its way through vast and sorrowing crowds.

Establishment of a Czech Communist Government

The Social Democratic Party was incorporated with the Communist Party in April 1948. On May 30th the elections took place. There was a 'single list' of 770 candidates, of whom 300 were chosen by Communist leaders. Two hundred and thirty-six were members of the fused Social-Democrat-Communist Party. The ballot was secret, but an official warning was issued against returning blank papers. Absence from the polls without legitimate excuse rendered the offender liable to a fine not exceeding £50.

The 'National Front' received 6,431,963 valid votes out of a total of 7,204,256. In Bohemia and Moravia the Government list secured ninety-one per cent. of the votes cast, in Slovenia eighty-six per cent. and in the whole country over eighty-nine per cent. Most Westerners attributed these results to the single-list election; but there is no doubt that the Government's pledge to bring about a twenty per cent. increase of agricultural production under a Five Year Plan, to fix prices and delivery quotas, and to distribute more fertilisers and other farm implements, captured a large proportion of the peasant vote. It was equally to be expected that there would be an exodus of those citizens, mainly middle class, who had been satisfied with the previous régime and feared the changes which the Communists would enforce. The Czech Ministry of the Interior announced on June 3rd, 1948, that 3,000 persons had fled from Czechoslovakia since February.

The question of how long President Beneš would feel it possible to remain in office, when his own traditions and outlook were so alien to those of the new Ministers was, answered in a letter which he sent to the Prime Minister on June 7th. "On May 4th last year," he wrote, "I informed

you of my very definite intention to resign from the Presidential office. We discussed at that time my decision in connexion with the problem of the whole political situation. I also told you that my physicians, too, recommended me to resign in view of the present state of my health."

Mr. Gottwald replied in generous terms. "Even though Dr. Beneš leaves the Presidency of the Republic," he declared, "he remains for ever in the history of our Republic, in the history of the struggle of the Czech people for freedom and independence for a progressive and just State." On Mr. Gottwald's proposition Dr. Beneš was awarded a pension for life, equivalent to his salary as President, and the use of the castle of Lány for his remaining years.

We have emphasised already that the Czech *coup d'état* created in the West a more unfavourable impression of Soviet and Communist methods than probably any other event in postwar history. If Russia could crush out liberal democracy so ruthlessly in Czechoslovakia, it was clear, in the popular estimate, that she would act similarly in any other country on which she could lay her claws. The mailed fist of Moscow had been revealed more openly than ever before. "Czechoslovakia is a danger signal," Mr. Eden insisted at Leamington (February 28th, 1948), "which must remind the world of 1939." "Two years ago," said Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Labour Attorney-General, in a speech at Stourbridge, "I was violently pro-Russian. I was on the extreme left of my party. . . . Step by step I have been forced more and more to the conclusion that the aims of Communism in Europe are sinister and deadly." He went on to contend that the "recent tragic events in Czechoslovakia had brought a new sense of urgency to the movement for Western Union."

Yet, however strong may be the individual antipathy of non-Communists, on emotional or rational grounds, to the course which the Communists pursued, there are two considerations which must not be forgotten, although they are frequently overlooked. The first is that, rightly or wrongly, the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that it was essential, in the interests of Communist civilisation, and as a result of

the measures which the West was adopting, to form an 'Eastern Union,' a closely knit bloc of Cominform States bound together by a common foreign and economic (Socialist) policy. Once that conclusion had been reached, it was inevitable sooner or later that Soviet pressure would be used to remove the type of Czech Coalition Government which had hitherto held power. There were far too many pro-Western elements among the Ministry to render that Government reliable for the purpose of Cominform unity.

Moscow therefore encouraged, and no doubt promoted, the *coup d'état* by what had always been Russian methods, methods which were not so alien, even to the Czech people, as they would have been to the British or Americans. It should be noted that there were no revolts, no riots, no hostile demonstrations accompanying the Czechoslovak revolution. Nor did any Soviet troops cross the frontier. Though we may attribute the absence of revolt largely to strict disciplinary methods, that argument must never be pressed too far. However rigid a police State, there will invariably be some hostile demonstration, provided opposition to the revolution is deep and widespread.

The second consideration is that Czechoslovakia, however strong its cultural associations with the West, had been since 1945, at least, politically situate within the Soviet sphere. It was in no sense on the Western side of the iron curtain. The fact, therefore, that Russia had used pressure to secure the establishment of a régime in Czechoslovakia of which she approved was not necessarily a proof that she would resort to similar action outside her sphere, however strongly public opinion in the West might interpret these events as evidence of Soviet duplicity.

VII

THE YUGOSLAV SCHISM

Causes of the schism

OF all the resistance movements which were waged against the Germans in occupied countries the Yugoslav campaign became probably the most formidable. Indeed, by the time that the Allies had disowned Mihailovitch and recognised Tito, the Yugoslav forces had reached the status of a national army, engaged in open warfare against the enemy, and had ceased to be a collection of guerrilla bands. The courage of the men and women who fought under Tito, their endurance often under appalling conditions, the skill of their military tactics, the success of their campaigns—even though until the latter stages of the war the Allies could send them little help—make an epic story. The Yugoslavs are naturally proud of their national record, proud that their gradual liberation from the Nazi yoke was due in large measure to their own efforts. Long before the powerful German machine had begun to collapse under the advance of the Soviet armies from the East and the Anglo-American invasion from the West, the Nazis were facing in many parts of Yugoslavia a grave military situation.

Not only did the Yugoslavs stand high in the estimate of their Communist neighbours, on account of the virility of their war struggle, but their orthodoxy in Communist faith and practice was regarded as unimpeachable. Their postwar achievements were held up by Soviet statesmen as a pattern which other Communist States would do well to imitate. When the Cominform was formed, Belgrade was deliberately chosen as its headquarters.

When, in March 1948, the first criticisms from Moscow in

regard to Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Federal Government were published to the world, Western opinion was taken by surprise. No such rift in the Communist camp had been popularly expected. Western opinion was agreeably surprised; it was hoped that this was an indication of the weakening of Communist solidarity and that other satellite States might perhaps similarly break away from Moscow control. In Yugoslavia itself the surprise seems to have been equally widespread. There had been no apparent sign of Soviet disapproval. To the ordinary Yugoslavian, and even to Yugoslav statesmen, it was difficult to understand how and why the quarrel had so suddenly materialised, what were the Soviet motives for precipitating the breach, why praise and approval had been transformed overnight to bitter condemnation. In examining this issue we must of course take account of the major charges and complaints which were levied from the Soviet side and the replies sent from Belgrade.* But it is evident that we must look also beneath the surface of the specific criticisms and endeavour to discover what deeper influences were actually at work. The nearest parallel in English history to the Yugo-Soviet schism is probably the conflict of Henry VIII with the Papacy. Our interpretation of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute would be superficial if we were content merely to attribute it to the accusations mentioned in the official correspondence.

The fundamental cause of the Yugoslav revolt can be traced to the sense of sturdy national independence which is characteristic of many of the races comprising this modern State. There is a legacy of long centuries of struggle against Austrian, Turkish and other oppressions. The analogy of the English Reformation is in some aspects fairly close, for it is unlikely that so large a proportion of the bishops and clergy would have allowed Henry's matrimonial problems to lead them into schism had there not been an underlying Anglican

* An English translation of this correspondence is given in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, a publication issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London). The quotations in this chapter are taken from this publication, by kind permission of the Royal Institute.

jealousy and protest, discernible from time to time through the pre-Reformation era, against papal interference with domestic ecclesiastical affairs. Similarly, Yugoslavia would have been disinclined to submit to Soviet control, where such control appeared to clash with national aspirations. It is significant that prominently in the Cominform communiqué of June 28th, 1948, the assertion is made that "the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that consequently the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the international traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road of nationalism. . . . The Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and mild Socialism without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union."

The Soviet authorities may have been watching for some time the emerging symptoms of this 'nationalist' tendency. If so, it must have caused them considerable anxiety. For, let us again remind ourselves, the Soviet authorities regarded it as essential, because of developments in the West, to build up an entire political and economic unity in the Cominform group, under the discipline of Moscow direction. Any deviation from this plan, whether it be the 'nationalist' ambitions of Yugoslav leaders or the pro-Western sympathies of former Czechoslovak Ministers, was fatal to their policy. Such tendencies had therefore to be suppressed before they grew to serious proportions.

There had been incidents before the rift which must have caused the Moscow statesmen some disquiet. When the Yugoslavs were ordered by the Western Powers to evacuate Trieste, and the occupation of the port by Britain and America had been agreed, Marshal Tito made an angry speech threatening that Yugoslavia would refuse to sign the treaty. As the Soviet Union had then accepted the Trieste settlement, Marshal Tito's denunciation of the Powers included—at least

by implication—the Soviet Union. Again, when the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, announced that his country and Yugoslavia were aiming at the formation of one federal State, *Pravda* immediately attacked the scheme, and Dimitrov was compelled to apologise; Yugoslavia cannot have been held guiltless of this indiscreet utterance.

An earlier and significant Soviet complaint related to the behaviour of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party at the end of the war, when it complained to the head of the Soviet mission in Belgrade of the “undignified manners of some Soviet soldiers and officers” when occupying Yugoslavia. There is some doubt as to the exact wording of this complaint; the Soviet authorities alleged that the Politburo declared that “Soviet officers had inferior standards to the British.” But, however the complaint was framed, the Soviet authorities did not forget that their personnel had been affronted.

The Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence

The first public intimation of trouble was a letter sent by Tito to Molotov on March 20th, 1948, in which he expressed ‘amazement’ at the information conveyed to him two days earlier that the Moscow Government had decided to withdraw from Yugoslavia all military advisers and civilian experts. The reason given for this decision was that these officials found themselves “surrounded by hostility,” a charge which Tito indignantly denied. Tito’s letter drew a detailed and critical reply from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on March 27th, addressed to Tito and other members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In this reply the criticisms were largely expanded. Not only were the complaints as to Yugoslav treatment of Soviet officials explained in detail—such as the charge that these officials were ‘followed’ by Yugoslav security agents, and information withheld from them by Yugoslav Ministries—but Tito’s request that the reasons for Soviet dissatisfaction should be stated was met. These reasons included the allegation that “many high-ranking Yugoslav officials” were spreading rumours that the Soviet Union had “ceased to be revolution-

ary," and intending to create an "anti-Soviet atmosphere"; that the Yugoslav Communist Party had only been given a semi-legal status, and that no criticism or self-criticism existed in the Party; that capitalist elements in the country were still flourishing; and that the Yugoslav Communist Party was virtually submerged in the People's Front, on much the same principle as the Russian Mensheviks had advocated before the Revolution. The Soviet Note admitted that the Yugoslav Communist Party had every "right to criticise the C.P.S.U.,"* even as the C.P.S.U. has the right to criticise any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticised of the opportunity to reply to the criticism."

On April 13th, 1948, Tito and Kardelj answered this communication. They began by emphasising that they "were terribly surprised by its tone and contents." After denying the accuracy of some of the specific charges, they replied to the more general complaints. As regards the complaint that attempts were being made to spread anti-Soviet sentiments, the writers comment: "We feel that on the basis of unidentified persons and suspicious information, it is incorrect to draw conclusions and make accusations like those brought in the letter, against men who have performed invaluable services in popularising the U.S.S.R. in Yugoslavia and won priceless renown in the war of liberation." Again, "it is not true that there is no freedom of criticism in our party. Freedom of criticism and self-criticism exists in our party and is carried out at regular party meetings and conferences of the *Aktiv*.† Therefore, someone thought out this falsehood and passed it on as information to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

"Our party is not semi-legal. . . . It is completely legal and known to every man in Yugoslavia as the leading force.

"The allegation . . . that capitalist elements in the villages and cities are being strengthened, etc., is completely inaccurate.

* Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

† *Aktiv* denotes an inner circle within the Communist Party of officials carrying out party work.

Where did this information come from, when the entire world knows that since the October Revolution nowhere in the world have there been such firm, consistent social changes as in Yugoslavia?

"The People's Front of Yugoslavia by its quality is not only equal to some other Communist parties, which accept anyone into their ranks, but is even better in its organisation and activity. Not everyone can be a member of the People's Front of Yugoslavia even though today it has approximately seven million members. . . . The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has a completely assured leadership in the People's Front because the C.P.Y. is the nucleus of the People's Front. Therefore, there is no danger of its dissolving into the People's Front."

More significant than these somewhat vague rejoinders to vague charges, indicating that before the exchange of Notes, uneasy relations had already emerged, is the final portion of the Yugoslav reply, where the authors pass to the offensive. "We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service to recruit in our country, which is going towards Socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders . . . have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. . . . We cannot allow the Soviet Intelligence to spread its net in our country."

This reply drew an even lengthier rejoinder from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on May 4th. The tone of the communication was more acid, suggesting the rebuke of a parent or schoolmaster to a rebellious and foolish child. The leaders of other Communist parties, it is remarked, "behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced everyone's ears by their unlimited self-praises. It is also necessary to emphasise that the services of the French and Italian Communist parties to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian Communist Parties have so far achieved less success than the C.P.Y., this

is not due to any special qualities of the C.P.Y. but mainly because . . . the Soviet Army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the C.P.Y. to achieve power." This Note contained detailed references to utterances by Tito and Kardelj which were held up as examples of deviation from Marxist orthodoxy. The Note also included a threat. "The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this [anti-Soviet] attitude . . . means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends."

A brief answer was sent by Tito and Kardelj to Stalin and Molotov on May 17th, 1948. "We received your letter of May 4th, 1948. It would be superfluous to write of the discouraging impression created on us by this letter. It has convinced us of the fact that all our explanations, though supported by facts showing that all the accusations against us were the result of wrong information, are in vain." A further letter was sent from Moscow on May 22nd, and replied to on June 20th. On June 28th was published a detailed resolution passed by the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, largely recapitulating the Soviet charges. The Yugoslav Central Committee replied on June 29th.

The process of the formal excommunication of Yugoslavia from the Cominform fold was shortly afterwards completed.

Yugoslavian relations with the West

The excommunication of Yugoslavia from the Communist fold necessarily affected the balance of power in Europe. When Soviet statesmen foretold that Tito's revolt would lead him into the arms of the Western group, they were indulging in a safe prophecy. The Soviet Union no doubt hoped for and expected an uprising of pro-Cominform forces within Yugoslavia and an overthrow of the Belgrade Government. The Cominform, indeed, in its resolution of June 28th, called on the Yugoslav Communist Party to replace Marshal Tito and his Government by a "new international leadership." But though there were

individual dissentients, such as Zhujovic and Hebrang, there was no widespread movement in their support. Although vigorous measures were taken by the Government to suppress any rebellious elements, the absence of internal disturbance cannot be attributed solely to disciplinary precautions. It was due rather to the innate spirit of nationalist independence on the part of the Yugoslav peoples, and resentment of the Soviet attempts to override it.

Once, however, the rift had occurred, and once it was clear that the Tito Government would not be unseated, then it was reasonably certain that Yugoslavia must increasingly look to the West for support. Yugoslavia is a country with rich natural resources, such as timber, copper, lead and aluminium, but she has not the capital equipment to develop these resources unaided. Her break with the Cominform, and the subsequent Soviet policy of cutting off all trade relations between her and the Communist group, was a severe economic blow. Yugoslavia was not in a position to be to any great degree self-supporting. She was bound therefore to rely on American and British loans in order to grapple with the serious economic problem now facing her. She must turn to the West to replace the markets in the East from which she had now been ejected.

Nor was Western financial and commercial aid the only assistance which she required. For some years after the schism the Federal Government in Belgrade was nervously apprehensive that a military attack would be launched by one or more of her Cominform neighbours. The Yugoslavs are valiant fighters, as their history and particularly their record in the second world war had shown. But were a Cominform attack to materialise, backed by the immense military strength of the Soviet Union, there could be no doubt as to the final outcome of such a struggle. Yugoslavia's policy led eventually to the formation of mutual defence treaties with the pro-Western Governments of Greece and Turkey. Her attitude to those States and to the West generally became more friendly. This tendency involved, as we have seen, a reversal of her former willingness to afford shelter to the Greek rebel forces at war with the Athens Government. All these developments seemed

to confirm the Soviet contention that heresy would result from schism, that once she had defied Soviet direction Yugoslavia would drift into the American camp and ally herself with the enemies of Communism. "The Yugoslav leaders," the Cominform communiqué of June 28th, 1948, declared, "evidently do not understand, or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic." But if we were attempting to examine the bona fides of that charge, we should have to decide how far the Soviet Union was responsible for the rift, and whether therefore the Russian statesmen had not themselves helped to produce in Yugoslavia the very tendencies which they now denounced.

The Yugoslav apologists, of course, fiercely denied either that they were drifting into the Western group or that they were deviating from Communist orthodoxy. Marshal Tito and other Yugoslav leaders constantly proclaimed that they had no intention of bartering their country's independence for American dollars, and would resist any encroachment on their freedom by Western domination as vigorously as they had defied the Moscow yoke. On more than one occasion Yugoslavia voted against the Western group at the United Nations. In 1950 Yugoslavia, as one of the newly elected temporary members of the Security Council, voted for the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to a seat on that body. On June 25th, 1950, the Yugoslav delegation proposed a resolution that the United States should call for an immediate cessation of military operations in Korea and the withdrawal of all troops to the demarcation line between North and South Korea, in order that an invitation might be sent to both disputants to present their case to the Security Council. This motion was defeated, but it showed that Yugoslavia was not disposed blindly to follow the Western lead.

The Yugoslav rejoinder to the charge of heresy was that Yugoslavia alone remained loyal to the teachings of Marx and Lenin, and that it was the followers of Stalin who had departed from the path of Communist orthodoxy. This is a pattern of argument which is very familiar in religious history: the

schismatic denomination always protests that it is seceding because the central Church has departed from the original gospel, and that it is the new sect which is preserving the authentic and undiluted doctrine.

We have already noted that inevitably, as a result of being cut off from the Cominform group, the Belgrade Government cultivated closer and more friendly relations with the Western Powers, and that in that sense the Cominform estimate may be said partially to have been confirmed. A further consequence of the rift has been the trend of Yugoslav internal policy towards decentralisation, greater independence and responsibility for the six republics composing the federal State, greater independence for the industrial corporations, a determination to defeat bureaucratic tendencies, and a more liberal attitude to racial, political and religious minorities and to individual rights. These developments could be interpreted by Soviet critics as the symptoms of a spreading heresy, or, from the Yugoslav standpoint, as evidence that Communism need not manifest itself on a rigidly uniform Russian design. Certainly, the experience of most foreigners who visited Yugoslavia for the purpose of examining national conditions and governmental structure was that in any conversation with officials the primary emphasis would be laid on the difference between Yugoslav and Soviet methods.

Cominform propaganda against Yugoslavia

The Soviet-Yugoslav controversy is an appropriate illustration of the distortions and absurdities revealed in modern propaganda-warfare. The Yugoslav Press, once it had recovered from the first shock and amazement produced by the action of the Moscow Government, settled down to a campaign of bitter recrimination. Although until recently all Yugoslav references to the Soviet Union had been entirely adulatory, now there could be no mention of Soviet practice or policy which was couched in other than condemnatory terms. Many of the Yugoslav articles dealing with Russia might have been reproduced from the columns of the most extreme American journals.

With corresponding inconsistency the Soviet-Cominform commentators who had previously pointed to Yugoslav effort in the industrial, agricultural and educational fields as a model which other Communist States should copy, now denounced these enterprises as badly organised and futile. Overnight these achievements had been transformed from examples of success to revelations of failure. At the same time a campaign was launched on the Cominform radio accusing Yugoslavia of mobilising her military forces, with the help and at the instigation of America and Britain, in order to invade the territory of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania or Hungary. Some of these charges were so reckless, and so easily disproved, that it is surprising that the Cominform authorities, in their own interests, should have allowed them to be made. Thus, on August 24th, 1950, Moscow radio announced that "the Greek and Yugoslav Governments have now received orders to prepare the ground for the realisation of the aggressive plans of U.S. imperialists. This explains Rankovic's recent decree setting up military zones with a depth of fifteen kilometres along the frontiers of the People's Democracies. It is significant that whereas in practice these zones extend to as much as sixty kilometres, the military zone along the Austrian border is only some five to ten kilometres."

A delegation of eight observers was sent from Britain by the (British) National Peace Council, to inquire into this and other Cominform charges, in September 1950.* The delegation travelled by cars through Montenegro, Southern Serbia and Macedonia, up to the main frontier posts facing Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, and through the alleged 'military zone' adjoining the Albanian frontier. They "saw no sign of troop movements, no dumps of supplies or any other indication of plans for attack." Two of the observers spoke Serbo-Croat, so that the delegation did not have to rely exclusively on interpreters. None of the various civilians to whom the delegates talked in the villages throughout this area had ever

* The report of this delegation, *Yugoslavia and Peace*, was published by the National Peace Council. As a member of the delegation I can testify personally to the accuracy of this report.

seen foreign troops or any concentration of Yugoslav troops, other than the usual frontier guards.

Another singularly baseless charge, advanced by the Prague radio on August 8th, 1950, was an alleged quotation from the *Daily Graphic* (London) that the Nazi Field-Marshal von Kleist had been released by the Yugoslavs from prison and appointed military adviser to the Yugoslav General Staff, in which capacity he was said to be assisting in drawing up plans for an attack on Albania. The editor of the *Daily Graphic* denied that any such report had ever appeared. Moreover, von Kleist had been handed over to the Soviet authorities at Horgos on March 5th, 1949, and a receipt for his person signed by three Soviet officers. The receipt document was seen at Belgrade by the British delegation and photographed.*

All the charges which this delegation examined were found to be entirely without foundation, and this experience may serve as a useful reminder of the general untrustworthiness of much of the propaganda which is levied by protagonists of one side or the other in any acute controversy, and which, if efficiently promulgated, may have a considerable effect in perverting public opinion.

For several years after the schism the Yugoslavs expected that at any moment one or more of the Cominform States, with the backing of the Soviet Army, would commence hostilities against them. There were many counter-charges, emanating from Yugoslav sources, of mobilisation preparations in these countries, accompanied by the usual references to frontier incidents. But no offensive materialised. Some Western commentators have cited the Soviet decision not to bring force to bear on Yugoslavia as proof that the Soviet leaders desisted from such action because they believed that the West would treat it as a *casus belli*, using it as an argument for the policy of Western rearmament. But, however valid this interpretation of Soviet motives may be, it is a double-edged argument when used in support of rearmament. For, if the Soviet Union

* Another member of the delegation and myself talked to Major Gojko Ivosevic, who pointed out to us the building at Horgos where the Field-Marshal had been handed over by him.

refrained from bringing military pressure to bear on Yugoslavia because it feared Western reprisals, the inference is that Western military strength was already, even at that date, sufficient to prevent Soviet aggression, and that therefore a vast additional programme of rearmament was unnecessary.

Developments in Poland

In this context it is appropriate to consider briefly the fate of Poland, a country where strong nationalist sentiments prevailed, but where, unlike Yugoslavia, the sentiments were vehemently anti-Russian.

Polish antagonism did not date only from the 1917 Revolution. It stretched back to the long years of cruel oppression under the Czarist régime. It had flared out in the military attack on the Soviet Union after the first world war. It was further embittered by the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939 and by the failure—the deliberate failure, it was believed—of the Red Army to relieve Warsaw, thereby allowing the Polish resistance forces to be sacrificed to the brutal atrocities of German vengeance. The Polish Government which evacuated to London was a bitter opponent of Soviet policy and represented a reactionary political standpoint, antique and feudal in its outlook. Moscow was determined that these elements should not prevail in a postwar Poland, and had set up what came to be known as the Lublin Government, Communist in complexion and subservient to Moscow direction. When, after the war, Britain persuaded sixteen leaders of the Polish underground movement to go to Moscow and negotiate with the Russians, in order that the new Polish Government might include London as well as Lublin Poles, they were immediately arrested by the Soviet authorities and sentenced to imprisonment on the charge that they were making use of their visit to indulge in subversive activities.

Nevertheless, on the Soviet assurance that free elections would be allowed in Poland, Mr. Mikolajczyk, the Premier of the 'London' Government, returned to Poland and attempted to reorganise his Peasant Party for the elections in January 1947. Soviet influences placed every obstacle in his way.

Many of his political supporters were arrested, 142 of his candidates were imprisoned during the election campaign, and it was claimed that 130 members of the Peasant Party had been put to death. Mikolajczyk declared that his party had received seventy-four per cent. of the total votes, but the published results of the election gave his party only twenty-four seats as against 327 to the Communists. Mr. Mikolajczyk stayed on in Poland until the late autumn of 1947, but then escaped to Germany and America. Under extreme pressure his party gradually disintegrated until the last vestiges of its power disappeared.

In Western eyes this episode constituted a further example of Soviet ruthlessness and defiance of democratic principles. Mr. Howard K. Smith, however, points out in his book, *The State of Europe*,* that "as the most conservative party in Poland his [Mikolajczyk's] party, immediately on his return, was inundated by the fifteen thousand-odd landlords dispossessed in the land reform, and by the anti-Semitic middle classes. Mr. Mikolajczyk admitted, when I talked to him in 1947, that they had joined him, but added, 'I cannot be responsible for all those who support me'." Mr. Howard K. Smith adds: "I have no doubt that if Mikolajczyk had been granted freedom during the 1947 elections, his party would have swept the polls. But, equally, I do not doubt that he would have ceased to rule the country before five years were out." He goes on to describe the new Poland, emerging under Communist rule, as "a surprisingly well-constructed, precocious and lively infant. It is unpleasant to have to appear to justify violence in this way, but in this book I am recording facts, not wishes." A confirmation of this estimate was provided by the report of American financiers from the World Bank who visited Poland in 1947, and enthusiastically recommended that that country was an excellent 'risk' for a loan. America turned down the recommendation.

The Soviet purpose was obvious. A 'progressive' as distinct from a reactionary, anti-Soviet Poland was essential for the future. The Soviet method was crude and violent,

* See page 35.

without respect for the liberty of the subject, and cannot be compared to the more subtle Anglo-American measures in Greece, designed equally to ensure that a Government of which they approved was securely established in that country. "At first," Mr. Howard Smith concludes, "his [Mikolajczyk's] party was frustrated by brutal political repression. In the end, when he left the country, his following was deserting him because it was genuinely drawn away by the Government's programme. Mr. Mikolajczyk offered nothing but opposition to it. Farm credit was being granted on better terms than Polish peasants had ever known. A good harvest was for the first time not accompanied by collapsing prices. The Government bought it at the old scarcity prices for export abroad. Requisitioning of grain was virtually stopped in 1947. Abundance was such that at the end of 1947 rationing was abolished and the Ministry of Food closed down. In 1948 the Polish peasantry was growing moderately prosperous—to such an extent that Moscow accused the Polish Government of pampering it."

VIII

THE ATOM DEADLOCK

The Baruch proposals

STALIN was first told about the atom bomb at the Potsdam Conference, but he does not appear to have recognised the full significance of the discovery. On August 6th and 9th, 1945, the two bombs were dropped on the Japanese, and on the second occasion President Truman announced to the American nation that the secret of manufacturing the bomb would not be divulged until means of controlling its use had been found.

On November 5th, 1945, the American, British and Canadian Governments issued a declaration that they were "prepared to share with the others of the United Nations detailed information concerning the practical industrial application [of atomic energy] just as soon as effective, enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." This offer, involving as it did the disclosure of a supremely important military secret, has been rightly regarded in many quarters as an exceptionally generous proposal—exceptional in so far as the usual practice of State Governments has been jealously to guard any inventions in their possession of vital military or industrial value. It must not be forgotten, however, that the three Governments concerned were well aware that Soviet scientists would before long achieve a parity of knowledge in the field of atomic research.

At their Moscow session in December 1945 the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend the setting-up of a commission to examine and report on methods of atomic control; and the following month the General Assembly of the United Nations appointed a body known as the Atomic Energy Commission. On March 16th, 1946, the board of

consultants of the Atomic Energy Committee of the American State Department issued a report, the main feature of which was a recommendation that two categories of atomic operations should be strictly distinguished—the 'safe' and the 'dangerous' operations. The 'dangerous' operations should be placed entirely under the control of an Authority to be established under United Nations auspices. The report emphasised that during the transitional period, before this Authority had taken over its full functions, plants to produce fissile material and stockpiles of bombs would be exclusively located in United States territory. Thus, if during this period there should be a breakdown of the negotiations, America would retain a monopoly of the bombs and the machinery for making them. The report also contended that inspection of this material and machinery could not be regarded as offering any 'reasonable reliance' as a "primary safeguard against violations of conventions prohibiting [the manufacture of] atomic weapons".

This document became known as the 'Lilienthal Report.' It was followed in June 1946 by the publication of detailed proposals presented by Mr. Baruch, on behalf of the United States, to the Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch proposals envisaged the establishment of an Atomic Authority, and were concerned with the functions which the Authority should exercise. The chief of these were "complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials," inspection and licensing of the plant, promotion of atomic research, and the stimulation of peaceful application of atomic energy. It was further explained that the managerial powers of the Authority would mean that the complete control and operation of plants "producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities" would be placed in the hands of the Authority, and that the Authority would "own and control the products of these plants."*

* A chronicle of the atomic research negotiations, with comments, has been set out in *Atomic Energy* by Dr. Alex Wood, and appears in the book *Two Worlds in Focus* as well as in a separate pamphlet, both published by the National Peace Council, London. I am indebted to this publication for much of the material in this chapter.

Mr. Baruch went on to suggest that when, and only when, a system of control of atomic energy had been agreed upon and put into effective operation, and when all the States concerned had formally renounced the use of the atom bomb as a military weapon, it would be feasible to prohibit the manufacture by America of further bombs and to 'dispose of' the existing stocks. Full knowledge as to the means of producing atomic energy would be vested in the Authority, but there must be no method of vetoing the majority decisions of the Authority, as was permitted under Security Council procedure. The Baruch proposals explained that this important proviso was framed in order that the decisions of the Authority should not be frustrated by a minority of dissentients, and no cover allowed to "those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes."

Soviet reaction to the Baruch proposals

The Baruch proposals were hailed with approval in many quarters. Their merit was seen to be the removal of atomic energy development out of the field of national competition, and so to forestall the deplorable possibility of an atomic arms race. Moreover, it was felt that these proposals registered an extraordinarily liberal gesture on the part of America, since the United States held the secret and the bombs, and was under no legal obligation to part with the secret. The Baruch plan, however, would have placed the Soviet Union in a position of serious disadvantage. Not only would the transitional period, which might be indefinitely prolonged, mean that in the event of war with America the U.S.S.R. would have no atomic weapon, while America would be free to use it, but the proposed inspection would mean that its own defensive preparations were liable to be disclosed to a potential enemy; the foreign inspectors in their exploration of Soviet territory would have the opportunity of discovering some at least of the military defensive preparations which the Moscow Government had established. Moreover, even when the Atomic Development Authority was set up, U.S.S.R. would have no guarantee that its constitution would not be such as to ensure a permanent

pro-American and anti-Soviet majority. The provision that no right of veto should be vested in this body would rob her of any means of resisting decisions regarding the peaceful application of atomic energy which might be inimical to her own interests.

What the supporters of the Baruch proposals entirely overlooked was that the proposals were congenial to them since they had complete confidence in American integrity. But the Soviet Union had no such confidence. The Soviet Government was convinced that American intentions remained consistently hostile. Whether that conviction was justifiable or not is irrelevant to the issue. The fact was that these Soviet fears and suspicions of American policy existed, and that, given that fear, Moscow could not conceivably assent to placing the control and development of atomic energy in pro-American hands.

It might be argued that by rejecting the Baruch proposals Russia was in no better position than if the proposals were adopted. America possessed the atom bomb; Russia did not. But the Soviet calculation was that before long her own scientists would discover the secret, and that Russia would then be similarly equipped. Subsequent events were to show that this calculation was warranted. It was in the latter half of September 1949 that an atom bomb explosion in Russia was reported to have taken place. The Tass Agency indeed stated that the atomic secret had been discovered by Soviet scientists in 1947.

When Mr. Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet Union, formally rejected the Baruch proposals in July 1946, his main argument was that the Atomic Authority would be independent of the Security Council, and that the powers which were allotted to the Security Council under the Charter would be infringed. The Atomic Authority would also interfere with the sovereign rights of States, since it could prevent any State using atomic energy for peaceful domestic purposes, if it saw fit.

Stalin emphasised (October 28th, 1946) in a public statement that the Soviet Union fully recognised the need of a "strong international control" over atomic production. When the Atomic Energy Commission met on December 30th, 1946,

Mr. Gromyko reiterated the acceptance of this principle. "It is indisputable," he said, "that control organs of inspection should carry out their control and inspectional functions, acting on the basis of their own rules, which would provide for the adoption of decisions by a majority in appropriate cases." But he insisted that the veto should be retained, even in a case of alleged violation of the agreed convention, and urged that the first step to be taken should be a decision to outlaw the bomb altogether.

In January 1947 the Commission issued its first report. The report adopted in general the Baruch proposals and recommended that "the rule of unanimity of the permanent members which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council shall have no relation to the work of the International Control Agency." The Security Council approved the report by ten votes, the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. On March 5th Mr. Gromyko criticised the report in the Council. He declared that the control organ would be an "international syndicate or trust," and that America was seeking to dictate in this matter to the other members of the United Nations. "The Soviet Union," he said, "is aware that there will be a majority in the control organs which may take one-sided decisions, a majority on whose benevolent attitude to the Soviet Union the Soviet people cannot count. Therefore the Soviet Union, and probably not only the Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of its national economy be handed over to this organ." The proposals for the management of atomic energy were in his view "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable."

So far the Soviet attitude had been largely negative. But on June 11th, 1947, the Soviet counter-proposals were laid on the table. These proposals claimed that there should be separate conventions to prohibit the use of atomic weapons and to set up an International Control Commission. Simultaneously there should be set up a strict international control over the production of atomic materials and energy, and also over the mining of atomic raw materials. There should be periodical inspections of these activities. There should be special inspections whenever there was a suspicion that any State was

violating the convention. The Control Commission would have the right to recommend to the Security Council what measures should be taken against violations of the convention.

In August 1947 the Atomic Energy Commission discussed the Soviet document. The main point of the Western criticism was that unless unlimited international inspection was instituted there could be no guarantee that some aggressively minded State was not secretly building up atomic plant. The Soviet proposal to outlaw atomic bombs was regarded as of no more value in practice than the Kellogg Pact, outlawing recourse to war, had proved to be. A Canadian delegate moved that the Soviet proposals "as they now stand, and the explanations given thereon, do not provide an adequate basis for the development by the Committee of specific proposals for an effective system of international control of atomic energy." This resolution was carried, only the Soviet and Polish delegates voting against it.

On August 11th the British representative sent a letter to Mr. Gromyko containing a number of questions, to which a direct Soviet reply was subsequently received. Asked what was meant by 'periodic inspection,' the Soviet answer was that it was not intended to suggest that inspection should necessarily be "at regular intervals, fixed beforehand. Inspection can be carried out by the decision of the International Control Commission in compliance with the necessity."

A further inquiry concerned the method by which 'reasonable grounds for suspicion' under the Soviet scheme would be determined. The Soviet answer was that such occasions would arise where "reports from one or several Governments" had been received, to the effect that suspicious circumstances had arisen; or when the Commission itself found that there was a "discrepancy between nuclear fuel available and accounting data," or as a result of reports by inspectors.

Soviet counter-proposals

When the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, addressed the United Nations Assembly on September 27th, 1948, after the Atomic Energy Commission had finally reported a complete

breakdown, he complained that the reason for this deadlock was that "the [Soviet] minority in these matters resolutely refuses to accommodate itself, even in the slightest degree, to the wishes and desires of the majority." This was a view representative of informed Western opinion in general. It was not, however, a unanimous view. A year earlier, September 11th, 1947, the *Bulletin of American Atomic Scientists* declared that "since the negotiations began fourteen months ago, the Russians have conceded step by step: that international control of atomic energy is necessary, and should include both atomic armaments and atomic power for peaceful purposes; that it should be exercised by an international personnel, having unrestricted access to all mines, plants and laboratories engaged in atomic activities; that the control agency must sponsor international research, and that atomic energy developments in each country should be subject to a quota system."

The *Bulletin* regarded the Soviet proposals as "still far from satisfactory," mainly because they did not explain what safeguard there would be against illegal mining and processing, and how efficient inspection could be organised without international management of major activities. The *Bulletin* was critical on these two points, but its interpretation of the Soviet attitude during the negotiations was clearly opposed to that of Mr. Bevin.

On September 25th, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky moved in the United Nations General Assembly that the permanent members of the Security Council should, as a first step in the process of disarmament, reduce within one year their military, naval and air forces by a third, and that the atomic weapon, as an instrument for aggressive and non-defensive purposes, should be absolutely prohibited. His resolution also proposed the establishment of an international organisation to watch and control these measures, and that it should work within the framework of the Security Council. In the debate which followed Mr. Vyshinsky used these words: "We can have different ideologies, we can have different social systems and we can co-operate, if we respect each other, despite the differences in ideologies, despite the differences in social systems. Hence

our striving for co-operation. We—the minority—want this co-operation. On what basis? Not the basis of being dictated to. We want co-operation on the basis of mutual respect, confidence which arises out of this respect, co-operation of equal with equal.”

On November 4th, 1948, the Soviet Union submitted another resolution to the Assembly. The main effect of this was to authorise the Atomic Commission to draw up a draft convention on prohibition of atomic weapons, and another on the establishment of “efficient international control over atomic energy,” both these conventions to be signed and carried out simultaneously. The significance of this proposal was that the Soviet Union no longer insisted on the abolition of atomic weapons *before* the control was set up. As Sir George Thomson emphasised in the (British) *Atomic Scientists' News* (February 1949) “this undoubtedly . . . was a very real concession [on the part of the Soviet authorities], and, as I have said, one which was obviously essential if any agreement is to be arrived at.”

On November 22nd and 23rd, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky explained in fuller detail to the General Assembly the Soviet atomic programme. Its general principle was that there should be no veto on the Atomic Control Authority, but that policy decisions and sanctions should be dealt with by the Security Council—where the veto existed—on recommendation from the Atomic Authority; that there should be simultaneous conventions for prohibition and control; and that the international authority should have powers of inspection and control, but not of ownership or management. Inspection under the Soviet scheme would involve verification and classification of atomic raw material and manufacture, study of production operations, the drawing up of rules for technical control of permitted atomic enterprises, recommendations to Governments on questions relating to production, storage and use of atomic material and energy, and of recommendations to the Security Council on measures to be taken against violations of the convention. The Authority (Control Commission) would have the right of access to any enterprise for the extraction,

production and storage of materials and for "the exploitation of atomic energy." Mr. Vyshinsky added that "periodic inspection envisaged inspection of all enterprises, beginning with the mines and ending with the plants producing nuclear fuel, not in definite periods established in advance, but depending on need, by decisions of the International Control Commission."

The Soviet proposals were not accepted, and the Commission on July 25th, 1949, adjourned *sine die* on the ground that the differences "are irreconcilable at the Commission level, and that further discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission would tend to harden these differences and would serve no practicable or useful purpose, until such a time as the sponsoring Powers have reported that there exists a basis for agreement."

Was the deadlock inevitable?

The issues at stake were thus clearly revealed. From the Soviet standpoint the two main dangers in the Western plan were, first, the determination of America to preserve her store of atom bombs until the full machinery of control was set up, and, secondly, the transfer of ownership or management of atomic enterprises to an international body, on which pro-American influences would probably be predominant. "We say that the transferring as the property of this international control agency," Mr. Vyshinsky declared to the U.N. Political Committee, "of all atomic resources of every country, all enterprises processing atomic materials, all enterprises of so-called related industries—metallurgical, chemical, etc., as well as entire scientific research—to transfer all this as the property of this agency is impossible because it would mean paralysing the entire economic system" of those Communist countries attempting to develop their economy by atomic means.

The justification of this Soviet objection was admitted to some extent by the (British) *Atomic Scientists' News*. "What precisely is meant by 'ownership'," that publication observed, "is not very clearly specified either in the Baruch Plan or in the Lilienthal Report. Full ownership in the usual sense of the

word would meet with difficulty since it would give ADA [the Atomic Development Authority] the right to decide whether power plants could be built in any country, and the right to withhold the use of the power produced in such a plant or to place conditions on the supply of such power. Such restrictions would give the possibility of interference in the economic life of each country to a degree not essential to the purpose of preventing the abuse of atomic energy for destructive purposes."

"Some American and British newspapers," Professor Minnaert, President of the Netherlands Association of Scientific Workers, declared, "are complaining about 'the complete defeat of all negotiations' because they consider any deviation from their own plan as incomprehensible and mischievous. But if we study the Lilienthal-Acheson Report, the Chicago Amendments, the Baruch Plan and the successive Russian declarations, we find that the official Baruch Plan is in several respects poorer than the Lilienthal Report of the Chicago draft; and we notice that the Russians have made important concessions since their first declarations. . . . Generally speaking, we believe that we can understand fairly well the motives which are at the bottom of the two rival proposals. We think that they have sufficient in common to make an agreement possible."

On the other hand the West regarded the Soviet scheme as failing to provide any safeguard against the aggressive use of this new and deadly weapon. "The Soviet Union proposed that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials," *The Times* (October 27th, 1949) remarked. "The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials as atomic weapons. The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, operate and manage facilities for making or using dangerous quantities of such materials. The other five Powers believe that in such conditions it would be impossible to detect or prevent diversion of these materials for use in atomic weapons. The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities . . . supplemented by special investigations on

suspicion of treaty violations. The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not prevent diversion of dangerous materials, and that the special investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent clandestine activities."

There are two conclusions to which the brief survey of this sorry story seems to point. The popular impression, voiced by Mr. Bevin and current in Western circles that the Soviet Union had proved obdurately obstructive in the course of these negotiations, had raised difficulties merely for selfish ends and had refused to give any consideration to Western criticism, was not factually accurate. The Soviet objections were understandable, in so far as the Western plan would have placed Russia under a grave disadvantage with respect to the peaceful use of atomic development for industrial purposes; and the Soviet Government did in fact offer concessions and make constructive proposals, unsatisfactory in many respects as these proposals may have been. Secondly, the failure of the negotiations was yet a further expression of the deep distrust on each side as to the motives of the opposite group. Given that distrust, none of the schemes presented could have been acceptable to all parties concerned. In that sense the deadlock was inevitable. Yet, it should not have been, or should not be in the future, beyond the ingenuity of man to devise a plan which would both avoid placing Russia under the control of an anti-Soviet atomic authority, and at the same time protect the human race from the employment of this far-reaching discovery for murderous and suicidal ends.*

* It is worth noting that the Soviet Union made a further important concession on November 23rd, 1954. The Soviet representative in the Political Committee of the United Nations had moved an amendment proposing that the Atomic Energy Agency—the body which is designed to administer the proposed 'atoms for peace plan'—should be subject to the veto in the Security Council. When this amendment was defeated the Soviet representative accepted the American resolution that the Agency should be independent of the Security Council. *The Times* (November 24th) commented on this event as follows: "The Soviet bloc gave in with good grace and supported the plan in its revised form."

IX

NORTH ATLANTIC AND WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

Plans for Western military consolidation

BY 1946 or 1947 Western statesmen, as we have already seen, had become convinced that a serious menace to world peace arose from the Soviet Union, and that Soviet intentions were to establish Communism wherever it proved possible to do so, in Western Europe, in Asia and elsewhere. The Western calculation was that the Soviet Union would use its immense military strength to further this end, or at least that this eventuality was so likely that active preparations must be taken to prevent it. This fear, this desire to preserve Western civilisation from the encroachments of Communist authoritarianism, had been the motive of the various schemes to consolidate Western Europe economically and even to promote some form of political federalism. Mr. Bevin, on January 22nd, 1948, had expressed to the House of Commons his belief that "the time is ripe for the consolidation of Western Europe. . . . We shall not be diverted by threats, propaganda or 'fifth-column' methods from our aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and other contacts those nations of Europe that are ready to co-operate." He had declared further that "Western Union would fit in with the Charter of the United Nations."

But these schemes, with some of which Britain (for reasons which we shall presently examine) was not ready to commit herself, were impracticable unless Western Europe was adequately protected from a Soviet attack. If the prevailing estimate that the Soviet Union intended to attack was accurate, then military consolidation was the first necessity. And the

moment this conclusion was drawn, it was evident that American support must be obtained. There had always been in Western circles a 'neutralist' school of thought which maintained that the right course to be followed was to constitute Western Europe a self-contained area, independent of both the Cominform group and of America. If, however, it was to be assumed that Russia was planning to extend her rule over all or part of Western Europe, whether Western Europe was neutral or not, then in terms of military preponderance Western Europe would not be strong enough to defend itself without the full backing of America. In the same parliamentary debate in which Mr. Bevin had spoken, Mr. Churchill, after urging that a "diplomatic approach to Russia" should be made by the Western nations, reverted to the principles which he had outlined in his Fulton utterance,* and suggested that "any discussions with the Soviet Government would not be more likely to reach favourable conclusions if we waited until the Soviet Government had also got the atom bomb." At the Conservative Conference at Llandudno on October 10th, 1948, he enlarged upon this theme. "The Western nations," he said, "will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate other just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too. . . . The atom bomb stands between Europe today and complete subjugation to Communist tyranny."

The *New York Herald* (October 12th, 1948), commenting on this speech, insisted "that the West must be prepared to use the atom bomb, if necessary, and every other available means of strength against Communist imperialist aggression, seems indisputable." The response of *Pravda* appeared on October 22nd. "Blinded with fury," it declared, "the ex-Prime Minister proposes that immediately, without any delay, something in the nature of an ultimatum should be presented to the Soviet Union. . . . Churchill quite overlooked the fact that this is '48 not '17 or '18." *Pravda* described Mr. Churchill as "a bison of British reaction who has outlived his day."

On the other hand most of the British Press applauded the

* See page 30 *seq.*

utterance. "Perhaps the greatest merit of Mr. Churchill's speech," the *Observer* (October 17th, 1948) remarked, "was that he plainly stated the terms on which alone lasting peace with Russia is possible. . . . These terms are broadly three: Russia must withdraw within her own ample frontiers, refrain from subverting foreign Governments, and agree to an effective international control of atomic energy. It is muddle-headed nonsense to say, as one of our contemporaries does, that this amounts to 'unconditional surrender.' It demands from Russia only what every other State is prepared to give."

When Mr. Bevin at the U.N. General Assembly (September 17th, 1948) reviewed not only the developments of the Berlin blockade, but the wide field of Anglo-Soviet relations, he was loudly cheered. "If the black fury and incalculable disaster of atomic war," he protested, "should fall upon us, all I can say is that one Power, by refusing its co-operation in the control and development of these great new forces for the good of mankind, will alone be responsible for the evils which may be visited upon mankind." He then proceeded to make certain observations as to the course to which the Western States were now committing themselves. "We are co-operating with our friends," he declared, "but we are not suggesting an attack on anyone. In fact, if the Soviet Government is living in fear of our joining in an attack on the territory of the Soviet Union, they may rest in peace. We shall never do it. On the other hand, if having secured Soviet territory they then use the territory of other States to prepare attacks on us, then a very different situation is created in which we can only look to our own defence."

Mr. Bevin went on to argue that the Soviet disarmament proposals* must be regarded with suspicion. Then came the sentences. "As a result of the cold war the West may have to suspend United Nations ideals and make regional pacts. . . . If we cannot proceed on a world basis as we hoped, we must proceed on a regional basis. We must agree with whom we can agree, work with those with whom we can work, understand and trust those who are willing to enter into trust and understanding with us. It is perhaps out of this regional structure that there

* A brief reference to them has been made on page 117.

may yet grow that world government for which humanity yearns and towards which it has been striving and struggling for so long."

Does the North Atlantic Treaty infringe the U.N. Charter?

What had become increasingly noticeable, as the plans for military co-operation between the North Atlantic States matured, was an emphasis by advocates of the Treaty on two points. First, that this concentration of military power was inspired by entirely defensive and not aggressive motives; and, secondly, that although the Treaty had admittedly come into existence because the United Nations Organisation was regarded as an insufficient guarantee of peace, it was in no sense a violation of the U.N. Charter.

The former of these contentions we have already discussed. A mobilisation of armed force has always appeared, and will always appear, to be a threat of aggression towards the Powers against whom it is directed. Moreover, however sincerely the promoters of mobilisation intend this military strength to be used only for defensive ends, the occasion very easily arises when the boundary between offensive and defensive action wears thin. The peace-loving State which has taken the precaution of massing troops on its frontier may easily be tempted to interpret some action on the part of its potential enemy as a direct threat to its security, and—still in the interests of self-defence—present an ultimatum or launch an attack before the enemy has struck. However firmly we may hold that the North Atlantic Treaty was an essential measure in view of the postwar situation, we cannot deny that it was precisely the kind of preparation which must incur these dangers.

The contention that the Treaty was no infringement of the Charter needs closer examination. When the text of the Treaty was laid before the House of Commons on March 18th, 1949, Mr. Bevin, broadcasting to the nation, used these words: "Frankly, just as the League of Nations did not fulfil its purpose, neither so far has the United Nations." He went on to point out that the Council of Foreign Ministers had failed to

produce a settlement, that it had produced five peace treaties but these had not been observed; that the Soviet Union had repeatedly exercised the right of veto on the Security Council, and had thus obstructed the work of that body; and that there had been a constant propaganda effort on the part of the Communist Governments to disrupt the West. "What were we [peace-loving countries] to do?" he asked. "To stand idly by and be destroyed one by one, or to build up some collective security which would weld [our] peoples together in a strong resistance against such methods?" The pact, he continued, "does not seek to interfere, but equally it does resist the right of any Powers with aggressive intentions to upset our institutions, to bring us into bondage, or to create a situation which will enable them to introduce the police State, or carry out devices which have been applied in so many other countries."

In a broadcast on the (British) Home Service an American commentator, Mr. James Reston, explained that "under the pact the United States would treat an armed attack on the countries in the pact as a threat to the security of the United States. Secondly, America would consult with the other North Atlantic Treaty nations on any situation that threatened peace and security. Thirdly, the United States would plan the defences of the whole area (covered by the pact). Fourthly, the United States would assist the countries participating in the pact economically and militarily to achieve the security of the whole North Atlantic area." He added that the American Government insisted that it must be free to decide at the time whether such an attack had actually taken place, and what should be done in response to the attack.

Article 5 of the Treaty reads as follows: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or some of them, in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs each of them in exercise of individual or collective self-defence, recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other

Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures to restore and maintain international peace and security."

The terms of Article 51 of the Charter are as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Section 1 of Article 52 of the Charter must also be taken into account. "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

The Western Powers had been careful to draft the Treaty so as to include an immediate reference to the Security Council of any action taken by the Atlantic group as well as to provide that the group would cease to take action once the Security Council had adopted measures "necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." Thus, it could be claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty was a 'regional arrangement' contemplated under the Charter. The Charter, however, was worded sufficiently loosely to leave room for varied interpretations and left in doubt the answer to several pertinent questions. For example, if the Security Council

considered that the action taken by a regional group was unwarranted, and refused to carry out any measures implementing the action by a regional group, or to adopt measures which the regional group considered adequate, would the regional group be justified under the Charter in continuing to pursue its independent activities? Who, in fact, would be the final authority in deciding what measures were necessary to maintain peace—the regional group or the Security Council? Who should decide whether “regional arrangements” and regional activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations? According to the Charter it is the Security Council which has authority to make this decision. But if the Security Council held that the North Atlantic Treaty group was an ‘arrangement’ contrary to United Nations purposes, the question would then arise whether the group would be willing to dissolve. Article 39 of the Charter states that “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” But there is nothing in the Treaty to suggest that the North Atlantic States would submit to a ruling of the Security Council unfavourable to their own decision. They would presumably only cease to act independently when the Security Council had adopted measures which they considered to be necessary for the maintenance of peace.

The scope for other views on the question of the compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter will be appreciated if we turn to the Soviet Note of protest issued on April 1st, 1949.* “To justify the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty,” the Note observed, “references are being made to the fact that the Soviet Union has definite treaties with the

* It may be relevant to note here a subsequent reference to the relation of the Treaty to the Charter by Senator Taft, in a speech (read, as he could not be present) at Cincinnati on May 27th, 1953. “When we adopted the North Atlantic Treaty we did not ask the United Nations’ leave, and we did not consult it. We claim that such an organisation can be formed under the terms of Section 51 of the Charter, and perhaps it can. But to my mind it is the complete antithesis to the Charter itself, and while it may not violate the Charter, it certainly substitutes a military alliance for that of the United Nations, as a means of resisting Soviet aggression.”

countries of the People's Democracies. These references, however, are utterly untenable. All the treaties of the Soviet Union . . . of mutual assistance with the countries of the People's Democracies are of a bilateral nature, and they are directed solely against the possible repetition of German aggression, of which danger no single peace-loving State can be unaware. The possibility of interpreting them as treaties which are in any degree aimed against the Allies of the U.S.S.R. in the late war . . . is absolutely precluded.

"Moreover, the Soviet Union has similar treaties . . . not only with the countries of the People's Democracies, but also with Great Britain and France.

"In contradistinction to this, the North Atlantic Treaty is not a bilateral but a multilateral treaty which creates a closed grouping of States, and—what is particularly important—absolutely ignores the possibility of German aggression. . . .

"Participants in the North Atlantic Treaty are effecting extensive military measures which can in no way be justified by interests of self-defence of these countries. The extensive military measures carried out by the United States in co-operation with Great Britain and France under the present peacetime conditions, including the increase in all types of armed forces, the drafting of a plan for the utilisation of the atomic weapon, the stockpiling of atomic bombs—which are purely offensive weapons—the building of a network of air and naval bases, etc., by no means bear a defensive character.

"The preservation in Washington of the combined Anglo-American staff, organised during the second world war, the recent establishment of the Military Staff of the so-called Western Union at Fontainebleau, as well as the intention immediately to set up the Defence Committee envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty, is by no means an indication of the peace-loving or defensive aims of the participants of the Treaty, but together with other numerous military preparations, contributes to an intensification of anxiety and alarm and to the whipping up of war hysteria in which all sorts of instigators of a new war are so interested. . . .

"The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty maintain that

this Treaty allegedly represents a regional arrangement envisaged by Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. But such references are utterly groundless and untenable. There can be no question whatsoever of any regional character in this Treaty, inasmuch as the union provided for by the Treaty embraces States in both hemispheres of the globe, and has not as its aim the settlement of any regional issues. . . .

"Nor can the establishment of the North Atlantic grouping of States be justified by the right of each Member of the United Nations to act in individual or collective self-defence, in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter. Suffice it to say that such a right . . . can arise only in the case of armed attack against a Member of the [U.N.] Organisation. Yet, as is known to all, neither the United States, Britain, France, nor the other parties to the pact, are threatened by any armed attack."

The Soviet Government also contended that the Atlantic pact was inconsistent with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. On April 13th, 1949, a British reply was handed to the Soviet Embassy in London, declaring that "His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the North Atlantic Treaty is contrary to Article 7 of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, since the North Atlantic Treaty is directed solely against aggression." The British Note went on to accuse the Soviet Union of violating "every relevant clause" of the Potsdam Agreement, such actions culminating in the blockade of Berlin. Open attempts had been made by the Soviet Government "to wreck the European Recovery Programme, on which the restoration of the standards of living of the people of Western Europe depends." The Note further cited as infringements of Article 5 of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty (by which both parties undertook "not to seek territorial aggrandisement for themselves and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other States") the acquisition by the Soviet Union of territory in Poland, Finland and Ruthenia.

The cost of Western rearmament

Western policy, as we have seen, had developed on the assumption that a Soviet attack was an imminent threat and

that therefore it was necessary to build up an immense strength in self-defence. The new international era which the Charter of the United Nations had envisaged was regarded as stillborn, and there must be a reversion to the traditional system of 'balance of power.' Public opinion as a whole accepted the view that Western democracy could only be saved and peace preserved by preparing for war. The Trades Union Congress in September 1950 supported the Government policy of rearmament by 6,942,000 block votes to 595,000. In turning to a consideration of the financial cost and the economic price which this programme exacted, we will take Great Britain as our example, not only because we are naturally concerned more directly with the experience of our own country, but because the British experience has been shared in varying degrees by the other West European States.

The (Defence) White Paper of 1950 proposed that £780,800,000 should be spent on defence, as against the sum of £759,860,000 officially proposed in the previous year. Man-power in the Forces was to be reduced by 34,000 in 1951, but increased pay and a lengthening of the period of conscription accounted partly for the larger sum. By July 1950 the war in Korea had begun, and the Americans had asked the North Atlantic Treaty members to state within ten days what additional military production they could undertake with American assistance. As a result the British Government proposed to commit itself to an expenditure of £3,400 million over the next three years. Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister, admitted that this supplemented programme would probably involve the transfer of 250,000 workers from export production to armaments manufacture, and that probably the balance of payments would be adversely affected. "We are having to rearm," he said, "when we are devoting all our resources to rebuilding our economic position . . . [at a time when] Britain was paying her way for the first time since some years before the war. Along with our sterling area partners we were in approximate dollar balance. We were, indeed, making some increase in our reserves. We had had some relaxation in the

austerity imposed upon us by our economic circumstances, and we were looking forward to more."

In February 1951 Mr. Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that the revised defence programme would probably involve an expenditure of £4,700 million to cover a period of the next three years. This would include the costs of production, research and works, and production by the engineering and vehicle industries as well as expenditure on building and textiles. Further amounts would have to be spent on stockpiling, on replenishing existing plant and on more machine tools, for which latter need, orders had been placed abroad, as home production had not the capacity to meet the full demands. Parliament would be asked to sanction further capital expenditure on new plant. Steps would have to be taken to reduce civilian expenditure, particularly as regards the use of textiles. "This year," he said, "I am afraid the terms of trade will again be worse, and the cause, of course, is simply the impact of world rearmament on prices. I believe it will cost us at least £300 million. That will be the extra burden . . . in the first year over and above the direct cost of rearmament, if we are to hold the balance of payments at the same highly favourable level as 1950."

It was after the Budget of 1951, which reflected the first consequences of this programme, that Mr. Bevan resigned from the Government, together with two other Ministers, Mr. Harold Wilson and Mr. John Freeman. Mr Bevan, in the speech to the House of Commons explaining his action, argued that the defence programme was inconsistent with the maintenance of the existing social services and the national standard of living. The figures in the Budget for defence expenditure, he said, were unrealisable because of the scarcity of raw materials and equipment. "We have allowed ourselves," he declared, "to be dragged too far behind the wheels of American diplomacy. This great nation [Britain] has a message for the world which is distinct from that of America or the Soviet Union. . . . The £4,700 million arms programme is already dead. It cannot be achieved without irreparable damage to the economy of Britain and the world."

Mr. Bevan's protest was condemned by the Labour Government, and won only the support of a small number of 'back-benchers,' who became known as the 'Bevanite Group,' although in the trade unions, and to a more considerable extent in the constituency Labour Parties, the 'Bevanite Movement' gained ground. Labour Party authority subsequently demanded the dissolution of the group as an organised parliamentary body, and rather than injure the Government by a split Mr. Bevan and his followers submitted to the imposed discipline. The Conservatives welcomed the division in the Labour ranks, but supported the Government line that this colossal defence expenditure was necessary, and that in general it could just be borne by the national economy. Indeed, in both Conservative and official Labour quarters Mr. Bevan's warnings were greeted with derision. In little more than a year, however, his calculation that the 1951 programme would prove unrealisable was confirmed. By a strange irony it fell to a Conservative Government to provide that confirmation. The White Paper of 1952 stated that "such a programme [the original £4,700 million expenditure]* could be achieved in three years only if the labour, raw materials, machine tools and other manufacturing capacity were available as and where they are needed. It is now clear that these conditions cannot be fully satisfied. . . . Since the programme was started, the economic position has seriously deteriorated and severe measures have had to be taken in the civil sector of the economy. About eighty per cent. defence production consists of products of the metal-using industries, which are responsible for about two-fifths of our exports. . . . In the light of this . . . it has been necessary to adjust the defence programme. This adjustment will have the effect of reducing the immediate burden which the programme will place on the metal-using industries. It also means that the programme must take more than three years to achieve."

On July 20th, 1952, Sir Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that "if we had followed . . . to a logical conclusion

* The estimates of course allowed for the amount of American aid given and promised.

the defence programme which we found descending upon us when we took office, in 1954 or 1955 we should have been exposed to enormous increases in expenditure, unforeseen, so far as we know, at the time when the programme was originally launched, and utterly beyond our economic capacity to bear.

"Even if we had not been called upon at this time to make new efforts to stimulate exports and to reduce the investment programme and social expenditure at home, it would in any event have been necessary to grip the whole position in order to prevent the automatic growth of defence expenditure from rising in the third, fourth and fifth years, far beyond the limits of our economic strength."

This reduction in defence expenditure and extension of the preparation period could make no substantial impression on the weight of the burden entailed by the Western policy. Britain was not the only NATO State to appreciate the drain on her economic resources, but the effect on her future was peculiarly severe. The full effect would not immediately be felt. It was not a burden to be reckoned only in terms of financial cost, but in the diversion of labour, of raw material and capital equipment, from the manufacture of goods for trade; and this at the very time when British recovery urgently required an intensification of export trade in order to pay her way. Similarly, her standard of living, her social services, and her ability to contribute to world schemes for combating poverty and disease in undeveloped territories, both within and without the Commonwealth, were bound to be seriously affected. These considerations inevitably raised the question of whether the West was compelled to embark upon this vast armament undertaking, of whether, indeed, the policy underlying the Atlantic Treaty would prove to have been justifiable, seen in the perspective of history. Though, in the view of the majority, no other course in the existing international situation was conceivable, this opinion was by no means unanimous. The Bevanite revolt was not merely a party schism; it was symptomatic of a fundamental doubt which had taken root in the minds both of a British minority and of a considerable public in other Western nations.

Plans for Western economic consolidation

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4th, 1949, the signatories being the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal. Subsequently Greece and Turkey were added to the list.

But the North Atlantic Treaty was not the only expression of the desire to weld the West together as one group, or at least to create a closer co-operation between the various Western States for the purposes of military and economic development. A network of organisations designed for these ends began to emerge. A 'North European' group was formed in 1949, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, consisting of Britain, Norway and Denmark. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was a product of Marshall Aid, a result of the American determination not to administer this assistance through a United Nations body. The terms of reference for OEEC were, first, to assist the United States in its programme of assistance to Europe, and, secondly, to develop (economic) co-operation between the member-nations. Benelux was virtually a customs union, set up by Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, in which it was hoped to involve France and Italy. France and Italy also set up their own customs union. On May 9th, 1950, M. Schuman, on behalf of France, presented proposals for placing the coal and steel production of France and Germany, together with any other countries which cared to join, under a single authority. This authority was to be vested with supranational powers, and was intended to be a first step towards a European federal union. A conference to examine these proposals and carry them into effect was held in Paris in June 1950, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg being represented. Britain was unwilling to commit herself, for reasons which will be presently explained.

But the most ambitious and far-reaching development grew out of the movement which was generally described as 'Western Union.' This embraced Sweden, who had refused to compromise her traditional neutrality by entering NATO. The

organisation eventually formed was termed the 'Council of Europe,' and consisted of two Houses—the Committee of the Foreign Ministers of all the member-States, and the Consultative Assembly. From the first, at its various sessions at Strasbourg, the Consultative Assembly was confronted with fundamental problems. A strong body of opinion was anxious to press without delay for the creation of nothing less than a West European federation. But this proposal at once raised the question of how far the various States were prepared to yield their national sovereignty. The British and Scandinavian Governments in particular were extremely cautious in their attitude to this objective. It was uncertain, for instance, how far under a federal scheme the nationalisation programme of the Labour Government would be endangered, how far a supranational authority, which would be almost entirely non-Socialist in character, would have power to interfere with national legislation. Moreover, it was pointed out that any British Government would have to be careful not to allow Britain to be absorbed in Western Union to an extent which was incompatible with her relations with the Commonwealth. "A federal solution including Great Britain," Lord Layton has remarked,* "is not in sight. A federal solution without British participation is unlikely." It was this consideration which was one of the main causes for the British abstention from the Schuman Plan. Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking on November 1st, 1949, insisted that "Britain cannot integrate her economy into that of Europe in any manner that would prejudice the full discharge of her responsibilities to the Commonwealth and the sterling area."

The clash of the claims of national sovereignty with the ideals of federalism found expression in the problem of what was to be the ultimate relationship between the two Houses of the

* Paper read by Lord Layton at Chatham House, and subsequently printed in *International Affairs* (July 1953). In this paper Lord Layton pointed out that the draft Constitution of the new European Political Authority proposed that there should be two chambers—the Senate, representing the member-States, and the Popular Chamber, representing the people. This latter House would be elected by popular suffrage and not by Governments—an important constitutional innovation.

Council of Europe. The Consultative Assembly was obviously restive at the suggestion that it should remain merely a debating chamber without any sort of executive authority; all that the Assembly was constitutionally entitled to do was to submit recommendations to the 'Upper House.' But the Committee of Foreign Ministers was jealous of its ministerial status. Its composition ensured that, so long as it retained control, the official policies of the respective Governments, and therefore the principle of national sovereignty, would not be compromised. The composition of the Assembly, indeed, was unsatisfactory. Representation of the various member-States was allotted in proportion to the size of population, but the method of selecting national representatives was left to each State and was accordingly far from uniform. The eighteen representatives allotted to Britain, for instance, were chosen by the political parties from their parliamentary personnel and not by any system of election.

German rearmament

But this movement on the part of Western Europe towards closer integration was not directed solely to economic and political ends. The main incentive was that of military protection against attack, to pool the armed resources of the various States so that they would be in a better position to resist aggression than had been the case in 1940. In March 1948, a fifty years treaty was signed in Brussels between Britain, France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg for collaboration in "economic, social and cultural" matters and for collective self-defence.

American influence encouraged, and indeed largely promoted, this development. American policy was concerned to prevent a further spread of Communism from the East but was naturally disinclined to bear a disproportionate amount of the burden of these preparations by retaining indefinitely a large army on European soil. If the West European States were to be assisted militarily, they must contribute their share in building up a united force to the fullest measure of their capacities. On December 20th, 1950, it was decided to merge Western Union

defence with the NATO command. This integrated force for the defence of Western Europe was placed under the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers (SHAPE). General Eisenhower was appointed to this post and held it until June 1st, 1952, when he resigned in order to stand as candidate for the American Presidency, his successor being General Ridgway. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery became the deputy commander.

We have already seen that the Soviet Government, in criticising the North Atlantic Treaty, claimed that its own treaties with Cominform States were directed against any possible repetition of German aggression, whereas the Treaty had no such intention. Very rapidly the scheme for a West European army led to the opposite extreme. Far from taking measures to prevent a German military revival, the Western Allies found themselves planning to restore some degree of West German military strength. This reorientation of policy was a logical process. The case for Western rearmament rested on the assumption that the danger of a Soviet attack was acute, and moreover, that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites far outnumbered the existing forces of the West—despite the immensity of American productive resources. No West European army could stand, it was argued, against a Soviet offensive unless it was supplemented by a German contingent. America was particularly insistent on this need. From the American standpoint it was essential not only that Western Europe should cease to be a poor relation, relying perpetually on economic assistance from the United States, but also that it should become an effective military barrier against Communist encroachment, independent of a vast American army of occupation. Without the enlistment of a German contingent such a barrier, it was held, could not be established.

This proposal to accept Germany as a military ally must be reckoned as part of the general trend of Western policy. West Germany was already a political unit, the three Western zones having virtually been merged. "It was only when the Soviet Government . . . refused to treat Germany as a unit, in

accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference," a Foreign Office Note declared (October 11th, 1949), "that His Majesty's Government were compelled, in conjunction with the Governments of the United States and France, to unify Germany in so far as it lay within their power and to take progressive steps towards the unification of their respective zones." A West German Government had been elected, with Dr. Adenauer, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, as Chancellor. The Soviet reaction had been at once to set up an East German Government, located in Berlin, and formed on the Soviet model of elections. On November 3rd, 1949, it was agreed by the Committee of Ministers to admit West Germany into the Council of Europe, provided the permanent commission of the Consultative Assembly consented. This admission was ratified, together with the granting of a seat to the Saar. By the following year German rearmament had definitely become a feature of the Western programme. At first it was referred to as a measure of retaliation for the arming of the *Bereitschaften* (police force) in the Soviet zone. In the autumn of 1950 the proposal took the form of urging the creation of a military force of some 132,000 men in twenty-two brigades which would be integrated with other West European divisions. The emphasis on integration was stressed, no doubt, largely in order to allay French fears. France, who had suffered three times in the last hundred years from German might, was deeply apprehensive at the prospect of restoring a German army, and objected to the proposal to allow Germany to participate in the administration of the Ruhr industrial area, the German arsenal in the two world wars. Not only in France, Belgium and Holland was there considerable alarm in face of the sinister implications of German rearmament, but in Germany itself there was opposition to the scheme in some of the more democratic circles. In February 1951 General Eisenhower felt himself obliged to say that he wanted "no reluctant [German] contingents in an army under my command." This opposition was partly due to a dread on the part of West Germans lest they might some day be ordered to engage in battle against armed East Germans, and also to a

belief that those Germans who would most enthusiastically support the rearmament programme would represent precisely those militarist and nationalist elements which had rallied round Hitler in the cause of world conquest.

The Western case admittedly exposed itself to this danger. It was true that Western statesmen could profess themselves satisfied with the democratic integrity of Dr. Adenauer and his Government. But there was no guarantee that future Governments in West Germany would preserve the same political complexion, and that, once weapons had been placed in German hands, they might not become the instruments of of aggressively nationalist policy. On October 16th, 1951, Dr. Adenauer stated in the Bonn Federal Parliament that 134 officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were former members of the Nazi Party. He qualified this statement by insisting that not one of these individuals had held "high office in the party."

Various pro-Nazi and near-Nazi groups were already making their appearance in the country, such as the *S.A. Traditionsabteilung*, the *Deutsche Sozialistische Partei* and the *Völkische Freiheitspartei*. The authorities took steps to repress the most flagrantly anti-democratic political movements; under Article 21 of the Basic Law of 1949* the German Federal Court was empowered to declare illegal political parties "whose aims and the conduct of whose members seek to impair or abolish the liberal [*freiheitliche*] democratic order." Nevertheless, the disturbing fact that bodies of a Nazi type existed could not be denied. Nor could it be overlooked that convicted war criminals, such as the wealthy industrialist Alfred Krupp, had been allowed by the Western Powers to return to public life; Krupp, indeed, was permitted to regain most of his former armament-making property.

* The Basic Law was drafted in 1948 by a Parliamentary Council, elected by the Diets of the three Western zones, as a provisional Constitution for West Germany. This draft was approved by the three Western Military Governors, and came into force on May 24th, 1949. The three Military Governors were replaced by civilian High Commissioners when the West German Government was formed.

Earlier estimates as to the necessary size of the German military contingent had been modest, but in later calculations the figure rose to more ambitious proportions. On January 11th, 1952, the Swiss *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* made the following announcement: "The Security Commissioner of the [German] Federal Government, Herr Blank, gave details yesterday, before a meeting of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Party, of the German defence contribution. The Federal Republic will raise twelve divisions of 13,000 men each, according to the announcement. Of these divisions six are to be armoured divisions, each with 280 to 300 tanks; three are to be *Panzergranadier* divisions, each with 150 to 180 tanks; and three are to be motorised infantry, each with 70 to 90 tanks. . . . The German contingent will dispose directly of its own air force; this is to be 75,000 men strong and have 1,500 fighters and fighter-bombers. A further 25,000 men will be raised for coastal defence." By June 1952 the Bonn Government had reintroduced conscription. On January 21st *The Times* reported that "the suggestion that the European Defence Community would consist of a German army under Allied leadership was dismissed by Herr Blank as nonsense." This utterance was taken to mean that the Federal Government took it for granted that German soldiers would be commanded by Germans, an interpretation which was confirmed by the current German demand for 'equal rights' as the price of rearmament—that is of the right of Germany to have a national army, if Britain and France meant to retain that privilege. Indeed, the development of Western armament plans seemed now to envisage, as a concession to prickly national sovereignty, an association of nationals under one supreme command, rather than the formation of a single supranational force.

The Soviet policy towards Eastern Germany underwent a change in 1952. Hitherto Moscow had favoured a limitation of German forces to a police level, but now it was conceded that Germany should be entitled to raise an army at least to a standard necessary for self-defence.

The risk which was being incurred in encouraging Germany

to rearm arose not only from the opportunity which it presented to the professedly near-Nazi elements. On a wider front there was a public to be reckoned with which, while not actually Fascist and anti-democratic, was inspired by patriotic nationalist motives and would be likely to venture its armed strength in the future to regain the Eastern German territory which had been lost to Poland at the end of the war. It is not difficult to imagine how serious would be the threat to world peace if Western and Eastern Germany, or either of them, employed their power to recover these lands, and how embarrassing might be the position of those Powers which were bound to them by military alliance.

But an even greater problem was produced by the policy of rearming West Germany. The Western States had now committed themselves to the objective of raising a West German force and binding it in military alliance to themselves. They were also committed in principle to the objective of reuniting East and West Germany and of setting up an all-German Government, on condition that the Soviet Union consented to free elections for such a Government and that adequate provision for such elections was carried into effect. How far were these two objectives reconcilable? How could a united Germany be formed, if one half of it was militarily allied to the West and the other half was not? Presumably the official Western view was that the whole of Germany should enter into military alliance with the (West) European Defence Community. But it was as inconceivable that the Soviet Union would agree to the formation of a rearmed united Germany, embraced by the American and Western group, as that the West would consent to such a Germany bound to the Cominform. No attempt appears to have been made by Western statesmen to explain their answer to this dilemma. The only solution apparently would be to admit Germany to the United Nations, but to do so with the qualification that Germany must not be allowed to form a military alliance with any separate group of Powers. This, indeed, was the gist of the Soviet proposal, but it was generally rejected by American and British statesmen, on the ground that Germany must be as free

to form her own treaties as any other State—at least to the extent allowed by the United Nations Charter.

The Times in a leading article on May 14th, 1952, discussed this very issue. "In the long run," it was argued, "no treaty could prevent a united and independent Germany from allying herself with other nations. Yet it is true that while the Soviet Government might conceivably accept a united Germany that was independent to start with . . . it clearly would not allow a united Germany that was already included in the Western alliance. To do so would mean bringing the whole might of the Atlantic Powers up to the borders of Poland."

During 1952 a succession of Notes passed between the Soviet Union and the West over the German problem. On March 11th the Soviet Union proposed to the American, British and French Governments that the Four Powers should meet to discuss without delay the question of a German peace treaty. The Soviet draft allowed Germany the right "to have her own national armed forces (ground, air and naval) necessary for her own defence," but excluded her right "to form any alliance directed against any Power which had taken part with its armed forces in the war against Germany." The Western reply was delivered on March 25th. It insisted that no definite German frontiers were agreed upon at Potsdam, and further maintained that a restriction on the freedom of Germany to form alliances would be "a step backwards and might jeopardise the emergence in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on co-operation, and not on rivalry and mistrust."

On April 11th a further Soviet Note accepted the principle of free elections throughout all Germany, but dissented from the proposal that the supervision of such elections should be under the auspices of the United Nations, on the ground that the Charter leaves the administration of Germany in the hands of the Occupying Powers.* The Note repeated the claim that the

* Article 107 of the United Nations Charter lays down that "nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any State which during the second world war has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter (e.g. Germany), taken or authorised as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action."

German frontiers had been fixed at Potsdam. The Western reply on May 13th declared that the Western Powers would not be "deflected from their support of the formation of a European Defence Community which will include the [German] Federal Republic." In a more conciliatory tone the three Powers stated that they would prefer a United Nations Commission to superintend the free election, but would be prepared to consider any other practical and precise proposal. They would not agree, however, to a commission set up by the four Occupying Powers, as this would mean that the parties concerned—in any dispute arising from the methods of election—would be judges. On May 25th the Soviet Union complained that the previous Western Note showed that the Western Powers were trying to delay discussion of the urgent problems of a German peace treaty. An immediate meeting of the Four Powers was again proposed. The Note insisted that any separate agreements into which either West or East Germany had entered (such as the agreement to ally an armed West Germany with the West European Defence Community) must not bind the Government of a united Germany. Such a Government should have the same rights as the Government of any other independent State (excepting the right, presumably, of joining a Western or Eastern group).

A further Soviet Note on August 23rd expressed willingness to discuss the composition of an election commission at a Four Power meeting, and suggested that such a commission might be made up of representatives appointed by the West and East German Governments. Once more the Soviet Union maintained that the Bonn Agreement (incorporating West Germany in the Western group) would "prevent freedom of action for a united Germany." The replies of the three Western Powers in late September reiterated that the ensurance of free elections must precede every other consideration.

The chain of Notes thus produced nothing more than a melancholy impasse. Soviet eagerness to see a united German Government set up was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to prevent a reinforcement of Western armed strength through the merger of a German army in the NATO and West European

military organisations. The Western Powers were obviously determined to carry through this scheme, if necessary, at the price of permanently dividing Germany. This was disclosed by the Notes as the essential point of divergence in the attitudes of the two sides. The difficulty of ensuring genuinely free elections in Germany would no doubt be formidable, but it was not the fundamental stumbling-block. The Soviet proposal that the supervising commission should be appointed by the two German Governments was probably as fair a guarantee as could be devised. It was the proposal to fuse an armed West Germany in the Western bloc which effectually frustrated the negotiations. And still more serious was the problem of whether a united Germany could be allowed to form a military alliance either with the West or the Cominform, without still further endangering the prospects of world peace.

Estimates of Soviet military strength

The Western claim that for purposes of self-defence it was essential to carry out a vast rearmament programme, including the rearmament of West Germany, was based, as we have seen, on the calculation that Soviet armed strength was superior to that of the West. We must briefly consider, therefore, the validity of this calculation before we turn to other aspects of the relationship between the Communist States and the Western democracies.

In a Labour Party official leaflet, *End the Veto on Peace*, issued in 1949 it was stated that "the Soviet Union has four million men under arms, more than all the rest of the world [forces] put together. Britain and America between them have well under two and a half million. In addition, young Russians do at least two to three years' military service." Other nations, this leaflet claimed, had produced a plan for an international police force. America had offered to surrender the atom bomb to a world authority. Other nations had agreed on disarmament proposals and had proposed to set up a commission to work out these proposals. Russia had imposed a veto in both cases. "In the last ten years," the pamphlet continued, "Russia has annexed 180,000 square miles of territory.... She has

organised civil wars in Greece, China, Burma, Indonesia and Malaya. She has declared war on Europe's recovery programme. Her agents try to sabotage the workers' standard of living all over the world. . . . After three years of such behaviour by the Russians no one would think twice about throwing away his defences. . . . There is only one reason for British rearmament—the uncertainty which Russia has created in the world."

On November 16th, 1949, Mr. Hector McNeil (British Minister of State) addressed Mr. Vyshinsky at a United Nations meeting at Lake Success. "Mr. Vyshinsky," he said, "go back and tell the Soviet Government that they, and they alone, are cutting off their people from the sympathy of the world. Go back and tell them that the conscience of the world is revolted by the mechanical cynicism of the Soviet régime." He went on to deny that Britain and America had built up a network of bases to hem in the Soviet Union. "The Soviet forces have withdrawn hardly anywhere from their farthestmost points of advance. Britain has reduced her forces from one million to about 750,000, but there has been no comparable reduction in the Soviet forces." Mr. Vyshinsky replied to this charge by claiming that "if we find no common ground for understanding, co-operation is impossible. Is it possible to find such co-operation? I think it is. While nobody supposes that the Soviet Union intends to bomb Britain, the United States has permanent bases there that in terms of atomic fire-power have room for 19,800 Super-Fortresses. The Soviet Union is devoting nineteen per cent. of its budget to rearmaments; Britain's figure is thirty per cent."*

The *Daily Worker* (February 20th, 1951) asserted that Soviet demobilisation had been carried out in three stages. The

* Comparisons between the Soviet and the American or British budgets are, however, difficult to draw and are apt to lead to inaccurate conclusions. The Soviet budget, for instance, includes the whole of the sums devoted to financing the national economy, whereas in Britain expenditure on education and social services comes largely out of local authority funds. Debt charges loom largely in British budgets, whereas the Soviet Union allocates little under this head, since pre-revolutionary debts are repudiated.

first and second stages had taken place in 1945, the last from May to September 1946. In addition, there had been a demobilisation of older age groups in 1946 and 1947, leaving the Soviet Army composed of the two normal age groups only.

Stalin, interviewed by *Pravda* on February 16th, 1951, declared that "a new world war cannot be considered inevitable at the present time." "If," he continued, "Prime Minister Attlee were competent in financial and economic science . . . he would have realised that not a single State, the Soviet Union included, can develop civilian industry to the full and simultaneously multiply its armed forces and develop its war industry."

The actual proportions of the Soviet Army were variously computed by British statesmen. On March 18th, 1951, Mr. Strachey (Minister of War) stated that it consisted of 175 divisions. On April 22nd, 1951, Mr. Shinwell (Minister of Defence) gave the figure of 200 divisions. On July 28th he declared that there were 4,600,000 men in the Soviet Army, plus 1,070,000 in East Germany and the satellite States. These divergences were later explained as due to the fact that the Russians reckon their artillery in separate divisions, the official British estimate being 215 divisions.

Two further comments may here be relevant. In comparing the size of the Soviet with other armies, allowance must be made for the fact that the Soviet Union has a far greater land frontier to guard than any other country. Secondly, the Soviet allusion to American air bases in Britain was not, and could not be, disputed by the Western Powers. Nor could it be argued that these air bases were established for strictly defensive purposes. Indeed, the presence of these bases would, in the event of war with the Soviet Union—far from protecting Britain from air attack—ensure that she became a primary target for Soviet bombers. Mr. Woodrow Wyatt (Financial Secretary to the War Office), speaking at Feltham in August 1951, declared that "the chances of winning if we were attacked are extremely good, provided we stick to our rearmament programme. The contributions that the countries of Europe are making should be enough, if we keep at it . . . to prevent

the Russians falling into temptation before 1954. By that time we should be strong enough to prevent the Russians starting a war. If it did come we must keep the enemy off in Germany—the Channel is not sufficient safeguard—so that his V1s and V2s and improved methods of air bombing may not be too damaging to us.” Mr. Woodrow Wyatt did not, however, discuss what would be the effects of a few atom bombs dropped in Britain, nor explain how, if war came, such atomic bombing could be averted.

X

THE SITUATION OUTSIDE UNO—AND WITHIN

Soviet and Western 'unofficial relations'

WHILE the official 'cold war' was waged mainly in terms of rearmament, economic issues and diplomatic incidents, *unofficial* propaganda wandered into other fields. Western opinion, that is to say, was incensed against Soviet methods and behaviour in many directions outside the strictly political sphere. The Lysenko controversy, for example, which resulted in a condemnation by Soviet scientific authority of the Mendelian theories of heredity and in the assertion that all alleged hereditary characteristics could be changed by environment, was regarded in lay as well as scientific circles as an illustration of the process by which scientific truth and empiricism were sacrificed under Communist authoritarianism to the interests of political motive. Even in comparatively trivial events popular antagonism and nervous irritation could be easily aroused. On January 13th, 1949, a fire broke out in the Soviet consulate in London. The fire alarm was sounded. Some of the English newspapers reported that Soviet employees at the consulate had interfered with the firemen and prevented them from carrying out their duties. A British air hostess, Miss Rougier-Watkins, who happened to be at the scene of action, had rescued, it was claimed, a four-year-old Russian child from the flames. The Soviet authorities denied this claim and declared that the child's mother had been the rescuer, Miss Rougier-Watkins having merely offered her services in getting the child to hospital. Miss Rougier-Watkins, on hearing the Soviet statement, was reported to have replied: "It is entirely wrong. What I said was the truth. If they are not grateful, then to hell with them."

The *Royal Sovereign*, a 29,000-ton, thirty-three-year-old British warship, had been lent to the Soviet Union in 1944. She was returned to Britain on February 4th, 1949. On arrival at the Firth of Forth, the Soviet commander was asked what places of entertainment ashore he and his men would like to visit. He at once requested that he might see the Rugby match between Scotland and Wales which was being played at Edinburgh that day. One hundred and fifty officers and ratings were accordingly taken to the football ground. The Lord Provost was subsequently entertained aboard for two hours by the Soviet officers. "They were so hospitable and pleased to see me," the Lord Provost was quoted as saying, "that I just could not get away." Yet even this pleasant exchange of courtesies was not allowed to pass without hostile criticism. Lord Ailwyn, a former naval captain, complained in the House of Lords that the Russians had failed to fire a salute on arrival, and that the Soviet Commodore had remained silent when the British Admiral went aboard and made a friendly speech. Viscount Hall, First Lord of the Admiralty, replied that the *Royal Sovereign* had been stripped of her saluting guns when she was modernised for war service and lent to the Soviet Navy.

After the death of King George VI in 1952 Mr. A. J. Cummings made the following remarks in the *News Chronicle* of February 19th: "Not one message came from any of the Communist nations to join the tributes of sympathy and goodwill that flowed into Britain from every part of the world." Mr. Cummings was obliged, however, to admit his mistake. A message had been sent by President Shvernik of the Soviet Union, and by Mr. Vyshinsky to Mr. Eden. Presidents of five of the other Communist States sent messages. The Soviet Ambassador at Bucharest attended the memorial service held at the British Legation in Bucharest.

It should not be forgotten that when, in February 1953, a flood disaster struck East Anglia and Holland, the Soviet Union sent £90,000—contributed by such organisations as the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Union of Consumers Society, the Soviet Red Cross and the

Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women—to the Lord Mayor's Relief Fund. The Premier, Sir Winston Churchill, personally thanked the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, for this gift. The Soviet Union also sent £100,000 to Holland, whose losses had been even greater.

Against these expressions of Soviet goodwill must be set the many misleading and sometimes grotesquely false descriptions of conditions in Britain given by Soviet individuals and Soviet publications. Thus, a Moscow school-teacher, Mr. F. P. Kalinin, who had recently visited England as a member of an educational delegation, declared on the radio (Vladivostok Regional Service), November 21st, 1949, that "eighty per cent. of [British] children leave school at fourteen because of poverty. The only children classed in the highest group are those who, according to the teachers, show an aptitude for science. The only children assigned to that category are those of the bourgeoisie. . . . The workers' children are included by the bourgeois pseudo-teachers in the less developed and more mentally backward groups." He added that British children are "whipped with special leather straps for the slightest misdemeanour."

In the seventh volume of the *Soviet Encyclopedia* (an official publication issued under the authority of the Council of Ministers) occur the following remarks: The Labour Government encouraged Fascism in Britain, for "it regarded the Fascists as a shock force which could be used against the British workers' movement." Under the Health Service "the only way in which an ailing person can obtain treatment is by becoming a paying patient." "In the provinces [British] school-teachers are obliged to attend church every Sunday. Headmasters and teachers who do not attend church, or who express dissent with their position, are dismissed and frequently put on trial for alleged antisocial activities."

Communism and the Churches

The cold war spread also into the ecclesiastical sphere. Marxist orthodoxy is positively atheistic, and Communist statesmen accordingly regarded all religious bodies as standing for false

superstition and acting as an influence obstructive to intellectual enlightenment and progress. The attitude of Communist Governments to the various denominations ranged from violently hostile propaganda to tolerant non-interference, the latter policy usually being adopted in cases where it was believed that the particular Church was sufficiently in decline to constitute no serious threat to progress. Where penal measures were carried out and priests or ministers imprisoned or executed, it was always alleged that such punishment was inflicted for political crime and not as religious persecution. So nearly do religious and political causes overlap that it has been far from easy in these instances to establish beyond doubt that the motive was solely anti-religious and that the charges of political sabotage were not at least believed by the prosecuting authorities to be true.

Western opinion was, however, greatly affected by the accounts of arrests and the sentences passed from time to time on Christian leaders and priests. These occurrences were taken as evidence of the intention of Communist States to suppress the Churches and of the bitter enmity of Communism towards religion in general. This view was shared even by those who themselves could hardly be described as ardent supporters of organised Christianity. Few of the developments which were taking place behind the iron curtain aroused more vehement indignation. In February 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty was tried before a Hungarian court on an indictment for treason. The Cardinal had made no secret of the fact that he regarded the Communist régime with abhorrence and that he desired to see a restoration of the monarchy. In the interests of religion he held that an atheistical order must be overthrown. Without entering into any consideration of the bona fides of the evidence produced against him, it is difficult to credit that a man of his fiery temperament and with the courage of his convictions would not have taken some steps to work against the existing Government. A Catholic meeting was held in the Albert Hall to protest against the trial as an act of deliberate religious persecution. Mr. Bevin, as Foreign Secretary, sent a telegram to the meeting, declaring that it was the Hungarian

Government and not the Cardinal which was morally on trial. Lord Henderson, Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, on March 9th, 1949, stated that "the whole Western world is unanimous in its condemnation of the crude and cruel methods which were directed to intimidating these spiritual leaders into submission." It should be noted, however, that the *Manchester Guardian* (February 9th, 1949), commenting on the campaign in defence of the Cardinal, remarked that it had "taken some nonsensical forms, outraging the Hungarians and doing nothing to hasten a reasonable settlement of the case."

It is clear that the religious bodies which Communist Governments have been most prone to suspect of seditious practice, and have been most ready therefore to punish, are those which are controlled by foreign authority or are closely associated with religious organisations in Western countries. The severe sentences which were inflicted on a number of Protestant ministers in Bulgaria may have been largely inspired by the fact that the Bulgarian organisation to which they belonged was founded by an American mission. The Roman Catholic Church has been the chief victim in this respect, inasmuch as it is governed by the Vatican. The Vatican has framed its policy on the principle that against Communism, as the deadly foe of Christianity, the Church must virtually wage a holy war. Cardinal Griffin asserted in a Pastoral Letter (Trinity Sunday, 1951) that "according to reliable information over ten thousand priests and members of religious communities [in Communist countries] have been murdered, imprisoned or deported." Where, as in the case of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union and other Communist States, the religious body is autonomous, there appears to have been no interference with freedom of worship, and little or no conflict between Church and State. In the period immediately following the Soviet revolution of 1917 the Orthodox Church was undoubtedly subjected to severe oppression; priests were arrested and executed, churches were despoiled of their property and handed over to secular ownership, and all ecclesiastical officials were disfranchised. But these injuries were prompted largely because of the close

alliance which had existed in Russia between the Church and the Czarist administration. Since that period, and particularly in the postwar years, the religious bodies in the Soviet Union profess an entire satisfaction with the liberty they enjoy—despite the fact that some of the freedoms for evangelical activities which most Christian bodies in the West would demand are curtailed, and that children are educated in an atmosphere of definitely secularist propaganda. The pro-Soviet attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church may be due in part to its heavily Erastian tradition, but outside the Soviet Union such bodies as the Hungarian Reformed Church claim to have greater facilities for their work than in pre-Communist days. Even in the Roman Catholic Church there have been movements of the clergy, as in Czechoslovakia, which did not consider that support of the Government involved the compromise of religious claims.

In Poland, which numbers twenty-four million professing Roman Catholics, the attitude of the Communist Government was at first ostensibly friendly. The State exempted Church land (over 841,000 acres) from the confiscation exacted by the land reform laws. Under the agreement reached in April 1950 between the Episcopate and the Government, compulsory Catholic teaching to all pupils in State schools was allowed. Up till March 1953 Catholic organisations were left free to distribute their weekly and monthly publications, though this literature was subjected to State censorship. However, Cardinal Sapieha and Archbishop Wyszyński subsequently complained to the Polish President (September 1953) that the terms of the agreement had been violated, so far as youth organisations and schools were concerned. The Catholic ecclesiastics alleged that some 500 priest-teachers had been dismissed because they refused to sign the Stockholm Peace Petition (drawn up under the auspices of the World Peace Council), and that the bishops had not been permitted to replace these teachers.

The general effect of granting these facilities was to rally the non-Communist elements in Poland under the wing of the Catholic Church. With the suppression of the Social

Democratic and Democratic Peasant parties, the Church provided the one refuge where these political elements could meet. For almost a century the political sympathies of the Church had been wholly with the Right and opposed even to the moderate Left factions. Now, under a Communist régime, ecclesiastical protection embraced a wider public. When Stalin appointed, in 1949, Marshal Rokossovsky as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, and imported several other Soviet officers of high rank, nationalist resentment augmented popular support of the Church. The Communist Government attempted to counter this by establishing pro-Government Catholic bodies, but out of 9,000 Polish clergy not more apparently than some 300 joined. With a growing recognition that the power of the Church was becoming formidably strong, State policy underwent a considerable change. Many of the former facilities were revoked. Catholic publications were suppressed, and by the summer of 1953 there were probably not more than fifty schools where religious teaching was still given. War between the Papacy and the Polish State had virtually been declared, leading eventually to the arrest of the Polish Primate, Archbishop Wyszyński.

In a report on religious conditions in Cominform States, a commission set up by the (British) National Peace Council* arrived at the following general conclusions: "The problem which we are considering cannot be considered merely as a collection of individual and unrelated incidents. We have realised, as our study has proceeded, how difficult it is to reach a judgment on each of the many allegations of Communist action against Christians that have been brought to our attention. We are inclined to think that some of the allegations are exaggerated and cannot be wholly substantiated. Nevertheless, we have reached the conclusion that it is Communist policy to try to prevent Christians from fulfilling their true function in society, from acting according to their conscience, and from making spiritual insight the supreme guide to conduct. The more vigorously the Church is fulfilling

* *Christians and Communists: A Study of Relations between Church and State in Eastern Europe.*

its prophetic mission, the greater the attempt to reduce it to a position of impotence. If the present trend of action in many States continues, the question may well become one of the actual survival of the Churches, rather than of their adequate functioning. We do not forget that the State has rights in the suppression of subversive activity. . . . But we believe that Communist Governments, even on the most generous interpretation, have consistently and deliberately exceeded those rights."

Visa restrictions

One of the most persistent criticisms directed against the Soviet system concerned the conditions alleged to exist in the labour camps and the methods by which the prisoners were forced to work. Mr. Mayhew, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had declared in 1949 that apparently at least five million 'forced workers' were collected in camps in various parts of the Soviet Union. The Economic and Social Council in August 1949 discussed this matter at length, and on August 29th a letter appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* from Dr. Trainin, an 'Honoured Worker of Science' in the Soviet Union, claiming that the conditions were "less severe than in Western prisons." The *Manchester Guardian*, commenting on this statement, pointed out that Dr. Trainin had not said what constituted the crimes of which these workers had been found guilty, or by what means they had been sentenced. Such workers, it observed, had "come to play a large part in the Soviet economic system." A number of sensational books have been published in America and Britain, written by ex-prisoners, describing their experiences in these institutions.

Another prevalent criticism against the Soviet system has been that the Soviet public have been given no opportunity to hear the Western case in current controversial issues. The *British Ally*, a publication which was designed to supply this need, had enjoyed a steady circulation in the Soviet Republics of 47,000. In April 1950 Sir David Kelly, then British Ambassador in Moscow, had an interview with the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, and complained that so many

copies were being returned that the circulation had dropped to 30,000. By the following month it had fallen to 15,000. By September 1950 the sale was no more than 13,500; and the publication had to be closed down. It should, however, be recorded in this connexion that at a Press Association luncheon in London Mr. Herbert Morrison challenged *Pravda* to report an interview, either with the Prime Minister or himself, in its columns, in order that the British case could be freely stated. *Pravda* accepted the challenge by inserting in full an article by Mr. Morrison, justifying the British objection to certain features in the Soviet system.

In November 1950 a Peace Congress was to have been held in Sheffield, under the auspices of the World Peace Council. A large number of speakers and delegates from Cominform States were to have attended, and, although the invitations included some speakers who were not committed to the full Communist standpoint, it was evident that the occasion would be a demonstration highly critical of British and Western policy generally. The Labour Government decided not to prohibit the holding of the Congress, and on this assurance the organisers went forward with their plans. The Government, however, refused visas to some of the most prominent foreign speakers, and refused entry to 250 delegates at the landing ports, with the result that the Congress was wrecked. One public meeting was held in the Town Hall on the Sunday evening, and the Congress then adjourned to Warsaw. The Government's case was that it was under no obligation to allow foreigners to come to Britain for the express purpose of promulgating what could be termed 'Communist propaganda,' in the sense that it would invite whole-hearted support for Soviet policy and would certainly involve strong denunciation of the official British attitude. The promoters of the conference could reply that they had been involved in heavy financial loss and immense disorganisation by the Government's action, inasmuch as they had had no previous warning that a large proportion of those who had accepted the invitation to attend would be peremptorily forbidden to land on British soil. Many of the British public, who were far from sympathetic to the Communist cause, considered that the

Communists had had a raw deal, and when the Congress reassembled in Poland there were fierce denunciations against what was described as the British Government's intolerance. Even if these protests were justified, however, it is only fair to remember that the Soviet Union on its side would certainly not have permitted an international conference, denouncing Soviet policy, to be held on Russian soil.

One of the most conspicuous symptoms of the tension between the Cominform and the Western world is to be noted in the elaborate precautions which have been taken by many States to prevent anyone crossing their frontiers, even on a temporary visit, whom they suspect as possible spies, or even of holding hostile political opinions. The individual Westerner, wishing to visit the Soviet Union independently, has found it extremely difficult to obtain a visa. The United States has erected round itself so solid an iron curtain that the tourist is subjected to a searching examination of his political affinities; and, even if he obtains a visa, is liable to be turned back by the immigration authorities, or interned on Ellis Island, if he is considered to hold opinions (or to have, or to have held in the past, any political associations) which are not considered to be respectable. The Internal Security Act of 1950 forbids any person entry to the United States who admits his belief in "the economic, international or governmental doctrines of Communism," or anyone who "once gave or promised support to some body affiliated with any of the American organisations now deemed subversive," unless they can prove that neither at the time that they "gave or promised support [to such organisations] nor thereafter, did they know that the organisation was Communist." President Truman himself described this Act as "conceived in panic and executed in haste." Nevertheless it was passed by Congress.

The Soviet Government imposed severe travel restrictions on the British and other Western Embassy staffs in Moscow. The British Government retaliated by imposing restrictions of a similar type on the Soviet Embassy in London, namely a refusal to allow its officials to make journeys of more than

twenty-five miles from Hyde Park Corner without notifying the Foreign Office forty-eight hours in advance.

The use of the veto

The conflict between the two camps has naturally been most apparent within the arena of the United Nations Organisation, and particularly in the Security Council. Under the Charter decisions of the Council must secure seven affirmative votes from the eleven members composing the Council in all matters of procedure. On all other matters a decision must obtain not only seven votes but also the votes of all the permanent members, namely the American, Soviet, British, French and Chinese (Nationalist) representatives. One contrary vote from these defeats the resolution, and is termed the 'right of veto.'

By the end of 1949 the Soviet Union had exercised this right forty times, once in conjunction with France and the remainder on its own separate initiative. France had also used one veto separately. The Western complaint against the Soviet Union has been that its repeated use of the veto is proof of its defeatist tactics and its determination to be obstructive. It must be remembered, however, that a large number of Soviet proposals have been rejected by the Council and that there has been no need on any of these occasions to employ the veto, since the anti-Soviet vote is always in a majority, as is also the case in the General Assembly. As regards the temporary members of the Security Council, the General Assembly had tacitly adopted the convention of replacing a retiring member of the Council by a representative from the same political-geographical group. Thus, it was agreed from the first to allow the South American, Cominform, Asian, Arab and British Commonwealth groups each to nominate a candidate of their own, and the Assembly would accept the choice. This was obviously a fair and equitable arrangement. In October 1949 there were three vacancies caused by the automatic retirement of Canada, Argentina and the Soviet Ukraine. India and Ecuador were chosen and elected to fill the first two places, and the Cominform bloc 'nominated' Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia, however, applied for membership, and America

announced that she would support her candidature. No candidate could have been more unwelcome to Russia, since the Belgrade-Moscow breach had already taken place. Yugoslavia was, however, elected by a majority of twenty votes, and the 'gentlemen's agreement' was thereby broken.

John Maclaurin* has very usefully analysed the forty Soviet vetoes. The joint veto with France concerned a procedural proposal to transfer consideration of the Franco régime in Spain from the Council to the Assembly. Four, he points out, were due to the wording but not the substance of resolutions; the Soviet representatives considered the wording was too weak. Three of these concerned condemnation of France, and one the presence of British and French troops in Syria and Lebanon. Six were delivered against resolutions blaming Balkan States for aiding the Greek rebels. Twenty-two were rejections of applications for U.N. membership. One was a protest against condemnation of the Albanian Government for mining two British destroyers off Corfu, the result being that it was agreed to refer the matter to the International Court. Two defeated a proposal to appoint a committee to investigate how the *coup d'état* was brought about in Czechoslovakia. One was against an American resolution to send the majority reports of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Assembly with Council approval; no veto was passed on sending the reports without comment. Two were against sending the majority conclusions of the Conventional Armament Commission with the Council's 'stamp of approval.' One was against a proposal by 'neutral' States to lift the Berlin blockade and negotiate on the currency dispute; this was agreed upon later by the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers. Mr. Maclaurin concludes that "the veto was effective in excluding new members and in preventing a committee of inquiry into the change of régime in Czechoslovakia. In all other cases it was bypassed in one way or another, so far as practical results are concerned."

As regards the blocking of candidates for U.N. membership, the Soviet representative agreed in June 1949 not to veto the Western list of applications, provided the Soviet list—Albania,

* *Power Politics and the United Nations*. (Allen and Unwin.)

Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary—was accepted. This condition was refused, and the Soviet veto was therefore applied to Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria and Ceylon.

One argument in favour of the veto is the protection which it affords to the small States. If the unanimity of the Great Powers on the Security Council were not required, these States would incur the danger of being involved in a war between the Great Powers, following the lead of a majority vote on the Council.

The effect of the existence of the two main, and generally antagonistic, blocs is, however, all too obvious in the Assembly and the Security Council. It is perhaps significant that in September 1949 the Syrian delegate made the following comment in the General Assembly: "We know quite well that these two camps, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States, would not have been able to establish themselves if the small States had not joined either of them. . . . Why should not the small States agree among themselves to form a third camp and hold the balance in [their own] hands?"

Co-operation in the United Nations

The general public depends entirely on its national Press and radio for its information about the proceedings of the United Nations.

Neither Press nor radio has space or time to report these proceedings at any length, and they both tend to concentrate exclusively on those items which have a 'news value,' which means those items where controversy and opposition have been aroused—such as the occasions when the veto has been employed. The consequence is that ninety-nine out of a hundred people have the impression that UNO is merely an arena of fierce dispute in which the representatives of the two main parties fling accusations and denunciations against each other's policy, where no constructive work is accomplished, and where the consistent Soviet purpose is to sabotage every attempt at positive action. This is a distorted picture. The controversial element looms largely in accounts of the proceedings

particularly of the Security Council and the General Assembly. But there are other fields in which political influences have been subordinate, and where genuine constructive co-operation has been conspicuous. The general public is hardly aware of the work which has been carried out on the Economic and Social Council, for instance, and on various subsidiary agencies.

The Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) is a fair example of an organisation in which both Western and Cominform States have freely collaborated. It is true that there have been some difficulties raised in Communist countries concerning the presence of residential committees, due to the underlying suspicious attitude towards the permanent presence of foreigners in their territory. It is probably true that the co-operation of Cominform States has been induced by the fact that these States have received help from UNICEF. But it is true also that countries themselves in need of such assistance have willingly contributed help. Thus, gifts of sugar have been made by Poland; bicycles, trucks and millions of printed file cards have been sent by Czechoslovakia; jam by Yugoslavia; raisins by Greece and training facilities by France. Mr. Maclaurin relates an incident where the Soviet representative, Mr. Formashev, registered a negative vote against a proposal which had been made on the Social Commission. On the following day he explained that the pressure of work which his position on the Commission entailed had been so heavy that he had not had time to study the relevant documents. He asked leave, therefore, to withdraw his negative vote and to support the proposal, now that he had been able to give adequate consideration to its purpose.

Mr. Maclaurin has reckoned the amount of financial support, in terms of dollars, which various Governments have given to UNICEF, in ratio to their respective populations. Iceland's contribution comes out at 4.3 dollars per head of each of its inhabitants, Austria at 1.3 dollars, New Zealand at 0.7, Canada at 0.5 and the United States at 0.4.

The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) is a body on which all the European States, except Spain, are represented. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, until 1954, ostracised

the educational-social-cultural organisation (UNESCO)—probably for ideological reasons—and resigned from the World Health Organisation (WHO)*, after a brief membership. Moreover, it would be quite inaccurate to suggest that no reverberations of the cold war are audible in the network of these functional activities. But it is necessary to redress the balance of popular impression by a reminder that many valuable achievements have been carried out in UNO by the combined and amicable efforts of both East and West. Even in the General Assembly and Security Council there have been frequent occasions when the Soviet proposals in regard to outstanding problems have been directed towards a reasonable settlement. The discussions regarding the future of the Italian colonies are a fair example; for the Soviet Union, having renounced its claim to the trusteeship of Tripolitania, continued to make suggestions which at least demanded serious consideration and were as practicable and just as the suggestions put forward by the Western Powers. It could no doubt be argued that whenever Soviet proposals appeared to be designed for the common good and for genuinely peaceful solutions the hidden incentive was to curry favour with States outside Cominform jurisdiction, and thus subtly to extend Soviet influence. But, equally, the more intolerant pro-Soviet advocate could contend that Western policy had been animated by motives of self-interest rather than of altruistic humanism.

Human rights

In 1947 the Economic and Social Council of UNO appointed a Commission to draw up a Declaration Bill of Human Rights. In the following year the General Assembly adopted the Declaration—the more readily, it has been suggested, since

* During a visit to U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1952 I had an interview with the Vice-Minister of Health, Mr. Shabarnov. Asked why the Soviet Union had left WHO, he replied that Moscow had become convinced that WHO was American dominated, as 188 of the permanent staff of 300 were American subjects. I make no comment on the adequacy of that reply except to say that I have heard quite different reasons given in other Russian quarters.

The Soviet Union decided to join UNESCO on April 22nd, 1954.

no member-State would necessarily be bound by it. The Commission, however, continued its task of endeavouring to draft a Covenant, which, as a Covenant, would possess a far more ambitious status. Under this Covenant a complaint that a State was infringing the principles laid down in the Covenant could only be brought up by another State, and not by individuals. A proposal has been made that an Attorney-General should be appointed by the United Nations, whose duty it would be to consider complaints raised by individuals or non-official bodies, and who would have power to bring any such petitions before UNO which he considered to be serious enough to warrant consideration.

The reactions of the States revealed in the discussions on human rights were significant. The first objection to the Declaration came from Saudi Arabia, on the ground that it would enable an individual Mohammedan to renounce his religious faith with impunity. Pakistan, however, took a liberal view and declared that Islamic law was not intended to interfere with religious conscience. South Africa, smarting from criticism recently levied against her on account of her political attitude to her non-European citizens, regarded the Declaration as likely to encourage unwarrantable encroachment on the authority of States to deal with their own domestic affairs. By this attitude she acquired the Cominform group as her strange bedfellows, the Soviet view being that the Declaration undermined the principle of national sovereignty and was "nothing but an ideological preparation for a country's political surrender to a more powerful State."

The Communist reaction to the 'Human Rights' proposals was in the main an emphasis on the rights of society, whereas the Western Powers stressed the rights of the individual. Mr. Vyshinsky argued that the Declaration should set out the duties of the individual towards the State, as well as a definition of his claims to liberty. The Marxist standpoint was well expressed by the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Radovanovic. "The Declaration," he said, "overlooks the fact that man is not an isolated individual but a member of the community. . . . The well-being of a man depends in a very great measure on

the conditions existing in the community to which he belongs, and therefore the protection of the community, whether social, religious, or in any other respect, ought to be included among human rights."

This difference of emphasis might have been viewed as complementary rather than conflicting. The real significance of these different reactions is to be seen in the jealousy with which each State clung to the principle of national sovereignty, and the indignation which each State betrayed whenever administration of its national affairs was criticised in the Assembly. Each State in turn, whenever so criticised, resented such interference, and claimed the protection of Article 1, Section 7, of the Charter, which declares that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." Thus, the Communist group invariably replied to any accusations of forced labour, persecutions of minorities, purges and unjust trials in this vein. Soviet complaints of British colonial administration were denounced by Britain as mischievous propaganda and an impertinent interference with British responsibilities. According to the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, when America decided that UNRRA must cease to operate, "the overwhelming majority of the sub-committee had preferred the principle of action by an interim agency. . . . The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, however, had explicitly stated before the sub-committee that they could not bow to the majority in this case, and that they would not adhere to any decision which did not meet their point of view. . . . They wished to be free to judge on their own [responsibility] when and where relief was needed." When South Africa was reprimanded in the Assembly for her political and social treatment of non-Europeans, her representative announced that his Government would take no notice of whatever resolution was passed.

Although the Declaration of Human Rights had not been elevated to the status of a charter, and remained for the present a 'convention' which each member-State was left

voluntarily to endorse or ignore, it was important as a first endeavour to incorporate certain moral and humanitarian obligations which should govern the behaviour of States, and was therefore, in effect, a limitation of absolute national sovereignty. Moreover, the General Assembly has appointed a Commission on Race Relations which is authorised to bring allegations of infringement of racial freedom before the Assembly. In 1950 the Council of Europe adopted a Covenant of Human Rights, and the Pan-American Union passed a resolution advocating the establishment of an American Court of Human Rights. The same type of development was discernible in the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders (1947), when the Military Tribunal was given authority to prosecute for (1) crimes against peace (planning and waging aggressive war), (2) violation of rules of war (war crimes), and (3) crimes against humanity (against civilians before or during the war). The justice of these trials has been questioned in some legal quarters on the ground that the prisoners were accused of offences which were officially branded as offences subsequent to their commitment. But the moral principle, thus introduced, was obviously of fundamental importance in the framework of any modern international constitution. Goering, Streicher, Ribbentrop and Rosenberg were among those condemned to death on these counts, Goering anticipating the execution of the sentence by committing suicide.

The rise of Communist China

No part of the United Nations machinery is vested with greater authority than the Security Council. To that body was assigned the responsibility of preventing aggression and of taking such action as it saw fit to preserve world peace, including military sanctions, against any disturber of the peace. The composition of the Council was therefore no mere matter of organisational detail but an issue of vital moment. Moreover, the Security Council was so ordered that the major power was focused in the five permanent members. If the Council was to perform its functions adequately, it was essential that this extreme executive authority should be administered by

representatives of the States whose title to the permanent seats could be justified on practical grounds.

When UNO was formed it was considered that this authority must be centred in the Powers which had borne the main brunt of the fighting in the war, and which accordingly could claim to have made the chief contribution to victory over the enemy. America, Britain and the Soviet Union could clearly be placed in that category. France, although not continuously a combatant, was classified as a major European Power and regarded as qualified to take her place with the three great Allies. In the Far East China had been the victim of Japanese invasion long before the European war had commenced. She was therefore also allotted a permanent seat.

But the position in China had undergone a radical change during the postwar period. Chiang Kai-shek's Government, it was gradually realised, was riddled with effete feudal corruption and had consequently carried on the struggle against Japan with increasing incompetency. Virile resistance came from the Communist army, which was not only liberating whole provinces from the enemy but was effecting a wholesale revolution in the territory under its control. America, who had been pouring money and arms into China, found the situation so unsatisfactory that General Marshall was sent on a special mission in 1945 to attempt a settlement between the Nationalists (Chiang Kai-shek's supporters) and the Communists. In 1947 he reported in uncompromising terms on the calibre of the Nationalist political and military forces. "Irreconcilable groups," he declared, are only "interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China" and have "evidently no real intention of implementing" the liberal and progressive changes so urgently required. The Communists, led by the vigorous and intelligent Mao Tse-tung, were the only force both promising and accomplishing the far-reaching land, political and social reforms so long overdue. When the Nationalists and Communists met in open combat the advance of the latter proved to be irresistible not merely on account of its military strength, but by the virility of its morale. The Nationalists stood for a decadent, decaying

system; the Communists for liberation from centuries-old chaos. There is no need to adopt a perfectionist estimate of the new régime in order to reach that conclusion. Whatever condemnation we may feel it necessary to pass on revolutionary excesses, that does not alter the fact that the Communists in China can show to their credit immense achievements, particularly in the fields of education, agricultural production and sanitation, or the fact that the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek was essential to any semblance of progress.

The 'People's Liberation Army,' as the Communist forces were termed, swept the Nationalist troops before them. On October 1st, 1949, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic was proclaimed. Chiang Kai-shek had fled to the island of Formosa, the whole of China was passing under Communist control. This was by far the most momentous event since the end of the second world war. The spread of Communism across so large an area of Asia vastly extended the Soviet sphere of influence. No longer was the Soviet Union with its cluster of satellites a solitary oasis in a capitalist world; it now possessed a close and powerful ally, an ally formidable not only with respect to the size of its population but as a country of immeasurable potentialities, which could be developed agriculturally and industrially. Moreover, from the Soviet standpoint China was a strategic gain of no small value, in relation to the whole Asian continent; her influence as a successful Communist State, dependent upon and largely aided by Soviet resources, could hardly fail to be without effect on other Asian peoples.

In this situation American policy found itself in a serious dilemma. The White Paper of 1949* recognised the futility of attempting to restore the Chiang Kai-shek régime. But, instead of also recognising the inevitability—for better or worse—of a wholesale revolution, and endeavouring to cultivate friendly relations with the new Republic, the Washington reaction was to regard the revolution as a manifestation of 'Communist imperialism.' America was therefore logically bound to support the lost and discredited Nationalist cause.

* *The United States' Relations with China.*

Formosa was placed under American protection, and the new China went unrecognised diplomatically. This was unrealistic, but still more open to criticism was the fact that Nationalist China was allowed to retain its permanent seat on the Security Council. It is difficult to conceive of the slightest justification for this permission. It could only imply that, from the American point of view, a State should be represented on the Council not by the Government which it had set up, but by the Government which America considered it ought to have set up or retained.

On January 6th, 1950, the British Government, largely at the request of trade interests in the City of London, followed the example of thirteen other States which had already given official recognition to the Chinese People's Republic. Rather than risk a deterioration of Anglo-American relations, however, Britain acquiesced in the continued presence of Chiang Kai-shek's representative on the Security Council. The result of excluding real China from that body was necessarily to bring about certain consequences which we shall presently be examining.

XI

REVOLT AGAINST IMPERIALISM

Colonisation and the New Age

PERHAPS the most conspicuous feature of the modern age has been the awakening of national consciousness on the part of the coloured races. It is a profound change, a change which is affecting the political landscape of the whole world, but which has been mainly centred in the continents of Asia and Africa. Peoples who in the past have been vainly agitating for freedom from European domination, and peoples who were not sufficiently developed to be animated by any conscious desire for independence, are now demanding the same rights of national sovereignty which more civilised States long ago acquired. The result has been a challenge to the claims of imperialist colonisation, and to those forms of economic exploitation of native territories by White Powers which have not involved the actual acquisition of such territories as colonies.

Hitherto, the spread of civilisation to backward areas has been effected almost entirely by imperialist and quasi-imperialist methods. The European nations have benefited immensely by the discovery of vast regions possessing natural wealth where capital could be profitably developed and labour was cheap.* Britain, for example, has enjoyed a high standard of living largely as a consequence of her ability to extract wealth

* Cheap native labour has not infrequently involved actual health deterioration. The 1936 annual report of the Medical Director in Southern Rhodesia disclosed that casualties among the African employees in the mines amounted to nearly fifty-five per cent. in the year 1935. This percentage, the report stated, "could have been greatly reduced by a more generous ration scale, and still more by a correct one. . . . There appears to be no incentive to furnish the working native with his physiological requirements."

from her colonial possessions. This has involved the building of railways and roads, the introduction of agricultural and industrial equipment, and invasion by a White community made up of traders, land settlers and Government officials. The impact of Western civilisation on these more primitive populations has proceeded on imperialist lines; usually the missionary and the explorer have been the pioneers, but the trader and the colonial civil servant have followed in their wake. Without this impact the conditions of many of the native races would presumably have remained barbaric. But the incentive which has produced the impact has been the commercial enterprise of the European nations.

Under the stress of the present-day challenge the question which has increasingly come to the fore is whether the imperialist method has morally justified itself, whether the impact of Western civilisation has brought more blessings than evils on the subject native peoples. Undoubtedly, the imperialist record can claim to have controlled or eliminated some of the worst excesses of savage life, such as human sacrifice, the torture of prisoners, the tyranny of the witch-doctor. It has introduced hospitals and better sanitation. It has instituted schools and attempted to combat ignorance as well as disease. In its later phases British imperialism has enabled the advanced pupils in its various colonial communities to come to English universities and train for professional careers. Native universities have also been established.

Nevertheless, against these and other substantial reforms must be reckoned many features and tendencies which have counteracted these progressive influences. Chief among them is the fact that the primary motive of the imperialist nation in developing the natural resources of a colony has been its own commercial profit. Consequently, the greater proportion of the wealth extracted from the soil has gone into the pockets of the White investors. Though the native standard of living may have been raised, it has been in the inevitable interests of the colonisers to keep profits high and therefore wages low.*

* Mr. H. N. Brailsford in his book, *Subject India*, mentions as an example of this exploitation the case of the Indian jute mills. "With sufficiently full

Moreover, the cultural effect of the impact of European civilisation has been offset by the fact that the European community has carefully segregated itself from native society. The result has been that where, as in the cities, the two peoples are residing in close proximity, the emphasis on White racial superiority has been most marked. Clubs, restaurants, railway carriages, station waiting-rooms have been reserved strictly for Europeans, and this organised racial discrimination has created bitter resentment in the minds particularly of the educated coloured men. Above all, the growth of national consciousness among the native peoples has meant a craving for political independence and an increasing antagonism against the White settlers who, whatever the economic improvements they have introduced, are regarded as aliens who have seized land and power, who have no moral title to these possessions, and whose occupation has only been secured by force.

The settlers see the situation, not unnaturally, in quite a different light. To them the natives are obviously children (they are sometimes described in less polite terms), who are incapable of self-government or of developing their country so as to raise their own standard of living. Many of the settlers have exercised a beneficent paternal rule over their native employees; they have cared for them, shouldered their responsibilities and acted as guardians for their families. This is the same argument as the slave-owners in America used figures before me I reckon that during the early postwar [1914-18 war] years, for every £100 which these jute mills paid in profits to their shareholders in Scotland, they paid £12 in wages to their Indian workers." Moreover, as he points out, most of the British companies whose industrial works were situate in India were registered in London, the result being that the taxation levied on their profits went to the British and not to the Indian Exchequer.

Taking the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia as another example, Mr. Leonard Barnes in his book, *Empire or Democracy?*, claims that the total output in 1937 was worth £12 million. Of this, £5 million was paid as dividends to shareholders (all non-resident), £800,000 in salaries to the 1,690 European employees, and £244,000 to the 17,000 African workers. Mr. Barnes reckoned that for every £11 produced by mining as a whole and sent out of that country, only £1 was left behind.

against the abolition of slavery; to free the slaves, it was claimed, would be to leave them helpless and unprotected. To evacuate native territory would mean that the coloured peoples would relapse into the horrors of savage barbarism.

The crux of this problem, the question of how far colonisation is morally justified, turns on the ultimate purpose of colonisation. In theory British imperialism has generally professed that its aim is to educate its colonial subjects, and whenever—or if ever—they are fit to govern themselves, to promote their country to Dominion status. But, in practice, this principle has been largely thwarted by the fact that it is the imperialist Power which decides whether or not the colony has reached a stage qualifying it for self-government; the tendency is for the imperialist Power to deny that that stage has arrived. The colonisers will always be prejudiced against a decision that the subject people is ready for independence, since independence might mean for the settlers a loss of property, a loss of employment and of the fruits of the capital which they have invested. These self-interest motives can easily be rationalised: the settlers will protest that what they are concerned about is not the sacrifice which the freeing of the colony will mean for them, but the dire consequences which will engulf the native population. When the Royal Assent was given to the Indian Independence Act on July 18th, 1947, and independence was similarly given to Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, this was an event of momentous significance; for the first time Britain had raised three non-White dependencies to Dominion level, thus proving that the professed aim of her colonisation policy was indeed to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, this action met with a storm of protest and alarm in some British quarters,* on the ground that once British control was withdrawn the consequences would be catastrophic, since the Indians were incapable of governing themselves peaceably. The immediate results of liberation may have seemed to confirm that prophecy, but certainly not the long-term experience.

* When I was in India in 1947 I was continually assured by British residents and Service officers that the Labour Government's decision would mean a general massacre between Moslems and Hindus.

Indeed, the truth of the matter might generally be said to be that a people are never fit for self-government until they have had to govern themselves; and that that lesson may have to be learnt through a process of bloodshed and internal upheaval.

From a moral standpoint the case for colonisation might have been vindicated, had the colonisers been inspired by altruistic motives and had earned their living solely as instructors and administrators, aiding the native peoples to develop their own land and preparing them for intelligent political advance. What has vitiated the imperialist method is the vested interest which colonisers have acquired in the territory under imperialist occupation. An apt contrast may be drawn between them and the Christian missionaries, who as a whole have established churches, schools and hospitals with no thought of commercial gain. This conception of what should be the relationship between civilised and non-civilised races led in some degree to the policy, first instituted under the League of Nations, of mandated territory—the principle of placing undeveloped countries under the temporary control of a civilised State, and of holding that State responsible as a trustee to an international authority, not as an owner of the native territory. If colonisation were to be superseded by mandated trusteeship, many of the evils bedevilling the past relationship of Western civilisation and coloured peoples might indeed be redeemed.

National consciousness in Asia

These considerations are far from irrelevant to the subject of Soviet and Western tension. In the eyes of the Asiatic peoples, now demanding freedom from White domination, Communism tends to be identified with liberation. This is due to at least two causes. First, the Soviet Union always proclaimed that the many different races within its jurisdiction enjoyed complete political equality; however sceptical the Western Powers might be of these allegedly ideal conditions, the fact remained that under the 1936 Constitution the Soviet of Nationalities—one of the two chambers of the supreme federal parliament—

was composed of the same number of deputies from each constituent republic. Secondly, the Soviet Union was the close ally of the Chinese People's Republic—Moscow had retained official relations with Chiang Kai-shek till May 1949, but, immediately the Republic was proclaimed, gave full diplomatic recognition to Mao Tse-tung. Whenever a dispute between coloured peoples and imperialist States came before the United Nations, the Soviet Union would be found on the side of the coloured peoples. Many coloured delegates who have visited the Soviet Union have expressed the view that there is no racial discrimination there, and no suggestion of White superiority.*

Conversely, the design of Western imperialist policy in its attempt to suppress by force native insurrection and revolt confirmed the native view that Western democracy was to be identified with a retention of imperialist rule and a repudiation of the claims to national independence. The notable exception was, as we have seen, the British withdrawal from India, Ceylon and Burma. Elsewhere, however necessary it may have been for Western Powers to use military weapons to subdue outrages and disorder in Asia and Africa, the native nationalists interpreted these actions as yet another proof that the Western democracies meant to fight at all costs to preserve their commercial exploitation. Thus, whereas Communism tended to be identified with liberation, Western democracy was regarded as synonymous with oppression. The Western States, indeed, seemed to go out of their way to implement this conclusion, since they frequently described these native revolts—inspired by the desire for independence—as Communist outrages. The terrorists in Malaya were usually labelled 'Communist.'

* An American negro who had recently visited Russia once said to me, "When I walked in the streets of Moscow I was conscious for the first time in my life that I wasn't regarded as an inferior human being." I have met with several similar expressions of opinion. They may be unjustified to some extent—some European societies have discarded the primitive colour prejudices. But these impressions are significant in so far as they show how deeply the traditional White attitude has burnt into the minds of coloured men and women.

The cause of nationalist independence in Asia had been considerably affected by the Japanese occupation. Japanese propaganda had been mainly concerned to fan the flame of anti-White sentiments. Japan was careful to pose as liberator from the European oppressor and to pretend to be the champion of Asiatic self-government. When the war ended, the Western Powers were therefore faced with an entire change of Asiatic, and indeed African, opinion. The temper of coloured revolt had quickened throughout the world. We may personally deplore or welcome this development. Our pro- or anti-imperialist emotions, however, count for little. What had to be reckoned with was the fact that the imperialist and colonial system would now meet with fierce resistance from the subject races. The whole relationship between White and coloured peoples was undergoing a revolutionary transformation.

Holland and Indonesia

Holland was the first European State to experience the effects of the changed situation in Asia. For over three centuries she had maintained imperial sway over the vast Pacific region known as Indonesia. Indonesia consists of several thousand islands, the largest of which are Java, Sumatra and (Western) Borneo. Few regions are richer in natural resources. In addition to agricultural produce, there is tin, coal, copra, rubber and oil. It has been reckoned, indeed, that Indonesia accounts for thirty-five per cent. of the total supply of these raw materials.

Immediately after the surrender of Japan Indonesia took action. She proclaimed herself an independent Republic on August 17th, 1945. The situation was one of considerable unsettlement, complicated by the fact that the Japanese forces had not yet been evacuated. British and Indian troops were landed in Java and Sumatra to assist in restoring order, and suffered many casualties. After a series of negotiations with the Indonesian leader, Dr. Sutan Sjahrir, the Netherlands Government signed what was termed the Linggadjati Agreement on November 15th, 1946. Under this agreement Holland undertook to recognise the independence of Java, Sumatra and

Madura, to withdraw forces from these territories, and to establish a United States of Indonesia by January 1st, 1949.

But the troubles had not ended; they had but begun. The agreement was worded loosely enough to admit of various interpretations. The Netherlands Government met with opposition, of a strength which it had not anticipated, in the Dutch Parliament. Protests were raised on the ground that the Dutch negotiators had no authority to make so many concessions to the Indonesians. The Government were sufficiently alarmed by this display of hostile criticism to interpret the agreement in a much less liberal sense than the Dutch negotiators had led the Indonesians to expect. These negotiators were therefore placed in the awkward position of having to explain to the Indonesian leaders that the conditions for a settlement had been drastically revised. But the Indonesians were in no mood for compromise or surrender. On the contrary, they advanced further claims, insisting, for example, that their own Republican police must alone be responsible for maintaining order in Republican territory, without the collaboration of Dutch troops. On July 18th, 1947, Australia, France, Great Britain and (Nationalist) China officially urged the Indonesians to accept the Dutch terms. But on the following day Holland, irritated beyond measure by the prevarications and by the infringement of the agreement of which she considered the Indonesians to be guilty, issued an ultimatum; armed revolt on the part of the Indonesians must cease, and the Indonesian forces must withdraw six miles from their present strongholds, within forty-eight hours.

Australia, who had every desire to cultivate friendly relations with her Indonesian neighbour, and India, now brought the dispute to the attention of the Security Council. Holland at once raised the protest, which was to become all too familiar in similar disputes, that this was a domestic matter which lay outside the jurisdiction of the Council. The Council, nevertheless, took action by calling on both parties to cease hostilities forthwith, to settle this dispute by peaceful means, and to inform the Council of the progress of the negotiations. Meanwhile, Dutch military operations had been successful in drastically

reducing the extent of the Republican territory. The Republican forces were unable to put up an effective resistance to the Dutch advance, and fell back rapidly. On July 31st, 1947, the Security Council invited Holland and India, though not members of the Council, to take part in their consultations. At first the Council refused to invite the Indonesian representatives to be present, but acceded to this request on August 12th. A compromise settlement was reached on July 17th, 1948, known as the 'Renville Agreement.'

Holland resorted to further police and military action during December 1948 in Java and Sumatra. The fact that several of the Republican leaders had been arrested by the Dutch was condemned by a unanimous vote of the Security Council. The Council set up a 'Committee of Good Offices' both in 1947 and 1948 to assist in reaching a settlement. Under United Nations pressure, comparative peace was restored, and on November 2nd, 1949, a new agreement was signed at The Hague, by which Holland transferred the sovereignty of all Indonesia, except Dutch New Guinea, to the Republic. Indonesia became a United States, a federal republic composed of sixteen constituent countries.

During these troubles France and Belgium had generally supported the Dutch case. The Soviet Union gave unqualified support to Indonesia. Britain was critical of the Dutch ultimatum and resort to force in 1947, but supported the plea that this was a domestic dispute in which the Security Council had no right to interfere. Australia appeared as champion of the Indonesians, their representative at one stage comparing Dutch action to Hitler's 'invasion' of the Netherlands in 1940. The American outlook was affected on the one hand by her dislike of European colonisation, and on the other by her desire to see the South-East Asian economy as quickly as possible restored from the ravages of war to its former prosperity.

The French and Indo-China

The French were also seriously affected by the nationalist awakening in Asia. Since the nineteenth century France had taken possession of Indo-China, which comprises Viet-Nam,

Cambodia and Laos. Like Indonesia, it was overrun by the Japanese in the course of their sweeping victories during the war. The Japanese set up an autonomous State of Viet-Nam, comprising the areas of Tongking, Annam and Cochin-China. They appointed Bao Dai, the Emperor of Annam, as nominal ruler.

The French prewar colonial record in Indo-China had not been such as to render the native population enthusiastic for a restoration of French rule. By 1936 rice accounted for fifty per cent. of the exports, the native producers receiving 3s. 1d. per quintal, whereas the export price was 12s. The French rubber companies in 1937 admitted a profit of £2,470,000, while the total wages were less than £320,000. The coal mines in Tongking had yielded a profit of £45 million in sixteen years; the average miner's wage was £4. 5s. a year.

Immediately after the Japanese surrender the Viet-Minh people took matters into their own hands, proclaiming the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, under the presidency of Dr. Ho Chi Minh. The French reaction was to recognise Chi Minh's Government but to refuse to grant it dominion status, and to retain as much as possible of their former control. Viet-Nam representatives were invited to a conference held at Fontainebleau, and during the summer of 1946 the discussions were continued; but hopes of a settlement were ultimately wrecked by the action of the Viet-Minh forces. On December 19th, 1946, they attacked Hanoi, massacred a number of French residents and destroyed French property, including the Pasteur Institute. France at once retaliated by embarking on a long and costly war, which was ruinously to drain the French economy during the coming years, the very period when recovery was desperately needed. Nor were her military operations crowned with success. After six years of fighting no victory had been achieved. Thirty thousand French soldiers, apart from the casualties among the Colonial troops, had lost their lives, and still the popular forces were unsubdued. Indeed, considering that France was spending 1,300 million dollars a year on the campaign, it was remarkable that the less

efficiently equipped resistance had been so persistently maintained.

Not only the military but the political situation had become highly confused. France's policy was primarily to restore order and defeat the Nationalists, and was influenced by a desire to wipe out the challenge to her military prestige. She was also anxious to set up a rival State to that proclaimed by the Viet-Minh, an independent State of Viet-Nam which would be a self-governing member of the French Union. For this purpose it was necessary to find a leader who would supersede Ho Chi Minh, and who would be agreeable to the French programme. The choice fell on Bao Dai, who had eventually fled from Chi Minh's Republic and had since been negotiating with the French Foreign Office. Bao Dai and his wife had been successful speculators for many years and amassed a large fortune, with an estate in the Belgian Congo. Bao Dai proved to be a crafty and wary statesman who was not going to commit himself to either side until he saw more clearly how the situation would develop, what would be the extent of the French offers, and whether rebel forces would overcome the French Army. The prospect of a Viet-Nam Government under French protection appealed largely to the wealthy Chinese merchants of Cochin-China and the rice cultivators; they saw their interests imperilled by any Communist threat. But there could be little question that popular opinion overwhelmingly supported Ho Chi Minh. At the elections of January 1946, ninety-eight per cent. of the votes cast had been for Dr. Chi Minh. Six years later, according to the *Observer*,* French officials privately admitted that "given free elections, the majority of the country would vote for Ho Chi Minh." On June 14th, 1949, the new State of Viet-Nam was proclaimed at Saigon, with Bao Dai installed as Emperor. He was careful to explain that he retained this title provisionally, and that the Constitution of the State would be decided by popular vote.

The rebel forces were, however, far from appeased. Bao Dai was branded as a French puppet and the new State denounced as merely a device to preserve French imperialist claims. The

* July 12th, 1952.

situation became further complicated by the military aid which the Chinese People's Republic was now openly giving to the Viet-Minh cause. The Soviet Union had already officially recognised Dr. Chi Minh's Republic. The Americans were at first inclined to be sympathetic to the Nationalist cause. Indeed, *The Times** declared that "by recognising the Indo-Chinese National Front Government, improvised by Ho Chi Minh . . . and associating with him in nationalist demonstrations of an anti-French character, the American authorities built up Ho Chi Minh as . . . the effective ruler of a considerable portion of the country." This attitude was no doubt largely inspired in the interests of commerce and American financial investment. However, as soon as Chi Minh's Communist affiliations became evident, the American attitude changed. America, accordingly, came to the financial assistance of the French, granting a loan of 285 million dollars in 1951, and a further loan of 600 million dollars in 1953. American opinion was indeed critical of the peace settlement eventually reached in 1954, by which France assented to the transfer of half this territory to the Viet-Minh Government.

There was much criticism in Dutch circles of the difference in treatment accorded to Holland by the United Nations compared with that meted out to France. Whereas Holland had been censured by the Security Council, French action had been regarded as a domestic affair outside United Nations' responsibility. Whereas Holland had been forced largely to submit to the claims of the Nationalist rebels, France had been assisted by America in her struggle against the rebels. The Western reply to this reproach was that the Netherlands Government had initiated the offensive by launching an ultimatum against Indonesia and by the second 'police action' in 1948, whereas hostilities had been provoked in Indo-China by the rebel attack on Hanoi. Moreover, and probably more important in Western eyes, there was the fact that the Indonesians had no Communist affiliations, whereas the Viet-Minh was assisted by Communist China and had defiantly adopted a Communist programme.

* November 13th, 1950.

Troubles in Malaya

Malaya has become commercially one of the most valuable of British possessions. Her average rubber production per year is nearly one-third of that of the world. As a result of her annual export of rubber she has, unlike Britain, a dollar credit balance. Britain's economic recovery therefore depended very largely on restoring Malayan trade as rapidly as possible from the devastation it had suffered as a result of the war.

'Communist' agitation had commenced during 1947, and in the following year broke into open revolt. It had some popular grievance on which to fasten. The native population had expected that when their country was liberated from the Japanese occupation their standard of living would at least revert to the prewar level. But this was far from being the case. Malaya had never been able to produce more than a third of the rice which was needed for her own consumption, and, as a result of the war, neither Burma, Siam nor Indo-China could contribute the additional quantity required. Rice—the basic food of the native population—had therefore to be rationed strictly, and the cost of living rose by some 300 to 400 per cent. In addition, there was considerable political opposition to the British plan of constituting a Malayan Union. The main objections were the conditions laid down for attaining the status of citizenship, which, it was held, would result in domination by the Chinese residents and in the reduction of the powers of the Malayan rulers. The Union constitution, however, was revoked and a Federation established as from February 1st, 1948. Under this scheme the complaints of the Malayan people were removed, but political opposition now arose from the Chinese. In the spring of 1948 the Malayan Communist Party instigated a series of strikes, and later resorted to armed insurrection.

Support for the 'Communist' revolt came chiefly from the Chinese squatters, but, as the rising spread and the hostile attacks of the rebels intensified, the wealthy Chinese residents also supported the rebel cause, in so far as they paid 'protection money' to the 'Communist' forces in order to secure immunity

from destruction. The Malayan people themselves were anti-Communist. The insurrection soon assumed serious proportions. The rebels adopted underground guerrilla tactics, to which the nature of the country readily lent itself. Residents were massacred, British troops ambushed and property destroyed. In spite of optimistic statements made from time to time to the effect that the disorder had been virtually quelled, the revolt persisted. Vigorous military operations were carried out and additional British troops had to be sent to the theatre of disturbances.

The British case rested largely on the contention that it was their efforts, combined with those of the Chinese and Indian settlers, which had transformed the country from swamp and jungle into a fertile and profitable rubber-producing land, thus benefiting the native population to a marked degree. The anti-British case was founded on the complaint that the profits derived from the agricultural and civilising developments were largely withdrawn from the country into the imperial (Commonwealth) purse. British propaganda was designed to identify the unsettlement with Communist intrigue, fomented by agitators beyond the frontier, and to ignore the influence of nationalist aspirations. This was an inadequate analysis. There was a considerable body of native opinion, refusing to condone the terrorist campaign, Liberal rather than Communist in complexion, but vehemently dissatisfied with the control exercised by the White plantation owners, and demanding political independence.

How far the actual terrorist campaign was promoted and organised by the Chinese Republic, or even from the Soviet Union, remains a matter of some doubt. *The Survey of International Affairs*, issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London,* makes the following comment: "It seemed therefore that the Communist rising [in Malaya] was organised locally but was contributing to the general Communist cause, and as such it received the support of Communist parties in other countries, including the British."

* The 1947-8 volume. Part vi, Section 5.

The colour problem in Africa

The circumstances attending these wars and disturbances might vary, but the general pattern was the same. The same issue lay at the root of the troubles which Britain was presently to experience in the canal zone of Egypt, in Persia, in Kenya, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias; or of those which confronted France in her North African possessions. The underlying cause of all these unsettlements was the growing determination of native races, whether African or Asiatic, no longer to tolerate the occupation of their land by foreigners, no longer to submit to foreign political control, and no longer to allow their resources to be exploited by White settlers or trading companies. In some cases the determination took root in the hearts of peoples still at a very primitive stage of social evolution. In some cases the determination took a violent form leading, as in Kenya and Malaya, to atrocious outrages. Where such conditions existed, the British answer was that these terrorist campaigns must be suppressed by military force, and that until law and order were restored there could be no question of granting further political reforms. The native attitude was animated by scepticism as to whether, even when order was restored, the occupying Power would grant the complete independence for which the subject races had begun to make a bid. The British could point to the Indian liberation as evidence that there was no obdurate determination on their part to refuse such demands.

Yet, though a Labour Government might be liberal enough to admit that the privilege of dominion status was not a White monopoly, the suspicions of the native mind were fortified by the extremist convictions of those White settlers who openly declared that at all costs any moves towards native independence must be opposed, and that the liberation of India, or even the comparative political freedom introduced in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, was a fatal mistake which was directly responsible for such outrages as the Mau Mau murders. Many of the native leaders believed that this ultra-imperialist attitude would ultimately determine the future policy of the

British Government. The doubts of the native races were accentuated by their interpretation of the motives of such schemes as Central African Federation, the consequences of which would be, in the view of the majority of Africans, a continuance of White domination. More direct evidence of the true nature of the White attitude seemed to the native mind to be supplied by the policy of South Africa, where Dr. Malan was passing measures to ensure that the rule of the White minority should be permanently secured, and that the coloured population should be so subjugated as to be denied the rights of any semblance of democratic representation.

The relevance of this widespread coloured nationalist movement to the problem with which we are concerned is that the Soviet Union and its Chinese ally were not slow to make use of the propaganda opportunities which these disturbances afforded them. They could stand, in native eyes, as the champions of native freedom. So long as the Western democracies could be represented as striving to preserve their imperialist system, or at least to retain the vestiges of that system, valuable support could be gathered to the Communist cause. We must now turn to a development which cannot be dissociated from the nationalist movement, and which was critically to increase the East-West tension, even threatening at times to precipitate the outbreak of a third world war.

XII

WAR IN KOREA

Korea divided

WHEN Roosevelt and Stalin met at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 it was agreed informally between them that when Japan was defeated the northern half of Korea should be occupied by Soviet forces and the southern by American troops, until such time as a Korean Government had been elected. In August of that year America proposed that, for the purposes of this temporary military occupation, the 38th Parallel should serve as the frontier between the two zones. The Soviet Government agreed to this arrangement. At the Moscow Conference in December 1945 the Allies issued a statement that an American-Soviet Commission would be set up to enable the Koreans to develop democratic self-government and to draft "an agreement concerning a Four Power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years."

By the time the Japanese surrender had taken place, the Soviet Army were in possession of the whole of the northern zone. The American troops took up their position on the southern side of the Parallel by September 8th. Two days earlier a national Korean congress had been held at Seoul, proclaiming a People's Republic and electing Lyuh Wooh-Hyung as President. The Americans, however, regarded this development as premature and insisted that for the present the only authority in their area must be their own military Government. They were by no means convinced that the 'Republic' was supported by the whole population, and therefore treated the movement as constituting no more than one of the 134 political parties already registered with the American authorities

—that is, as a movement which would ultimately be given an opportunity to secure popular support. In the Soviet zone no military Government appears to have been established. A Korean 'administration' was set up, with Soviet help. Subsequently, in November 1946, an election in North Korea was held in which the United Democratic National Front secured ninety-seven per cent. of the ninety-nine per cent. registered voters. Kim Il-sen, one of the leading Korean Communists, was appointed Chairman, and in October 1948 the Soviet Union gave diplomatic recognition to this Government.

Thus, a political division of Korea, a division which had never been contemplated, was created almost from the first. The United Nations Commission in Korea reported unfavourably on the northern body. "The northern régime," it declared,* "is the creature of a military occupant and rules by right of a mere transfer of power from that Government." The Northern Government seems to have lost no time in organising an army of some considerable size. Meanwhile, in the South a parliament of ninety members was formed, half being chosen on a somewhat complicated system of election and half being appointed by the American Military Government. There was a large majority of Right Wing elected members, and the Americans attempted to redress the political balance by filling the other forty-five seats with representatives of the Centre and moderate Left groups. Dr. Syngman Rhee, who represented the three largest Right parties, visited the United States in December 1946 to persuade the Americans to agree to the formation of a State of Southern Korea. He was unsuccessful.

As the Soviet-American Commission had failed to reach any agreed proposal for the independence of a United Korea, America brought the problem before the United Nations in September 1947. The Soviet Union protested against this course, as a violation of the decision taken at the Moscow Conference. Russia, however, advanced two proposals when

* *Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea*, Chapter iv. (U.N. General Assembly Official Records.)

the matter was considered in committee. The first was that all Soviet and American troops should be evacuated from Korea at a given date, the second that Korean representatives should be allowed to take part in the U.N. deliberations. An alternative proposal was carried in the committee, to the effect that a Temporary Commission should be sent to Korea to supervise the creation of a free State, that elections for a National Assembly should be held by the end of March 1948, and that occupation troops should be withdrawn after the Government had been elected.

Koreans, as a whole, strongly resented the division of their country into two halves. By far the larger part of the population resided in the South, while the chief industrial enterprises were concentrated in the North. Syngman Rhee was almost alone in his desire to recognise the Parallel and set up a separate Southern State. But by now Soviet and North Korean propaganda was in full blast against the United Nations plan, on the ground that it was a scheme to "convert Korea into an American colony," and that members of the U.N. Commission were "hirelings of the American dollar." These and other such accusations by the North Korean radio were quoted by the Indian chairman of the Temporary Commission to a committee of the General Assembly. Although a conference had been held in the North, at which both Northern and Southern Korean leaders took part, the U.N. Temporary Commission was not allowed access to the North. A decision was then taken to proceed with elections in the South, a momentous decision, since it signified official acceptance of a divided country. The elections in South Korea were held on May 10th, 1948, and resulted in a victory for Syngman Rhee. The Communists in South Korea did not go to the poll.

In March 1950 a measure was proposed in the National Assembly of South Korea, designed to limit the powers of President Rhee by making his Cabinet responsible to the Legislature. The Bill was defeated by seventy-nine votes to thirty-three, but there were sixty-six abstentions. Syngman Rhee's reaction was to announce that the elections planned for

May 10th, 1950, would be postponed; but there was so vigorous a protest against this that he promised to abide by the scheduled date. On March 31st, however, he announced that the elections would not be held till November, on the excuse that this would allow time for the Budget to be administered.

Two Governments were thus in existence, both claiming to be the *de jure* executive of the whole Republic. The Temporary Commission reported that all American forces had been withdrawn by July 1949, while Tass stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops had been completed by the previous Christmas Day.

Outbreak of the Korean War

It is doubly necessary that at this point we should note with particular care the sequence and nature of the events which now took place. In the critical situation which had arisen United Nations authority was being put to a more exacting test than any to which it had previously been subjected. Would UNO prove capable of suppressing aggression and preventing war? Would it interpret its functions correctly, as conceived by the provisions of the Charter? Would its machinery prove workable, or would it break under the strain? Nothing less than these vital issues were at stake in the drama unfolded on the Korean stage. Moreover, a precedent was being set by which future action in international disputes would be largely determined. At least the Korean example should serve as a guide to remind us what course should be followed on future occasions and what mistakes avoided.

The U.N. Commission reported as early as 1949 that the increasing hostility between North and South Korea, both of which claimed that theirs was the *de jure* Government of the whole country, was creating a highly perilous situation. Serious frontier incidents occurred in August, September and October 1949, which the Commission declared to be perpetrated by Northern troops. On May 30th elections were held for a new National Assembly in the South. The Commission considered that these elections had been "on the whole successfully conducted and in an atmosphere of law and order," eighty-five

per cent. of the new representatives being returned as Independents. The Commission interpreted these results as a serious reverse to Syngman Rhee. On June 20th the Northern leaders proposed that elections throughout all Korea should be held in August, but that the U.N. Commission should not be permitted to act as observers, and that Syngman Rhee and other Southern 'traitors' should not be allowed to participate. The South refused to entertain these proposals. Three Northern representatives entered Southern territory on June 11th as emissaries, but were immediately placed under detention by the South Korean authorities and an attempt made to convert them. The U.N. Commission interviewed the three men, who admitted that they had been well treated and had been persuaded that many of the Northern allegations were untrue. A second plan for unification was forwarded by the Northern Presidium, but was also considered unacceptable. The Commission offered to mediate, but its services were rejected on June 20th by the North. Arrangements for the exchange of political prisoners were in operation between the two parties. But, suddenly, at 4 a.m. on June 25th, war broke out.

Statements as to which side was guilty of invasion were flatly contradictory. The South Korean Government declared that at the above-mentioned hour attacks were launched by the North along the whole 38th Parallel, that the main attacks had been directed against the Ongin Peninsula, the Kaesong area and Chunchon, that there had been seaborne landings on the east coast, that airfields close to Seoul had been bombed and that the Pyongyang (Northern) radio allegation of the previous night to the effect that South Korean troops had crossed the Parallel was entirely false. The North Korean Government declared that "early in the morning . . . the so-called national defence troops of the puppet Government of South Korea launched a sudden offensive on the territory of North Korea along the whole line of the 38th Parallel . . . to a depth of from one to two kilometres." The U.N. Commission reported on June 26th that in their view the Northern operations denoted a "well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea," and that the South Koreans had been "taken

completely by surprise " and were " in no condition to carry out attack on [a] large scale against [the] forces of [the] North."

Two comments should be entered at this point. First, the Commission, having been denied access to the North, was inevitably relying only on information supplied by the Syngman Rhee Government. Secondly, whatever the truth about prior acts of aggression by either side, the fact remained that on June 25th—when the Security Council assumed direct responsibility for intervening in the dispute—it was the North Koreans who had seized salients in South Korean territory, and who therefore at the crucial moment were the invaders.

Action of America and the Security Council

The Security Council took immediate action. It was hastily summoned by the American Government on June 25th, and passed a resolution by nine votes to nil (Yugoslavia abstaining), declaring that the North Korean attack constituted a breach of the peace, and calling on the North Korean authorities to withdraw their troops from South Korean territory, and on United Nations members to assist in the execution of this resolution.

The Soviet representative refused to attend this and subsequent meetings of the Council, and did not appear until August 1st, when he took his turn as President of the Council. On that occasion a ruling from the chair that the Nationalist member did not represent China was defeated by eight votes to three, the Soviet Union, India and Yugoslavia constituting the minority. In a Soviet Note, dated June 29th, 1950, replying to an American Note handed to the Soviet Government two days earlier, the statement was made that " it is not true that the Soviet Government refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council inasmuch as, because of the position of the Government of the United States, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council, which has made it impossible for the Security Council to take

decisions having legal force." The Soviet Union thereby raised once again a vital constitutional objection. Article 23 of the Charter, dealing with the composition of the Council, lays down that one of the permanent members shall be "the Republic of China." It was doubtful whether there could be any ground for maintaining that Chiang Kai-shek's Government represented "the Republic of China," and in any case, especially in a dispute where Communist China was closely concerned (on account of its geographical proximity and its political association with North Korea), the valid composition of the Council had become an issue of vital urgency. The American attitude on this issue was stated in a letter from Mr. Acheson to Pandit Nehru on July 18th, 1950: "In our opinion the decision between competing claimant Governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United Nations."

A weakness in the Soviet argument was that the Soviet Government had taken part in deliberations of the Security Council, both before and after this event, and that, although Nationalist China had been present, the Soviet Government had acquiesced in the legal validity of Council decisions. The further question arose as to whether the absence of the Soviet representative at the Council constituted a veto. Article 27, Section 3, of the Charter lays down that "decisions of the Security Council on all other [non-procedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." The Soviet Union, a permanent member, had not concurred.

But the Security Council members who met on June 25th and subsequent dates were troubled by no such quandaries. On June 25th, as previously stated, the Council declared that the North Korean attack constituted a breach of the peace, and called on the North Koreans to cease hostilities and withdraw behind the 38th Parallel, and on all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North

Korean authorities." On June 27th, the Council, having noted that the North Koreans had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn behind the Parallel, and having noted also "that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security," recommended that the United Nations "furnish such assistance to the Republic of [South] Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack." On July 7th the Council further recommended that the military and other assistance provided should be placed under an American unified command. The command was given to General MacArthur.

On June 27th a statement was issued by President Truman, explaining that he had "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the [South] Korean Government troops cover and support." The vital question of whether this order was given under United Nations authority, or was an anticipation of that authority—thus presenting the Security Council on June 27th with a *fait accompli*—must be judged by the interpretation which is put on the resolution passed on June 25th. "To render every assistance to the U.N. in the execution of this resolution" are the Council's words. "The attack upon Korea," the President's statement continued, "makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government of Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. . . . I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated

States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.”

The Soviet attitude was defined in a statement by Mr. Gromyko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued on July 4th, 1950. “. . . When it became clear that the terrorist régime of Syngman Rhee was collapsing, the United States Government resorted to aggressive armed intervention in the internal affairs of Korea. This intervention took place before the Security Council had met, and the United Nations was thus faced with a *fait accompli*. Furthermore, the action of the Security Council was a gross violation of the Charter. If the Security Council valued the cause of peace, it should have attempted to reconcile the fighting sides in Korea before it adopted such a scandalous resolution [the resolution of June 27th, already referred to]. . . . The real aim of American armed intervention in Korea is to deprive Korea of national independence, to prevent the formation of a united democratic Korean State, and forcibly to establish in Korea an anti-popular régime which would allow the ruling circles of the United States to convert the country into their colony and use Korean territory as a military and strategic springboard in the Far East. . . . The Soviet Government holds that the Koreans have the right to arrange at their discretion their internal national affairs in the sphere of uniting South and North Korea into a single national State, as the North Americans had in the sixties of the last century when they united the South and the North of America into a single national State. From all the aforesaid it follows that the Government of U.S.A. has committed a hostile act against peace, and that it bears the responsibility for the consequences of the armed aggression which it has undertaken.”

On July 4th, 1950, America informed the Soviet Government that she was putting into operation a naval blockade of the whole of the Korean coast. This was declared to be “in keeping with the U.N. Security Council’s request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders.”

On July 13th Pandit Nehru wrote to Stalin and Mr. Acheson explaining that “India’s purpose is to localise the conflict and

to facilitate an early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the U.S.S.R. can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China, with the help and co-operation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict." Stalin replied on July 15th that he welcomed India's peaceful initiative and fully shared Nehru's point of view regarding a peaceful settlement through the Security Council. He added: "I believe that for a speedy settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient to hear in the Security Council representatives of the Korean people."

Mr. Acheson replied on July 18th, in the terms to which allusion has already been made. Pandit Nehru, acknowledging this reply on July 19th, concluded by saying: "I do not think that the admission of China now [to the Security Council] would be an encouragement of aggression."

U.N. troops cross the Parallel

Meanwhile, in the military field the North Koreans were carrying all before them. By the beginning of August 1950 they had reached a point within forty miles of the south-eastern port of Pusan, the base of the American forces. By early September they had commenced an attack on the rectangular zone around Pusan, and, for the moment, it looked as if the South Korean and American troops would suffer a new Dunkirk disaster. General MacArthur's offensive did not get under way till September 15th, when American troops were landed at Inchon, on the west coast. The British 29th Brigade arrived at Pusan on November 3rd. Contingents from other United Nations countries were also added to MacArthur's army, but America's contribution was overwhelmingly preponderant. The tide of battle now turned. The North Koreans were driven steadily back, and before the end of September were retreating over the 38th Parallel.

A momentous event now took place. On September 21st, 1950, President Truman announced that the United Nations

must decide whether the advance should be continued beyond the Parallel, and that America would abide by that decision. But General MacArthur waited for no such instructions. He crossed the Parallel and pressed on northwards. On October 7th, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution in favour of creating "a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea." It contained no direct authorisation confirming MacArthur's action, but it was worded so generally as to make such an interpretation possible. If the aim of the United Nations was to set up a Government for the whole of Korea, it might be argued that military steps for subduing North Korea were approved; or, at least, that the absence of any condemnation of General MacArthur's tactics implied approval. At a Press conference on November 29th, President Truman indeed denied that the General exceeded his duties by crossing the Parallel.

The act of crossing the Parallel was indeed an event of primary importance. It meant that the United Nations were no longer concerned only to repel the invasion and clear South Korea of the enemy. They were now committed to war against the North Koreans, to the invasion of North Korean territory. And they were carrying out this undertaking without first hearing the North Korean case. They were abandoning the principle of endeavouring to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and were now resorting instead to force. They were now participants in the dispute, allies of one of the parties to the dispute. We shall have to examine presently, in closer detail, what justification can be advanced for this extremely serious decision.

But we should at once take note of the major aspect of the United Nations' claim. Assuming that the Security Council was properly constituted and that the absence of the Soviet Union did not invalidate its direction to invoke military sanctions, it can be held, and indeed was held by the majority of the General Assembly, that the North Korean Government had no valid status and that, therefore, North Korea was no legitimate State and the 38th Parallel no proper frontier. The North Koreans were accordingly rebels, revolting against the

authorised Government of Syngman Rhee. On this assumption, it was argued, General MacArthur had every right to suppress all traces of revolt throughout the whole of Korea. The weakness of this contention is that the first demand of the Security Council was that the North Koreans should retire behind the 38th Parallel, and not that their forces should be entirely disbanded. It would seem that this was in effect an admission that the Parallel was indeed a frontier, that the North Koreans were entitled to maintain their army on their own territory, and that therefore North Korea was in some sense a separate State—pending a wider settlement for the entire country.

Although doubts concerning the wisdom and legality of crossing the frontier were subsequently expressed by some of the members of the United Nations, there was no question at the time as to the interpretation officially placed upon the October resolution. An Interim Committee was appointed by the General Assembly in that month to advise the United Nations Command and to assume provisional responsibility for the civil administration of North Korea as the territory was occupied by the advancing United Nations forces.

China enters the war

General MacArthur was so successful in his advance that he reckoned the war would be won by Christmas. At a conference held at Wake Island on October 15th, 1950, he told President Truman that all formal resistance by the enemy would be at an end by Thanksgiving Day (November 24th). By the end of October he was approaching the Yalu River along the Manchurian frontier. All seemed to be set for final victory. But at this stage a dramatic development occurred which transformed the military situation.

Communist China had been watching the triumphant march of the United Nations troops with growing anxiety. Her sympathies were, of course, entirely with the North Koreans, and no doubt she had grave apprehensions about what would happen when a formidable army was planted at her doorstep. She had always claimed that Formosa was part of her territory,

and therefore regarded the American naval protection of that island as an aggressive act. American planes were alleged to have bombed Manchurian territory on which the North Korean planes were based. The Yalu River dam, which supplied sixty per cent. of its power to Manchurian industries, was threatened. Though we may feel that these complaints and fears did not justify China's entry into the war, the situation seen through her eyes was that the United Nations were seeking by force to overthrow the *de jure* Government of Korea at the instigation of America. China therefore decided to take action. On November 5th, 1950, General MacArthur reported that Chinese troops were entering Korea in large numbers. On November 27th a strong Communist counter-attack was launched with the help of over 200,000 Chinese, described by Communist radio as 'volunteers.' General MacArthur declared that "we face an entirely new war." The official Chinese explanation for this intervention was that American 'armed aggression' against Korea threatened the security of China and therefore could not be regarded as affecting only the Korean peoples. On September 30th, 1950, the Chinese General (General Chou) had announced that his Government "would not stand idly by" when the territory of its neighbour was wantonly invaded (referring presumably to the territory north of the Parallel).

The Security Council met on November 8th and considered a draft resolution calling on China to withdraw her forces from Korea, but at the same time assuring her that it was "the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone." The resolution also invited China to send representatives to join in the discussions. Further consideration of the resolution, however, was postponed in view of information received that Chinese representatives were on their way to United Nations headquarters, in response to an earlier invitation to take part in talks about American action regarding Formosa.

The Chinese representatives arrived at Lake Success at the end of November, at a moment when the military situation had

become most alarming. The Communist attack had been brilliantly successful. General MacArthur's lines of communication had been cut, and on December 23rd, 1950, he was only just able to evacuate his troops from a beach-head set up at Hungnam. The American representative declared to the Security Council that the Chinese offensive was not intervention for limited purposes but "in fact aggression open and notorious." Meanwhile, thirteen Asiatic and Arab nations had made an appeal to the Chinese Government for a cease-fire, pending negotiations. These countries were not prepared to brand China as an aggressor until a reply to their appeal had been received. The Communist delegation, now in New York, refused to meet the 'cease-fire' committee on the ground that it was not a legal body, and their refusal was twice upheld by the Chinese Government, which further maintained that resolutions of the General Assembly were invalid, since China had not been allowed to occupy a seat in that body.

The Americans interpreted this answer as a total rejection of all armistice proposals. India and certain other Powers denied that it was a total rejection. A further proposal was forwarded to China on January 13th, 1951, by the U.N. Political and Security Committee, but this was also turned down by the Chinese Government on the ground that the proposal involved a cease-fire before the negotiations commenced, thus, it was urged, giving General MacArthur's forces a breathing space to recover from their defeats. The Chinese Government forwarded a counter-proposal that negotiations should precede a cease-fire. Mr. Acheson, for the United States, denounced this as evidence "that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations." On February 1st, 1951, the General Assembly passed an American resolution denouncing China as guilty of aggression by forty-four votes to seven, nine countries abstaining. A second military offensive had been launched by the Communist forces in January, but by February General MacArthur had regained the initiative. From then onwards, for over two years, neither side achieved any victory. The Communists were driven back to a line which was roughly equivalent to the famous Parallel, but they were

not, in the main, able to hold their line. When the armistice was at length signed, in 1953, therefore, the result from the strictly military aspect was a deadlock. In spite of incessant and intense bombing by U.N. planes, which reduced Northern Korea to a condition of utter devastation and caused intense misery to the civilian population, neither army was compelled to surrender. The Chinese and North Koreans sustained heavier losses, though the toll of life inflicted on the United Nations forces was also considerable. But the military situation at the close of the fighting did not greatly differ from the position at the outbreak of hostilities. The most that the United Nations could claim, so far as military operations were concerned, was that they had shown that armed aggression had not been allowed to escape with impunity.

United Nations attitude to Chinese intervention

It is not difficult to appreciate that in American eyes China was the arch-villain of the piece. She had wantonly intervened, in the American view, and had deliberately prevented the United Nations from completing their task of subduing the North Korean revolt. The Chinese case for intervening, as put forward by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, was partly answered by Mr. Dulles in the Political Assembly on November 26th, 1950. He replied to the charge that there had been no less than eighty-three violations of Manchurian territory by American aircraft, declaring that there had only been one such flight, and that this had been made by two American planes which had mistakenly supposed that they were flying over Korea. Any bombings which had occurred, he said, were mostly attacks on frontier bridges, the attacks being made on the Korean end of those bridges, though sometimes, he admitted, it had been impossible to avoid damaging the Chinese end. On November 22nd a British Note was sent to General Chou, emphasising that there was no intention on the part of the United Nations forces to cross the Yalu, and that there would be no interference with essential Chinese installations along the banks of that river. No reply to this Note was received.

But, though the official United Nations attitude to China was careful and restrained, there was wild talk in many American quarters of the desirability of launching a full-scale attack on China herself, and even of dropping atomic bombs on Chinese centres. It was suspected that General MacArthur lent a sympathetic ear to some of these counsels and that he was becoming impatient of the manner in which the United Nations were, in his view, hampering his plans. His relations with the American Government grew increasingly strained. The more diehard elements in Republican circles were rallying to his support, and his influence was rapidly extending from the military into the political field.

When China first threatened to intervene General MacArthur had urged the American Government to state officially that this would be regarded as nothing less than a declaration of war against the United Nations, and that the bombing of certain Chinese targets should then be sanctioned. He also urged that, in order to relieve pressure on his own front, General Chiang Kai-shek should be permitted to use the remnant of his forces in Formosa to make raids on the Chinese coast and to undertake a blockade of the mainland from the sea. But he subsequently declared that he was not advocating full-scale war with China. Anyone, he said, who wanted to throw American armies into China "must be a lunatic." General MacArthur further proposed that, in view of the Chinese intervention, American planes should be permitted to pursue enemy planes over the Chinese frontier. He pointed out that he was at a serious military disadvantage if his aerial forces were not able to attack the bases from which the enemy air attack was being directed. The American State Department, however, after consulting six other member-States decided not to authorise this latter proposal. The American refusal to allow General Chiang Kai-shek to raid the Chinese mainland was abandoned in 1953. President Eisenhower, in a speech delivered on February 2nd of that year, announced that the ban would be lifted, and that the American Seventh Fleet would continue to guard Formosa from Communist attack.

Britain, France and many other States contributing to the

United Nations campaign were now becoming seriously alarmed at the crescendo of American demands that a military attack should be launched against China. They had assented to a formal condemnation of China as an aggressor; but, whatever the strength of the moral indictment, they were well aware of the potential consequences of engaging in an offensive against that vast and heavily populated country. It would commit them to a protracted and costly campaign, with very dubious prospects of decisive victory. It would involve the concentration of American and allied forces in the Far East, leaving Europe comparatively unprotected. And, still more serious, it would invite the Soviet Union to fulfil its treaty obligations to China and come definitely to her assistance. In other words, it would mean in all probability nothing less than the declaration of a third world war. And though General MacArthur might be contemplating no more than pinprick action against this powerful adversary, such as a series of Nationalist commando assaults, there was every likelihood that the Chinese Communist Government would regard such assaults as provocation to engage in a full-scale war.

It was with the consciousness of these appalling risks and in the hope of preventing a rift between America and her allies that the British and French Prime Ministers visited President Truman early in 1951, and frankly informed him that European public opinion was apprehensive of General MacArthur's close association with the bravadoes of the reckless elements among American politicians. The State Department was itself critical of the General's attitude. On August 26th, 1950, the General had cabled a message to a convention in Chicago, composed of Veterans in Foreign Wars, a message which implied that the Chinese Republic was a declared enemy of the United States. President Truman had been obliged to issue an order to the General to withdraw his message, which he obeyed—but not before it had been published in full in an American paper and entered verbatim in the *Congressional Record* (August 28th, 1950) on a motion proposed by Republicans. On April 11th, 1951, came the dramatic news that the General had been relieved of all his commands and that General Ridgway had

been appointed in his place. For a while Western European fears were comparatively alleviated.

British relations with the Chinese Communist authorities, in spite of the diplomatic recognition which Britain had given to their Government, were far from satisfactory. At first the attitude of the Communist Army had been exemplary. Mao Tse-tung had himself proclaimed that his Government would respect the lives and property of foreigners in Chinese territory, provided that they did not assist the Nationalist forces. An unfortunate incident, however, occurred in April 1949. The British authorities had decided to keep a vessel at Nanking—at that time H.M.S. *Consort*—to facilitate wireless communications with the Embassy and to provide necessary supplies. The frigate *Amethyst* had been ordered to relieve the *Consort* and left Shanghai on April 19th, 1949, to proceed up the Yangtse River. Sixty miles from Nanking she came under fire from Communist batteries and was forced to run aground on Rose Island. The frigate had been seriously damaged, nineteen of her crew killed and twenty-two wounded. With the help of Nationalist forces, which were still in the region, the wounded were taken back to Shanghai. Meanwhile, the local Communist authorities refused to entertain a request from the British Consul in Peking that the *Amethyst* should not again be fired upon. The Third Secretary at the Nanking Embassy, however, (Mr. Youde) managed to reach the Communist military headquarters in the Pukow area, where, after consultation with higher authorities, an answer was given that the *Amethyst* would be allowed to continue her voyage to Nanking, provided that she assisted the Communist forces to cross the river. As the civil war was still in progress this condition could not be accepted, on the ground that Britain would be committed thereby to non-neutral action. The Communist argument was that the *Amethyst* had entered the war zone without permission, and that she had caused losses among the Chinese artillery by firing when attacked.

The *Amethyst* therefore remained in a precarious position, within range of the Communist gunners and with her supplies almost exhausted. On the night of July 30th, having obtained

permission from the British Naval Command, she ran the gauntlet and escaped down the river, a remarkable and daring exploit. The Communists complained that on her way she had fired upon and sunk one of their own steamers, but the *Amethyst* claimed that the damage to the steamer had been caused by the Chinese themselves mistakenly opening fire on the steamer. The effect of this incident was to bring about a marked deterioration in the relations between the British and the Chinese Governments.

Accusations of American bacteriological warfare

The war in Korea continued without any great change in the military situation, in spite of the incessant bombing by American and other planes, with the consequent spread of devastation over the whole North Korean territory, to which reference has already been made. The first ray of hope brightened the horizon when Mr. Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, proposed on June 23rd, 1951, that a conference should be held to discuss possible armistice terms. America and the Western Allies at once agreed to this proposal, and cease-fire talks were opened on July 10th. These were suspended on August 22nd, 1951, but resumed on October 22nd. The talks dragged on inconclusively until October 21st, 1952, when they finally broke down, the United Nations representatives refusing to agree to the Communist claim that all prisoners of war—even those who did not wish to be repatriated—should nevertheless be returned. The Communists could claim that the compulsory repatriation of war prisoners to their homeland had been in the past an international rule of armistice terms; but it had hardly been anticipated that a situation would arise in which prisoners might consider their safety to be endangered if they were returned to their native country. This was the only issue in dispute between the two parties; on all other matters agreement had been reached. The United Nations authorities put forward various suggestions for overcoming the difficulty. Mr. Eden reported in the House of Commons on October 15th, 1952, that a proposal had been made to the Communists that unwilling

prisoners should be evacuated to a demilitarised zone where representatives of their side could seek to persuade them. Although, in 1953, this was in effect the plan eventually agreed upon, the Communists rejected it at this stage, and the negotiations ceased.

On March 14th, 1952, the Communists accused the Americans of resorting to bacteriological warfare. Charges were made that American planes were dropping poisonous, disease-breeding germs on Communist territory, and a widespread propaganda was commenced protesting against this atrocity. Reports were published of infected insects foreign to the country, found crawling out of cylinders which, it was alleged, had been dropped by plane. On May 7th, 1952, the Peiping radio declared that American planes had dropped disease-laden vermin along the Manchurian frontier. The American authorities denied that there was any truth in these stories. Communist propaganda emphasised that America had never signed the Geneva protocol of 1925 renouncing the use of such weapons, and pointed out that there were now extensive laboratories in the States where experiments in their use were being carried out. This latter charge was not in itself convincing, since there was little doubt that most of the other Powers, including probably the Soviet Union, were experimenting similarly. The American reply to the former charge was that the Geneva Convention had been a pledge subscribed to by the League of Nations, of which America had not been a member. In many Western circles, however, it was felt that America would have been in a stronger position had she officially undertaken not to resort to this form of warfare.

What made a particularly bad impression on the already sceptical Western mind was that China and the Soviet Union refused to comply with the American proposal that the International Red Cross should be asked to send a committee of experts to investigate the charges. Mr. Malik, on behalf of the Soviet Union, rejected the offer on March 16th, 1952, and again on June 18th, on the plea that the Red Cross was not an impartial organisation but had shown itself to be anti-Communist in sympathies. However justified this particular

objection might be, there should have been no difficulty in selecting a body of persons whom both parties would have admitted to be both impartial and qualified to examine the evidence. Various scientists and lawyers did indeed accept the Chinese invitation to visit the scene of the alleged outrages and to hear the statements of witnesses. They published reports mainly substantiating the Chinese charges, but the reports were regarded in the West as unconvincing, partly because many of the investigators were suspected of a personal bias in the pro-Communist or at least anti-American direction.

This charge, indeed, was the kind of indictment which in any event it would have been difficult to substantiate directly. Once a rumour of this kind is started, the power of suggestion is obviously enormous. The examination of witnesses could show, no doubt, that the witnesses were sincere in their allegations, but almost certainly they would be persons liable to attribute such methods to the Americans and whose imagination might therefore have played a dominating part in the production of evidence. The factual evidence as a whole could be said on a generous estimate to do no more than suggest probability as distinct from proof. There could be no certainty, for example, that, even if the presence of these disease-carrying insects was established beyond doubt, they had not been planted by Communist agents for the purpose of stirring up a campaign of hatred and indignation against the enemy. All that might be urged against that possibility is the plea that the Communists would not have been likely to stoop to such means. But the moment that we enter the field of conjecture we have to take account of the counter-argument that, if the Americans had decided to employ bacteriological weapons, they would hardly have done so in such trivial proportions. Even if they were pursuing merely experimental tactics one would have supposed that the operation, in order to yield positive results, would have been carried out on a much wider scale. Here, again, however, we are lost in a fog of speculation.

What seemed at the time to be a far more serious testimony than the evidence of such witnesses were the signed statements of captured American airmen to the effect that they had been

instructed where to drop these missiles and had been told the nature of their cargo. Photographed copies of these statements were widely publicised; they contained precise details of the dates on which the instructions had been given and the names of the officers who had delivered lectures on the subject. After hostilities had ceased, however, and the airmen were released, they declared that the confessions had been forced upon them by psychological pressure and were entirely false. Other airmen prisoners confirmed that similar efforts had been adopted to extract from them similarly fabricated statements. It is difficult to understand why the Communist authorities accepted the risk of allowing these prisoners to be repatriated, knowing that they would almost inevitably recant and thus destroy the validity of their former evidence. The only explanation seems to be that the statements, even if false, had served their purpose; or else that it could be maintained that the statements were true and the subsequent recantations false—uttered in order that the repatriated airmen might justify themselves before the American authorities.

America repeatedly denied that the Communist charge was true, and sponsored a resolution in the Security Council on May 7th, 1952, that the accusation was completely unfounded. The Soviet vetoed the resolution.

If the charge was devoid of truth, if the campaign of propaganda was based on what the originators of the charge knew to be a deliberate lie, it casts an ugly reflection on the morality of Communist strategy.

Cease-fire talks

On December 1st, 1952, India presented peace proposals to the Political Committee of the United Nations. This was a decisive move, for though the proposals did not at first meet with a favourable reception, they were ultimately accepted as the basis for cease-fire talks. These talks were opened in April 1953, and at length led to an armistice. The armistice and subsequent negotiations, however, concern a period beyond that which this survey covers.

As has already been suggested, the Korean War was an

event of major significance; its importance is to be reckoned not merely as an episode in history, but as a guide to future action on the part of the United Nations. In the final chapter, therefore, an attempt will be made to estimate how far on this occasion the United Nations acted wisely or the reverse, what should serve as a precedent in any similar situation and what should be avoided. The Korean issue was the severest test which the United Nations had had as yet to meet, and we need to give a very careful consideration to the various aspects of that issue in order that we may reach an objective judgment in regard to it.

A question which has frequently been raised in Western circles is whether the Soviet Union was implicated in North Korea. Were the North Koreans aided and abetted by Moscow, or was the dispute local in origin? That there was a Russian military mission in North Korea, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, is not disputed. On the other hand, it is known that the Soviet Union did not supply equipment to renew the losses which the North Koreans had suffered in the course of the fighting. An American officer in Tokyo asserted, indeed, that only half the North Korean forces were mobilised at the commencement of the war, a statement which, if true, would seem to indicate that the North Korean invasion was not a premeditated plan. What authority this officer could claim for his assertion is, however, unknown.

The popular Western view was that the North Korean campaign was instigated by the Communist group as a whole, that it was a plot to challenge and weaken the Western Powers, and that the North Koreans were no more than pawns in the furtherance of this strategy. But this is yet another conjecture. And it will be more convenient to reserve our conclusions until we come to review the entire problem of East-West relations in the final chapter.

XIII

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Japanese Peace Treaty

FIVE years had passed, and still no attempt had been made to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. It was not until September 14th, 1950, that President Truman announced that America had long ago considered Japan to be entitled to peace terms and that measures would now be taken to bring about a final settlement. On October 26th an official American memorandum, outlining the proposed form of the treaty, was handed to the Soviet representative in the United Nations at Lake Success. The Soviet reply was delivered on November 20th.

As might have been expected, the Soviet reaction to the American draft was far from favourable. Objection to the proposals turned on three main issues: first, that Japan, in view of her record of wanton aggression, must not be allowed to rearm; secondly, that no foreign garrisons or bases should be retained on Japanese territory; and, thirdly, that the Chinese Government must be consulted before any peace treaty was signed. America had no sympathy with any of these demands. For her the memories of Pearl Harbour were obliterated by the need to establish a strong anti-Communist State in the Far East. Communist Russia and China had become the danger, rather than the possible recrudescence of a military imperialist Japan, bent once more on dominating Eastern Asia. For the same reason America was determined to take Japan under her protection, at least until such time as the country was militarily strong enough to defend itself; American garrisons and bases on the Japanese mainland were therefore essential in her estimation. Finally, America was adamant in her refusal to

recognise the existence of the Chinese People's Republic. Although it was beyond question that China—whatever type of Government was established there—had a very direct interest in the amount of power allowed to an ex-enemy at whose hands she had suffered for so many bitter years, and though it had been the Communist Chinese forces which had offered the most virile resistance to the Japanese invaders, the contention that China ought not to have set up a Communist régime was regarded at Washington as a principle which must at all costs be sustained.

It must indeed have been a cause of sore self-reproach for American and British statesmen that they had appealed to the Soviet Union to come to their aid in the last stages of the Far Eastern war. Had the Soviet Union preserved its neutrality, had no Soviet troops been invited to this theatre, America and Britain would have had a strong case for signing the treaty with Japan on their own terms and without reference to Moscow. The more sorely must they have reproached themselves when they subsequently realised that by the time the Soviet Union declared war on Japan that country's morale was already at its lowest ebb. The Western Allies could have brought the war to a rapid conclusion without Soviet assistance, although Russian propaganda made ready use of the opportunity to proclaim that it was Soviet eleventh-hour intervention which had secured the victory.

British opinion, both in Government circles and outside, was far from happy about the terms of the proposed treaty. The amount of military, political and economic power which Japan would be able to acquire filled many minds with apprehension regarding future developments. Here, once again, the condition which determined British policy was obvious. The vital need, it was considered, was that there should be no rift in British-American co-operation, which meant in effect that, whenever the American attitude was unyielding, Britain must accept the American decision. In spite of comparative doubts, therefore, Britain signed this peace treaty, in company with the United States and most of the other members of the United Nations. The treaty was signed at San Francisco on September 8th,

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1951. The Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia refused to sign. India and Burma did not attend the peace conference.

Economic conference in Moscow

In April 1952 an international conference was held in Moscow to which representatives from Western States were invited, on the understanding that there would be no discussion of political issues, but that the agenda would be strictly confined to the question of how trade between East and West could be accelerated. Thirty British delegates, including Members of Parliament and industrialists, attended, and were headed by Lord Boyd-Orr. The Russians kept faithfully to their promise that all political discussions should be avoided. Chinese representatives were also present, and Lord Boyd-Orr sent telegrams to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and other trade organisations, stating that "Chinese representatives [are] actively negotiating for cotton yarn and grey cloth [etc.]. Urge send responsible representatives with samples. Immediate business [is possible]. Missing opportunities [if this chance is not seized]."

A British Board of Trade official pointed out that most metals and chemicals were on the list of prohibited exports (by arrangement with America), so far as Communist countries were concerned. "Textiles," he continued, "present no such difficulties." The President of the Board of Trade sent a message to Lord Boyd-Orr on April 9th affirming that Britain was willing to increase its trade both with Russia and China.

It was subsequently estimated that the value of the trade negotiated at the conference amounted to £30 million. *The Times* on April 13th, 1952, reported that the British "delegation has been given complete liberty of movement in Moscow and [that the delegates] have had opportunities to indulge their inquisitiveness with remarkable freedom. . . . The delegation has been afforded opportunity of visits to other parts of the Soviet Union, either individually or in groups."

The president of the Nottingham Chamber of Commerce, Mr. L. R. Allen, stated on April 24th, 1952, that the East Midland textile firms rejected the Russian and Chinese

business offers. "It may be," he said, "that the promise of millions of pounds worth of business will be used to cause trouble among workers." He further remarked that the British Government had not been invited to the conference. The Federation of British Industries and the Association of British Chambers of Commerce had both, however, received invitations, and had refused to attend.

Last days of the Stalin régime

British visas were refused to foreign representatives desiring to take part in a Youth Peace Festival, organised under Communist auspices, at Sheffield towards the end of May 1952. The Home Office granted visas, however, to six Soviet artists invited to take part in a concert in the Festival Hall (London) on November 20th, 1952. One of the artists, Dmitri Kabalevsky, the musical composer, contributed an article to *Pravda* in January 1953, giving some of his impressions. "American jazz," he declared, "is sweeping Britain. The Americans are using it to influence Britain morally and ideologically."

Much criticism was aroused in the West by the arrest which took place in Russia, early in 1953, of nine doctors who were accused of deliberately damaging the health of their patients and of plotting to exterminate leading Soviet personalities. They were declared to be "agents of the U.S.A." and denounced as "monsters of the human race." Western attention was drawn particularly to this incident inasmuch as five of the nine doctors were Jewish. Taken in conjunction with a trial which had recently been held in Prague, it was suggested that the official Communist attitude had become perceptibly anti-Semitic. One of the acts of the new Government, formed after Stalin's death, was to declare the doctors innocent and victims of a gross act of injustice.

During the autumn of 1952 the Soviet magazine *Bolshevik* published a statement by Stalin which aroused considerable comment. He predicted that Britain and France would be "compelled to break loose from American domination," and

that "war between the nations of the West was more likely to occur than with Russia. The Soviet Union would not attack capitalist countries, but the decline of world markets must lead to war between capitalist countries."

At the Congress of the Communist Party on October 6th, 1952, Malenkov took up this theme and declared that "American capitalism has disorganised the economies of other capitalist countries by forcing them to accept American goods, while at the same time erecting barriers against imports from abroad."

At the same Congress, on October 14th, Stalin referred to the 'Hands off Russia' movement which had arisen in Britain and other Western countries at the end of the first world war. He instanced it as "an example of the support on which the Soviet Communist Party still depends." "Our party," he said, "cannot remain in debt to these allied [Communist] parties abroad. Our party should help them in their fight for peace and liberation."

The new Soviet Government

Stalin was now seventy-three. He appeared to be in good health when in January 1953 he was present on two occasions at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. The Argentine Ambassador had an interview with him on February 7th, and the Indian Ambassador on February 17th. According to Mr. Gordon Young,* both these diplomats reported that "they had seen no outward signs whatever of impending illness in the man with whom they talked."

It appears that on the evening of March 1st, 1953, Stalin was dining in the Kremlin with Marshal Voroshilov, who remained probably his closest friend. A few hours later an artery burst and internal hæmorrhage spread through the left side of his brain. At 8 a.m. on March 4th the first news of this seizure was made public over the Moscow radio. "In the night of March 1st-2nd," it was announced, "while in his Moscow apartment, Comrade Stalin suffered from a cerebral hæmorrhage

* *Stalin's Heirs*, by Gordon Young. (Verschoyle.)

affecting vital areas of the brain. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness, and paralysis of the right arm and leg set in. Loss of speech followed. There appeared serious disturbances in the functioning of the heart and breathing."

A list of the medical attendants followed, and an appeal to the Soviet peoples to display "unity, solidarity and fortitude of spiritual vigilance" in these hours of tragedy. Frequent bulletins were issued, describing in minute detail the condition of the patient. At 9.50 p.m., March 5th, 1953, the end came, described in the same Russian phrase as had been used in the case of Lenin—"The heart of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin has ceased to beat."

A post-mortem examination was ordered, presumably to satisfy public opinion that the cause of death was placed beyond doubt. The body lay in state in the Hall of Columns (Trade Union Building) for three days. The funeral was held on the following Monday, Malenkov walking immediately behind the coffin, with Beria and Molotov on his right and left. After the body had been laid beside that of Lenin, funeral orations were delivered by the same three statesmen. Official representatives of some forty foreign countries were in attendance.

There were many attempts on the part of the non-Soviet Press to read into the programme of events certain significances of a political nature. Thus, it was remarked that only three days were allotted to the lying-in-state, whereas there had been seven days in the case of Lenin. Reports were published suggesting that there was a marked absence of mourning among the Russian crowds, even on the day of the funeral. Some of these interpretations may have had substance, but they were obviously an attempt to introduce sensational implications. The crowds in Moscow were probably subdued, no less and no more, than the London crowds on the day of a royal funeral. The fact that Beria referred to Malenkov as a "disciple of Stalin," while Molotov made no mention of his future leader, was taken in some quarters to be an indication that Molotov resented the fact that he himself was not accorded a higher promotion. But a much more probable reason for this omission was that Molotov was moved with deep emotional memories of

the man by whose side he had stood in the darkest days of the German offensive—he almost broke down in the course of his speech.* Similarly, although the immediate announcement of the personnel of the new Government was obviously planned in order to forestall any political unrest and uncertainty—the possibility of unsettlement is necessarily greater in a country where there is no constitutional order of succession—the haste in which the announcement was made is comparable with the custom of proclaiming a new British Sovereign within twenty-four hours of the death of the previous monarch.

It was natural that all foreign countries should examine with the most careful attention the composition of the new Government, and attempt to form conclusions as to what would be its complexion, especially so far as international affairs were concerned. The main change to be noted was the contraction of the all-powerful Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from thirty-six to ten members. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which virtually made him the successor of Stalin. Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich and Marshal Bulganin were appointed Deputy Chairmen. Marshal Voroshilov was given the post of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Presidium—President of the U.S.S.R. Molotov was Foreign Minister, Beria was made Minister of Internal Affairs. Marshal Bulganin was War Minister, with Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vassilevsky as his deputies. Mikoyan was appointed Minister of Internal and External Trade, while Vyshinsky was confirmed in his position as permanent representative at the United Nations. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was composed of Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin.

How far this Government would follow or deviate from the general line of Stalin's policy, whether the effect of Stalin's death would be to increase or lessen the world tension, whether

* Also, it might be noted, it was Molotov and not Beria who kept his place in the new régime.

a new world situation was emerging, were questions which could only be answered in the light of future developments. History is a never-ending serial. For the purpose of this survey the termination of Stalin's reign is a suitable curtain. To extend the survey beyond that event would be to present a record eternally unfinished.

XIV

SUMMING UP

On forming our conclusions

THE survey which has been covered by the previous chapters does not, of course, profess to be a complete record. Incidents no doubt have been omitted which some critics will claim to be of special significance. But that criticism must be risked. The purpose of the survey has been to present sufficient evidence to enable the reader to form an opinion, perhaps more fully than he has had the opportunity to form hitherto, as to whether the responsibility for the strained relations between the Communist and the Western States lies solely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union, or of the West, or whether both parties are to blame. The reader's conclusions will not be a judgment of merely historical interest; it should make it possible for him to decide whether the policy which the West has pursued should be continued, or whether it requires amendment, drastic or partial. This analysis of the recent past will have little or no value if it is not related to the immediate future. The cold war is still with us. We are bound, therefore, to consider whether there is any means of reaching a peaceful settlement, and, if so, what appears to be the wisest and most practical course to follow.

In this final summary we shall find ourselves compelled, accordingly, to look to some extent beyond the period which closes with the death of Stalin and to turn our attention to the present and the prospects of the future. But before we do so it will be well to remind ourselves of a few of the more salient events which have occurred between 1945 and 1953, in order to see what moral can be drawn from them.

One other preliminary comment. Little reference has been

made to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, to the accusations of cruelty inflicted in labour camps, to the story of constant purges and elimination of individuals who were at one time acclaimed heroes and had been given positions of authority, to allegations of political oppression and terrorism, or to sudden and complete switches of policy which, it is contended, reveal a sacrifice or absence of principle. These omissions have been deliberate, since our task is not to assess the blemishes or merits of the Communist system, nor to compare it with Western civilisation. There is no need for us to draw attention to the fact that, imperfect as our own order may be, we have such stability as to render it unlikely that Sir Winston Churchill, Mr. Attlee or Mr. Aneurin Bevan will be arrested on a charge of treason. Our task is simply to determine whether the Soviet system is one with which the West can coexist amicably or whether it is a menace to Western civilisation and world peace. So long as the world is divided up into a number of States possessing national sovereignty it is a recognised and reasonably just rule that the domestic affairs of each State are its own concern, and that other States have no right to use military pressure in order to unseat its form of government even if they detest its ideology. The second world war was not provoked because of the horrors of Dachau and Belsen. War was declared on Germany because she was clearly bent on world conquest, and had invaded Poland as unscrupulously as she had overthrown the independence of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

It will be argued, however, that the Soviet Union revealed itself to be similarly an aggressor and disturber of the peace, inasmuch as Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and subsequently Czechoslovakia were compelled to set up pro-Soviet Governments, if not as a result of military invasion at least by means of political pressure. This argument opens up a maze of complex issues, from which it is difficult to draw exact conclusions. The Communist reply would be that in all these countries a pro-Soviet régime was established by the will of the majority of the inhabitants. But even if we reject this plea as insincere and insist that Soviet pressure was the decisive factor, we have to recognise that by 1945 two groups—the Communist and the

Western—were already emerging in Europe. The Soviet Union considered the situation to be such that it must establish a cordon of friendly States around itself. Britain and France, together with other West European Governments, were moving into close association between themselves and with America. To ask which party started this process is probably as unprofitable a question as to inquire who fired the first shot in a war. The relevant consideration in this context is that, unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union did not compel by actual military invasion any of its neighbours to become satellites,* and has not attempted directly to interfere with any country outside the Communist cordon. When Hitler marched into Poland, Poland was not a member of a Nazi group. No such groups were in existence.

The two cases are not, therefore, parallel. It will be argued further, however, that though the Soviet Union has not as yet attempted to impose its will on any State which is not associated with the Cominform—composed as it is of neighbouring States—the Soviet has had and still has the intention to do so, whenever the circumstances permit. That is a contention which we must now examine.

Alleged evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions

There are three methods which the Soviet Union might employ if it desired to make a bid for world domination and to overthrow Western civilisation. The first would be by launching a large-scale war and commencing a military offensive against the West. The second would be by encouraging one or more of the Cominform States to launch a series of minor military campaigns, for which the Soviet Union could pretend to have no responsibility, but the aim of which would be gradually to weaken the West. The third would be to pursue 'cold war' tactics, such as directing Communist parties in Western countries to embark on enterprises which would create unrest and possible revolution, obstruction in the United Nations

* Eastern Germany and Austria are exceptions, since Soviet troops were established in those territories. But those troops, like the Western forces, were legitimate armies of occupation.

designed to weaken and divide the Western group, and the output of critical propaganda designed to spread Communist ideology.

It is clear that Western statesmen assumed that the Soviet Union was likely to resort to all these methods, including, that is to say, the commencement of a third world war. The North Atlantic Treaty would not have been concluded, nor a vast rearmament programme undertaken together with the consolidation of a West European army, had not the threat of a large-scale Soviet military offensive been considered imminent. If it had been believed that Russia would content herself with cold-war tactics these preparations would have been unnecessary. Indeed, armaments are a futile weapon to use against cold-war strategy. We have therefore to ask ourselves what was the evidence which led the West to suppose that the Soviet Union would embark on a major military offensive.

One answer, as we have seen, rested on the claim that the Soviet forces were not reduced in strength and remained at, or were increased to, a size which was incompatible with a peaceful outlook. This is a double-edged contention. Western statesmen have continually insisted that the North Atlantic Treaty and their own rearmament programme are purely defensive in purpose and constitute no threat to the Soviet Union. Similarly, Soviet statesmen would reply that the size of the Soviet forces was no threat to the West, but was maintained because the Soviet Union from 1945 onwards considered it equally necessary to protect itself against Western aggression. If Western rearmament implied no offensive intentions, then it could be maintained that Soviet armaments were equally innocent. Any kind of rearmaments race is a vicious circle which cannot be resolved by theoretical reasoning.

We have to search for stronger ground—for actual evidence rather than supposition—to justify the Western fears. Two events largely confirmed those fears—the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. As regards Czechoslovakia we have again to remind ourselves that, however strongly we may be convinced that the upheaval in that country was due to Soviet pressure, it was pressure applied to a

State already largely Communist. Marshall Aid, in Soviet eyes, was regarded as a measure bound to consolidate the Western bloc under American influence. It was therefore considered necessary to tighten the links between Czechoslovakia and Russia. Because this pressure was applied, it did not follow that the Soviet Union would similarly impose its will on any West European State.

Once the groups had been formed, some process of pressure to ensure consolidation was inevitable. What, indeed, would be the American attitude if any State within the Western group—Italy or France, for example—went Communist? We should once again remind ourselves that in March 1948 Mr. Marshall, as American Secretary of State, openly warned Italy that “benefits under the European Recovery Programme will come to an abrupt end in any country that votes Communism into power.” Economic pressure applied to a comparatively poor nation can be quite as effective as military invasion.

The moral of Berlin and the Korean conflict

The blockade of Berlin seems to offer a more positive proof of the aggressive inclinations of the Soviet authorities. If they were prepared to go to such daring lengths in order to dislodge the Western forces from the German capital, was not this sufficient justification for supposing that they would resort to acts even more defiant and violent, whenever a favourable occasion arose?

In this survey the aim, as already explained, has been to state the case presented by both parties in the various disputes recorded. The Soviet as well as the Western case has therefore been stated in regard to Berlin, and we should not draw a final conclusion until we have carefully considered both. It is not enough for our purpose to decide that the blockade was a highly provocative challenge; we have to explore further and inquire why so defiant a challenge was flung. In other words, we have to determine whether, however aggressive the action, there were valid reasons which prompted Russia to take such action; or whether Russia is shown by this action to be inherently aggressive in nature and likely to have committed a

similar type of action whatever course of policy the West had pursued.

The Soviet excuse, it will be remembered, was basically that the West was in the process of setting up a separate State of Western Germany, with a capital and Government of its own; that the right of the West to occupy part of Berlin (itself in the Soviet zone) had been accepted on the ground that Berlin was the capital of the whole of (a united) Germany, and that once Western Germany was made a separate State, and Germany thus divided, that right had lapsed. Moreover, it was evident by that time that the West intended to rearm Western Germany, a development which was regarded very seriously by the Soviet Union, and the implications of which will be referred to presently. We are surely justified in protesting that the form which Soviet retaliation took was unwarranted. However legitimate the Soviet complaint may have been, the right procedure for the Soviet Government to have adopted would have been at once to bring its complaint before the United Nations, to negotiate and not to act without attempting to negotiate. But can we go further than this? Viewing the dispute from an entirely objective standpoint, can we assert that the West had done nothing to create a Soviet grievance?

The third major event affecting Soviet-Western relations was the war in Korea. As has previously been pointed out, the Korean conflict is important not only because it is cited by the West as an example of deliberate aggression by the Communist Powers (thus falling into the second category of methods which could be employed against the West), but also because it was the first major emergency with which the United Nations was called upon to deal. Two questions therefore, arise: first, whether the North Koreans were urged at Communist instigation to launch a local war; and, secondly, whether the United Nations carried out their functions correctly, or whether they ought to exert their authority in a different manner when corresponding disputes arise in the future.

With the first of these questions we shall not deal. Suspicions are not proof, and it is doubtful whether proof can ever now be established to sustain the charge that the Korean trouble arose

as the result of a plot by China, or the Soviet Union, or both, to embarrass the West. Let us assume either that the North Koreans were agents of such a plot, or that they were the principals, and turn to the latter consideration.

We need not become involved in the problem which arises in most instances where war has broken out, the problem of which of the parties fired the first shot or which of the parties was guilty of provoking the first shot. For all practical purposes North and South Korea had become two separate States, as both the Communists and the West virtually admitted. The West (United Nations) admitted it by ordering the North Koreans to retire behind the 38th Parallel, thus recognising a boundary between two territories or jurisdictions. The Communists (Chinese) admitted it when, on September 30th, 1950, General Chou announced that his Government "would not stand idly by when the territory of its neighbour [North Korea] was wantonly invaded."

The plain fact was that at the moment when the dispute was referred to the United Nations the North Koreans were on South Korean soil. Therefore the Security Council had every right to demand that the North Koreans should retire behind their own frontier, and was bound to compel them to do so by force if they refused to obey. That is a primary condition which must be fulfilled before any attempt to reach a settlement can be undertaken. An invading force, however morally justified its case, however unfairly goaded by its enemy, must comply with this preliminary requirement.

To retire and to cease fighting—but for what purpose? The function of the United Nations should clearly be to give judgment on the dispute. But to give judgment requires that the evidence of both parties be heard—not, that is, to make any decision until the defendant as well as the plaintiff has been allowed to state his case. The North Koreans were never heard by the Security Council. It is true that the Chinese representatives, having come to Lake Success, refused to plead. But the Chinese had come to protest against the American protection of Formosa and not to talk about the Korean War. They were invited, moreover, to appear before an *ad hoc* committee and

not the Security Council. In any event, they were not the North Koreans.

A stronger reason, however, can be advanced for refusing to hear the North Koreans. They had defied the United Nations order to retire and they had not agreed to a truce. A considerable time elapsed before the United Nations forces were in a position to drive them back behind their frontier. But, once this had been done, what was the proper course for the United Nations to pursue? If we agree that it is essential to hear both parties before judgment is delivered, it cannot be denied that at this point the United Nations went astray. The function of the United Nations is to act as a police force to safeguard international peace, and, when judgment has been given, to see that that judgment is carried out. If one of the litigants in a civil suit takes the law into his own hands, enters the house of his opponent and assaults him, the task of the police is to eject him, and to place him under restraint until the case is brought into court. They would be acting wrongfully if they punished the offender before the court had delivered judgment, if for example they broke into his house and proceeded to break up his furniture. When the United Nations forces crossed the 38th Parallel and continued the fight on North Korean territory, they were guilty therefore not merely of an error of strategy but of an infringement of a vital principle. They were acting no longer as police, but as co-belligerents on the side of the South Koreans. They should have halted their forces, guarded South Korea against further invasion, and called upon both the North and South Koreans to appear in the court of the United Nations and present their case, warning the North Koreans that if they failed to appear, judgment would be pronounced in their absence.

The intervention of China on behalf of the North Koreans was similarly a breach of the peace, an act which, if proper conditions of international order had prevailed, could have been condemned as grossly illegal. But the United Nations by becoming belligerents instead of a police force were no longer morally entitled to indict China. China had acted illegally because the United Nations had acted illegally. If the United

Nations is to carry out its task of preserving law and order with any effectiveness, in the future such an error must never, under any circumstances, be repeated.

But this is not the only moral to be drawn from the sorry story of Korea. The Security Council is invested by the Charter with permanent executive authority. It is the body invested with authority to pronounce judgment in any dispute which is of international concern. The composition of such a body is therefore a matter of the utmost importance. The legal title of each of its members should be beyond question. Under Article 23 of the Charter the ' Republic of China ' is allotted a permanent seat on the Security Council. But this Article has been violated by the presence of a Chinese member who no longer represents, in any sense, the Government of his country. It is arguable that this anomaly vitiates the validity of the Security Council decisions since the deposition of General Chiang Kai-shek, and that the attitude of the Soviet Union in virtually acknowledging the bona fides of this body by attending and voting at its meetings, save for an interval during the Korean conflict, may be held to be inconsistent. But even if this criticism is maintained, it is undeniable that the United Nations have provided the Soviet Union and the Chinese Government with legitimate complaints, and have put themselves on this score entirely in the wrong. For China is not represented on the Council, as the Charter enjoins. The only Chinese member is the representative of a deposed Government.

The American insistence that China must be excluded from the United Nations seems to be entirely unreasonable. The implication of the American attitude is that membership of the United Nations should be confined to representatives of those Governments of which America does not happen to disapprove. It could be maintained that the Chinese Government was ineligible for membership, provided that it could be shown that it is not a ' peace-loving State,' as defined in Article 4. But this, under the same Article, has to be determined by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, and not by America alone.

These issues are very relevant to the problem with which we

are here concerned, since by allowing the representative of a deposed Government to retain a permanent seat on the Council, and by excluding China from the United Nations, the Western case as against the Communist group has been greatly weakened. Moreover, that exclusion has undoubtedly fanned the hostility of China towards the West. No surer way of perpetuating Chinese and Communist hostility as a whole can be devised than that of boycotting this great and increasingly powerful nation from the international community.

Analysis of the causes of the cold war

Russia has not in fact declared war on the West. That fact the most severe critic of Communism must admit. Nor are we in possession of any positive proof that in Korea or elsewhere she has conspired to instigate minor war against the Western Allies through one of her satellites. The usual Western explanation of why Russia has not resorted to either of these openly aggressive measures is that she has been deterred from doing so by Western armed strength. But, as has already been pointed out, this argument tells against the need for a Western rearmament programme. If the Soviet Union in the immediate years after the war desisted from launching a military offensive because of Western armed strength, Western strength must have been sufficient to preserve peace even at that period. The contention of the advocates of Western rearmament has always been that the Soviet forces were relatively so much stronger than those of the West that rearmament was essential. But, if that were so, and if the Soviet intentions were to attack the West, why did not the Moscow Government launch the attack while the West was so comparatively weak? Why wait until the West had grown strong? The argument appears to be self-contradictory.

The case of Yugoslavia is significant in this connexion. For a war-minded Power the motive for a military offensive either by the Red Army or by Bulgaria and Rumania could hardly have been greater. Yugoslavia, in Soviet eyes, had offended grievously against Cominform authority. Her defiance called out for rigorous punishment. Yet no military attack was

undertaken. Those who maintain that Russia was willing to use armed force to impose her will on other States can explain her inactivity on this occasion only by contending that her plans for invasion of Yugoslavia were abandoned because such action would have precipitated war with the West. But if this theory were correct, it would be further proof that Western strength, even at that stage, was considered sufficiently formidable to constitute a deterrent.

It is difficult, accordingly, to escape from the conclusion that the Soviet Union intended at no period to undertake a major offensive against the West, or a minor offensive which would involve the risk of precipitating a major war. And, even supposing we hold that morally the Soviet inclinations were and are warlike, that Soviet statesmen desire, like Hitler, to make a bid for world domination, we should have to recognise that a strong deterrent influence is the knowledge that a third world war would be an atomic war and that the consequences of such a war would be catastrophic both for victor and vanquished. Nor is this consideration weakened now that the Soviet Union possesses atomic weapons, including the hydrogen bomb. The only difference in the situation is that, in the event of a war with the West, Britain could be virtually annihilated and the United States seriously injured. But that would not prevent bombs falling on Soviet cities. The Moscow statesmen know full well that a third war, even if the Soviet forces were nominally victorious, would put back Soviet civilisation fifty or a hundred years. That is a price they are not prepared to pay.

Then why do they persist in cold-war tactics? The answer is that they distrust the West, that they regard Western civilisation as corrupt and doomed eventually to decay, and that they detest the capitalist system just as fully as Westerners distrust and detest Communism. But this mutual dislike need not make war inevitable. Indeed, the more Communists believe that Western civilisation will eventually collapse, the less inclined should they be to pay the price of going to war merely to hasten the process. If it is asked why they should fear a system which they believe to be doomed, the answer presumably is that they imagine a disintegrating West may

resort to dangerous violence in its death throes. On any Communist calculation America is powerful enough to constitute a formidable threat, certainly if she is ready to use her strength for violent ends.

Once we agree that Soviet hostility, as revealed in her cold-war tactics, is due mainly to justified or unjustified fear, we have reached a crucial conclusion. For we shall have thereby admitted that one, at least, of the main causes of the international unrest is psychological in nature. Certainly there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that this diagnosis is correct. The Soviet purges, the constant arrests of alleged spies, the attitude of perpetual suspicion of Western actions and intentions, are familiar symptoms of neurosis. Equally, the extreme forms of anti-Communist phobia, manifested not only in McCarthyist circles, are obviously the marks of psychological *malaise*. Pronounced anti-Communist campaigns in the West are curiously similar to the No-Popery movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.

What is then to be done if the present tensions are to be resolved or alleviated? To one moral we can immediately point. If fear is the main incentive in the Soviet attitude, the policy of 'getting tough' with Russia—a policy which the West has largely adopted hitherto—is from the purely psychological attitude the worst treatment which can be devised. If a patient is suffering from genuine fear, you do not cure his fears and establish a rational relationship with him by making him more afraid. You endeavour to show him patiently and persistently by your actions towards him that he has nothing to fear. We shall return to this consideration in a final paragraph.

There is one other psychological feature in the Soviet make-up which is perhaps too rarely taken into account. Russia has always suffered from a certain inferiority complex in her association with the Western Powers. She has been conscious, long before the Revolution, that the West regarded her as semi-barbaric, Asiatic rather than European and only half civilised. The more she feels that she is being treated by the West as an outcast, the more she will be actuated by a spirit of resentful enmity. One effect of an inferiority complex is to

throw up a defence mechanism: desperate efforts are made to establish a claim to equality. Some of the characteristics of Soviet policy and propaganda can be traced to that cause.

The moral of the Geneva Conference

But our main question still remains unanswered. Is there anything that the West can do to create more settled conditions in the world? Has Western policy as a whole proved to be the wisest means of meeting the Communist challenge, or is some change—drastic or partial—required in the interests of peace? This question inevitably invites us to consider whether the Soviet régime which came into being after the death of Stalin has to any extent altered the international situation. Western observers eagerly sought for signs that the new Moscow Government was likely to be more conciliatory in character. Have these hopes been to any extent realised, is there any break in the clouds, or do the prospects remain as sullen as they have appeared to be throughout the period with which this survey has been concerned?

We should be cautious when attempting to answer these questions. Any interpretation of the significance of current affairs, any calculations of the results likely to follow from contemporary events, are liable to be upset by unforeseen developments. Perhaps the surest indication of the intentions of the post-Stalin régime is to be found in the trend of recent Soviet economic policy. The conspicuous feature of that policy has been the increase in production of consumer goods and thus the raising of the standard of living throughout the Soviet Union. This suggests that the Soviet Government now considers itself able to afford a greater degree of consumer-goods production, and appreciates that in doing so it will ensure for itself a fuller measure of popular support. Economic and foreign policy are closely associated. We may therefore assume that Moscow was reckoning on a period of peaceful coexistence, a period in which the Soviet public would be free to enjoy a higher standard of living without the threat of war and the economic privations which war entails. But German rearmament may change Soviet plans.

The official Western view is that there can be coexistence—coexistence in spite of fear and distrust—but that it can only be preserved by maintaining Western armaments on a scale which will prevent Russia from resorting to war. Those who are convinced by this argument, however, must admit that armaments in themselves will not remove Soviet suspicions; on the contrary, they are likely to confirm those suspicions. Fear can only be removed by positive remedies, by a policy which shows that the West has no intention of attacking Russia or of 'liberating' those countries which are subject to Communist rule; and by a policy also which shows that the West is ready to assist native races to acquire their political independence and to improve their social and economic conditions.

It is worth noting that at the Geneva Conference in 1954, where France and Britain followed this line in regard to Indo-China, the Soviet attitude became more co-operative and cordial than at any previous postwar meeting. The Geneva Conference was probably the most significant event in international affairs which has taken place since the war. It was significant because on this occasion two leading Western States were willing to meet the representatives of Communist China on equal terms. It was significant also because France and Britain showed themselves ready to act independently of the United States and to disregard the discreetly veiled disapproval of the American Government. It was therefore inevitable that the Indo-China settlement should be greeted by many American critics as a triumph for Communist machinations and a defeat for France. But those who hold that opinion suggest thereby that they are identifying the French (and Western) cause with opposition to Asian demands. If the conclusion which we are advancing is justified, that is altogether a false attitude. A racial claim for freedom from European rule does not become wrong because it receives Communist support. The moral to be drawn is rather that France should have offered some such settlement long before that Communist support was forthcoming.

In contrast to Geneva, the Berlin Conference of 1954 led to no agreement. The Soviet Union was once again accused of

sheer obstruction. But here we must remember that the West was insisting on conditions which the Soviet Union, in its own interests, could under no circumstances have accepted. The Western claim was that West Germany must be rearmed and included in a Western military alliance; and that if a unified Germany was set up she must be free to join the Western military group. It is difficult to understand how anyone could imagine that Soviet acceptance of these terms could be secured. A rearmed Germany, and a rearmed Germany in military alliance with the West, is the greatest threat to the Soviet Union that could be devised. This proposal may also constitute a deadly threat to the West, for there can be no guarantee that German rearmament may not be accompanied by a 'Nationalist' revival which will imperil the West as well as the Soviet Union and its allies.

Can a peaceful settlement be reached?

The possibility that atomic energy will be used for destructive purposes is a horror which casts its shadow over the whole human race. All warfare is detrimental to human life and welfare, but it is the atomic bomb which is the most acute menace. If, in the event of a war between Russia and the West, an immediate atomic attack is the Western military plan, it is difficult to imagine a more disastrous course to adopt—certainly so far as Britain is concerned. Such an offensive would be launched mainly from British territory, Britain being the advance American air base. It is inconceivable that such an offensive, however massive, could entirely destroy the Soviet bases and prevent Soviet retaliation. Soviet retaliation would at once follow, and this counter-attack would be directed chiefly against the bases in Britain. The effect of hydrogen bombs dropped on this small and highly populated island is beyond dispute. Britain, by assenting to such a plan, would be signing her own death warrant.

There is but one conclusion to be drawn when we face up to these grim realities: a vast military rearmament programme offers no solution of the world problem. That problem will be solved only if the mutual fears of East and West can be removed.

We have indicated the direction which Western policy must take if an attempt is to be made to remove Soviet fears. In general this means an abandonment of the 'get tough' attitude on which the West has so largely relied in the past. This is a difficult but by no means impossible path for the West to take. It is a possible path, likely to lead eventually to the ends desired, inasmuch as Russia is compelled to recognise that atomic war would be a catastrophic disaster not only to the West but to herself. The objection which is raised against this course is that a co-operative and conciliatory policy on the part of the West would mean appeasement, with the dire consequences which appeasement implies. But the fallacy of this objection is the supposition that appeasement is the sole alternative to a policy of 'toughness.' This is a confusion, a poverty, of thought. Undoubtedly the West can demonstrate its desire to co-operate with Communist States without any sacrifice of principle or security.

Appeasement would certainly be a mistaken policy to apply, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. The Russians are hard bargainers and usually demand far more than they expect to get. Their reaction to the conciliatory attitude which the Americans were inclined to adopt before the end of the war—such as the withdrawal of American forces from Czechoslovakian and German territory so as to make way for Soviet occupation of these areas—did not produce any conciliatory response. It is easy to understand the irritation aroused in the minds of American and British statesmen by Soviet non-co-operation. But though the distinction between firmness and hostility is often difficult to observe, the distinction exists. An outstanding example of this distinction is afforded by Western policy at the time of the Berlin blockade. America and Britain did not indulge in warlike threats or resort to aggressive action; but they resolutely maintained their position by undertaking the famous air lift. The wisdom of this course was proved by its results. The Soviet Union was compelled eventually to give way.

Obviously no permanent settlement can be reached until the Communist States are willing to respond amicably to any

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endeavours to build up friendly relations and to remove existing fears. Their response may be slow and hesitant. The poison of distrust has infected the hearts of both East and West too deeply to be susceptible to any rapid cure. Real peace is likely to be attained only by a gradual process. But real peace is worth a great price—certainly the price of patience. It is only by tireless effort, by a willingness to understand each other's standpoint, and by mutual recognition that the blame for the cold war is not to be attributed entirely to the faults of one side, that the nations will learn how to lay the foundations of a saner world. There is no other way.

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